"The programme for government in June 2020 made it clear that any commission would not critically examine Ireland’s ambiguous policy of non-membership of military alliances or neutrality so that is firmly off the table for discussion by the group." #CoDFrte.ie/brainstorm/202…
"By international standards, the levels of equipment and modernisation of the Irish Defence Forces are below international norms. The Irish air corps have no radar system to monitor Irish airspace and no fast aircraft to police it (for example, both Finland and Uruguay do).."
"The Irish navy have no guided missiles, torpedoes or ... sophisticated ship protection systems, but instead are austerely equipped as a coastguard. The Irish army have no tanks, a small number of lightly armed and protected vehicles, and an ageing collection of artillery pieces"
"It will be fascinating to see what observations the very senior foreign military experts on the Commission will make ... they may be in for a shock at how limited the basic Irish Defence Force is compared with their own home countries."
"Ireland is at least as well off as Finland, New Zealand or Austria and yet Ireland’s military balance sheet appears much more limited than those countries. Plainly speaking, Ireland’s Defence Forces have been allowed decline when compared with improvements in other small states"
"Yet the core limitation of any commission remains that it is only as good as its recommendations are acted upon. ... While the Commission will report within 12 months, real change may be longer in coming, especially if legislative change of the Defence Acts is required.."
"It is just possible that a window of opportunity exists to reboot Ireland defence forces or at the very least, to redress some of the problems arising from years of neglect."
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Regarding the controversial "Zima-20" ("Winter-20") Polish command staff war-gaming exercises that allegedly resulted in a simulated defeat of Polish Armed Forces in 5 days: Lot of folks focussing on mass (opposing force, OPFOR) but overlooking kinetics (reaction rates). 1/
Russia has intrinsic element of surprise. Assuming that a) NATO intel (remote sensing, SIGINT etc) has picked up on a degree of preparations; b) some degree of Russian field exerices are planned as cover; and c) Poland-NATO/US alert level is raised a notch. 2/
Nevertheless, a sudden switch to offensive mode will be a shock. Institutional inertia both in Poland and across NATO gives Russia a vital 96-hour (4 days) window to cross the border and seize/hold strategic locations & overwhelm defensive units before they can be reinforced. 3/
Some further information regarding the "Zima-20" ("Winter-20") command staff exercises, which allegedly resulted in a defeat for Polish forces during a simulated (war-gamed) Russian attack 1/
The official website of the President of Poland (27 Jan) states that 'Several thousand officers participated in the exercise "ZIMA-20", whose scenarios and details are secret, as well as political factors.' translate.google.com/translate?sl=p…
The military exercises "Winter-20" ended in disaster and a complete disaster. The simulation showed that after five days the war was lost and the Polish army ceased to exist, Interia informs. 2/
The simulations took into account new weapons systems ordered by Poland - although not yet delivered
The fierce defense of the east of Poland resulted in the destruction of the units there and huge losses 3/
What about the law of unintended consequences, black swan events and deep unertainty?
1. Controlled (forced?) migration ("retreat") from rural areas to megacities is likely to create numerous conflicts. In many senses it already is.
2/
2. Nuclear energy use may be relatively "safe" but what about nuclear waste and nuclear proliferation risks?
3. Geoengineering solutions, such as pumping sulphur dioxide into the stratosphere, are by definition large-scale, with no emergency 'exit' option or 'reverse gear'.
3/