Regarding the controversial "Zima-20" ("Winter-20") Polish command staff war-gaming exercises that allegedly resulted in a simulated defeat of Polish Armed Forces in 5 days: Lot of folks focussing on mass (opposing force, OPFOR) but overlooking kinetics (reaction rates). 1/ 
Russia has intrinsic element of surprise. Assuming that a) NATO intel (remote sensing, SIGINT etc) has picked up on a degree of preparations; b) some degree of Russian field exerices are planned as cover; and c) Poland-NATO/US alert level is raised a notch. 2/
Nevertheless, a sudden switch to offensive mode will be a shock. Institutional inertia both in Poland and across NATO gives Russia a vital 96-hour (4 days) window to cross the border and seize/hold strategic locations & overwhelm defensive units before they can be reinforced. 3/
There is a NATO enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) Battle Group in Poland. But that requires political clearance to support Polish defenders and engage Russian forces. Poland would invoke NATO treaty Article 5 collective defence. But political decisions could take days or weeks. 4/
Regardless of the units involved, their combat strengths and different states of readiness, Russian forces would have surprise & momentum. Polish/NATO forces would have inertia & delays in political decision-making, constraining reaction times & degrees of freedom to operate. 5/
Any hypothetical Russian offensive against Poland must factor in the Baltic States, Kaliningrad, Belarus, Article 5 and support via Germany, Czechia, Slovakia etc. However, NATO response calculus assumes "30 battalions, 30 days". By which time, eastern Poland is occupied. 6/
So many variables. So many risks (to Russia). Russia could expect to occupy territory with a hostile Polish population, requiring large numbers of Russian National Guard troops to suppress resistance. Would it be worth it? The Baltic States or Ukraine maybe (⬆️ probability). 7/
I haven't even mentioned two crucial factors: 1) the inevitable air war (top cover) involving fighters, bombers, UAS and air defence systems on both sides; and .. 8/
.. 2) the threat of "de-escalation" or Russia's doctrine of resorting to a limited nuclear strike against opposing forces using tactical (battlefield) systems such as Iskander-M or air-launched cruise missiles - to be used if Russian forces start to lose on the battlefield. 9/
I assume "several thousand" Polish officers involved in the weeks of "Zima-20" exercises factored in "de-escalation"? Because if Russia ever did invade Poland (or Baltic States) it would be under a "nuclear umbrella" threat. How would NATO/US/EU politicians cope with that? 10/
👆 This is one train of thought. In conclusion: defence planning must consider all possibilities and assign probabilities. "Zima-20" has done both Poland and NATO a favour. The loss of Georgian (2008) and Ukrainian (2014) territories shows that Russia means business. End/
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