Jay Powell cited an unemployment rate of 10% adjusted for participation. Willie Powell & I have been using 8.3% as the "realistic unemployment rate". Both are correct, both are useful, I won't be offended if you use his instead of mind, but a technical note on the differences.
The labor force participation rate has fallen from 63.3% in February 2020 to 61.4% in January 2021 as 4.3m people gave up looking for work. Powell's stat is that all 4.3m had not given up but were instead classified as unemployed then the unemployment rate would be 10% now.
The participation rate always falls in recessions so the Powell stat is a great way to capture just how terrible the current labor market is.
The downside of the Powell stat is that you cannot (or at least should not) compare it to historical unemployment rates.
For example, the official unemployment rate reached 10% in 1982 and 2009. But using the Powell adjustment unemployment rates would have been higher then because participation rate went down then too.
Willie & I ask a slightly different question--what would the unemployment rate adjusted for the unusual above normal withdrawal from the labor force. Based on the historic pattern, would have been 2.5m more people in the labor force and UR of 8.3%. piie.com/blogs/realtime…
Our concept has the advantage of being comparable to past unemployment rates like the 10% in 1982 and 2009. It is not a measure that by construction is always higher than the official rate, it is only higher now because of the surprisingly large withdrawal from the labor force.
But our concept has three disadvantages: (1) it is less vivid in capturing the current experience (people who left the labor force don't care whether they left more or less than people did in the past, they still left); (2) it is harder to calculate; and (3) I'm not Jay Powell.
I've gotten questions about whether to emphasize U-6 as the "true unemployment rate". It is currently 11.1%.
I don't because I think the concept doesn't add much, it misses how unusually bad the labor market is now, is analytically flawed, and can be misleading.
Thread:
The official unemployment rate is 6.3%. It is unemployed (people looking for work) divided by the labor force (working or looking for work).
U-6 is 11.1%, it adds in "marginally attached" (discouraged workers & would take a job if it came along) and involuntary part-time.
DOESN'T ADD MUCH. U-6 is one of several alternative unemployment concepts produced monthly by the BLS. They are all useful to look at. But they also all pretty much up and down together so they rarely tell much of a different story.
The new @USCBO report confirms that we have substantial fiscal space, in fact more than we've generally had in the past. This is even true if the American Rescue Plan passes in full.
Critical to this is low interest rates mean low debt service.
CBO projects higher debt/GDP than it did pre-pandemic. But even this projection is not "spiraling" within the budget window but a relatively gradual increase.
More importantly, debt/GDP is a bad metric to look at as I've explained before.
CBO has lowered its interest rate forecast more than it raised its debt forecast. So real debt service as a share of GDP is lower than what we expected pre-crisis. This is even true with the American Rescue Plan (and assuming it raises interest rates).
I thought I would engage with this criticism of my suggestion that the UI/week bump be phased down to $100 or $200/week by late summer/early fall even if I don't love the way this person phrased their disagreement.
--The UI bump is currently slated to be $0 then for late summer/early fall.
--The House Dem proposal calls for reducing the bump to $0 in September.
--IF we had adopted triggers the bump would likely have been well below this by then.
Second, my argument was about supply not demand. To have this much demand and not have overheating we need millions of people getting back into jobs. I believe that can happen. But I also want to give it every chance possible and this policy would be consistent with it.
@chrislhayes raised a question about "overheating" from a thread I did. I want to answer him in a thread with general conceptual points & their current application.
Short version: if there is no risk of overheating we are doing too little.
The chance of overheating with this package is not 0% and not 100%.
Overheating is not costless.
The right sized and designed package should balance the costs/probability of costs against the benefits/probability of benefits.
Framed differently we recognize this when we say "it is better to err on the side of too much instead of too little." That sentence acknowledges the possibility of errors in both directions.
(MMT also says the limiting principle for fiscal policy should be inflation.)
You should never update your beliefs too much based on any one paper. And evidence from 1950-2019 might be more relevant in thinking about July/Aug/Sep 2021 than evidence from 2020 (points @Claudia_Sahm has made in a different context).
If I was updating would say:
Given the excess saving, the larger bank balances that @ProfFionasm and team have documented elsewhere, the $2,000 checks, the unemployed would have pre-pandemic consumption levels even with less than $400/week. jpmorganchase.com/institute/rese…