I think what this shows is a different regulatory mindset.. the German and French regulators wanted unequivocal proof AZ worked well enough in older age groups before they authorised it..
the MHRA adopted a more speculative approach and looked at the balance of risks.. was it reasonable based on the evidence they had to assume efficacy in older age groups.. they concluded as JVT said yesterday that it was...
they could also weigh that against the costs of regulator hesitancy .. far fewer people would be vaccinated if they delayed authorisation of AZ ... and good sruveillance meant that they could pick up if their assumption was confounded..
ditto with the decision on the delayed second dose approach.. they assumed that given the very high levels of infection in the UK some protection for more people was to be preferred to more (potential) protection for some.. again monitoring. v important..
but Germany and France have undermined their messaging by a game of Chinese whispers which has converted a message of not yet proven to be effective (fair at the time) to ineffective/ dubious effectiveness.. that gives a lot of ground to recover ..
esp when set against the background of unused stockpiles and criticism for low vaccination rates.. interesting to see the extent to which they can convince people the AZ vaccine is OK...
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we have got a new @UKandEU set of #Brexitwitnessarchive interviews out this week - and on Wednesday our very own @hayward_katy is on a panel @instituteforgov talking about the Johnson NI protocol. so let's see how we got there... THREAD!!!!
all the Cabinet members we talked about agreed on the importance for May of not destablising Northern ireland - and her gradual realisation of the threat Brexit posed - this from @DLidington
and as he reminds us there was a pretty unbalanced view from Parliament in 2017-19 with the wipe-out of the SDLP and Sinn Fein abstentionism
.@UKandEU have just released a next wave of our #BrexitWitnessArchive - not as box office as Philip Hammond but intriguing nonetheless. a few tasters. Let me start with @GavinBarwell
That leadership contest did Theresa May no favours on Brexit. No chance to put some flesh on what her - rather than a purist Leadsom Brexit might look like
After the election, Barwell was tapped up to become Chief of Staff. Here are his tips on how to establish a connection with a notoriously buttoned up boss
we talk a lot about optimism bias as a reason govt projects go wrong-- assuming things can be delivered too quickly and at lower cost than it usually turns out .. @instituteforgov and @NAOorguk both have written on this
and optimism - and making people feel optimistic is a huge asset in politics.. whether its Boris boosterism, Obama hope/change or a Blairite new dawn
But optimism seems to have been the curse of UK politics in the past decade.. first David Cameron's assumption he could wing - and win - a referendum because guys like him just always wing and win... #effortlesssuperiority
Northcote-Trevelyan was a long time ago and things have moved on.. Rigour has been watered down - no technical assessments before promotions leads to lack of commercial skills.. but gaps in data - contract overruns
obsession with policy as theory not as impact on people.. but implementers rarely in room when policy made - but impact on the most dependent.. diversity of georgraphy and cognition needed (don't think anyone will challenge this motherhoody list)
Big message is that-as Gove points out - there is much less difference between deal/no deal than last year - or than there would have (probably) been with a deal May negotiated "Canada and Australia are similar but not identical"
But the problem with an acrimonious no deal (and could it really be anything else since govt upped the ante with #IMbill) is that it reduces likelihood of EU making life easier for UK through unilateral measures