No cause of outage information included though, so still requires some real guess-work as to what went wrong.
Focus on ~12:00am-2:00am February 15th period. That's when mass generator outages sent the Texas grid dangerously close to full system blackout. ercot.com/content/wcm/ke…
Like, what the heck was going on here with all of these natural gas plants failing over the course of two hours? Many correlated failures at multiple plants at about the same times (12:23-12:27am; 1:00am; 1:23-1:35am).
ERCOT focused in this deck ercot.com/content/wcm/ke… on 2/15 1:23-2:00am, which almost brought down the entire system as frequency plunged. But ~11:45pm 2/14 to 1:00am 2/15 also saw 3.1 GW in gas plant derates/outages, which depleted system reserves & set up the crisis period. Why?
This smells to me like network failures: gas pipeline pressure drops and/or transmission outages. Some wind also went down at same times, so that could mean transmission lines? I cant imagine such rapid correlated outages due to freeze-ups at different locations at same time.
@ERCOT_ISO really needs to release information on the CAUSES of these outages. That's what the public and policy makers need to know so we understand what failed and why, and what to do about it.
Low frequency could also cause multiple generators to disconnect, but that's more likely during the ~1:30am period when frequency was very low.
Were their local frequency/voltage deviations that caused generators to trip during the ~12:00-1:00am period too?
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Since rebound effects came up in my Voltscast chat w/ @drvolts' intro, a new paper by @steve_r_sorrell is timely! carbonbrief.org/guest-post-why…
"economy-wide impact of these effects and find they may erode more than half of the potential energy savings from improved energy efficiency."
Rebound effects describes phenomena where energy efficiency makes energy services (lighting, heating, industrial process) cheaper, inducing greater demand for those services (direct rebound), spending of savings on other energy using activities (indirect) + macroeconomic effects
The outages reported for wind in this report are based on reductions from the "Seasonal Max MW," which is the maxim rated capacity of the wind farm in the winter. But ERCOT wisely does NOT count on wind farms to produce 100% of their output (the wind is inconstant. Duh).
As the Winter "Seasonal Assessment of Resource Adequacy for the ERCOT Region" report details, ERCOT 'de-rates' wind during winter peak load events to account for its variability. The derate differs for wind in different regions, but the average derate is ~25% of the max capacity.
Wow, this graphic from a new @ERCOT_ISO report on the #TexasBlackouts shows how close the ERCOT grid was to a cascading failure that could have easily blacked out the whole system. ercot.com/content/wcm/ke… 1/
Going into the night of Valentine's Day, February 14th, a new winter peak demand of 69,222 MW was set at 7:06pm. By 1:23am in the middle of the night on February 15th, frigid temps had left more than 35,000 MW of generating capacity offline. 2/
Faced with greater demand & diminished generation capacity, ERCOT, the grid operator, ordered transmission utilities to start disconnecting millions of customers. The initial order was to shed 10,500 MW of demand. This grew to a height of 20,000 MW by the end of Feb 15th. 3/
A good look at the variability of wind and solar resources in Texas, from @VibrantCE. They show that wind power can exhibit significant inter-annual variability, and some extreme years exhibit winter months with near-zero output from wind. This is rare, but happens.
Solar exhibits less interannual & monthly/weekly variation than wind, but there is, of course, this thing called night. That said, batteries + solar can mitigate diurnal cycles well. So solar+storage can be counted on a bit more than wind it seems, with higher capacity value.
This variability needs to be accounted for in resource adequacy planning, including the potential for correlated extreme low wind events during periods of system stress.
Today's @nytimes editorial cites and echoes my recent op ed on what went wrong in Texas and what it means for building a cleaner & more resilient energy system.
For more on what went wrong in Texas, see my op ed in the @nytimes here
For a forward looking view on how to ensure adequate firm resources in a clean electricity system, my seminar on The Critical Role of Clean Firm Resources here:
Finally, check out this week's issue of @TheEconomist, which has a cover story building on the @Princeton Net-Zero America study about how the United States can regain it's leadership on #ClimateAction and build a clean energy economy
It takes a lot of gall -- or deliberate ignorance -- to see widespread failures of gas wells, pipelines, & power plants resulting in days-long loss of ~28,000 MW of thermal power plants, mostly gas, and say, "this proves we need more gas and coal plants!"
Some facts on the #TexasBlackouts for @KimStrassel and others peddling false narratives that do nothing but mislead and distract from the key steps Texans need to take.
2. "nearly half of the state’s natural gas production has screeched to a halt due to the extremely low temperatures, while freezing components at natural gas-fired power plants have forced some operators to shut down."