THREAD The West's relationship with Russia is broken. Its Russia policy is, too. How can the Biden administration build a more effective--and sustainable--approach for dealing with an increasingly adversarial Russia? carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/09/bac… 1/
I argue that a “back to basics” approach is the best option for the US/EU to address the damage stemming from 4 years of Trump’s madcap handling of Russia and ever more disruptive moves by the Kremlin in a new paper co-written with Eugene Rumer 2/
To succeed, leaders on both sides of the Atlantic will need to make some compromises (not least because their perceptions of Russia will never align 100%) while making sure Moscow is unable to drive wedges between the US and EU. 3/
On sanctions, a more streamlined approach is needed along with a renewed focus on efficacy. The existing program has grown too diffuse. Sanctions need to do more than tie the hands of a (now former) reckless US president or signal we're mad as hell over Russia's misdeeds 4/
The US/EU should not shy away from using precisely targeted sanctions against Russian officials and private individuals, as well as their family members and associates, who have been implicated in corrupt activities, rogue state behavior, and domestic political oppression. 5/
Those who subvert the rule of law and human rights in Russia and abroad should not be able to enjoy the benefits of free and law-abiding societies. (pic: @SergeyPonomarev) 6/
NATO-based military deterrence must remain credible and well-communicated. At the same time, NATO can afford to take a 2-track approach: leaving the door open on issues like arms control/CBMs/etc while making clear Russian provocations are unacceptable. 7/
The US and its allies need to reprioritize #Ukraine, ending 4 years of malign neglect under Trump. Overcoming Russian footdragging (and worse) on Donbas will be a tall order. But it will only happen thru closer US/EU coordination, plus efforts to energize UKR domestic reforms 8/
We also see scope to explore cooperation w Moscow on a handful of areas (eg resumed Iranian compliance with JCPOA, climate change). But don’t expect any breakthroughs let alone positive spillover to other areas of the relationship or types of problematic Kremlin behavior. 9/
Finally, the Kremlin’s relentless mistreatment of Navalny and the rise of a new street protest movement have put Russian domestic politics and human rights issues squarely back on the transatlantic agenda. 10/
The US and Europe should be braced for a challenging assault on civil society/human rights inside Russia that could endure for many years. It will likely remain a source of fundamental disagreement, just as it was in Soviet times. 11/
Question: am I correct that @JosepBorrellF's briefing this week was the first time the EU has formally said that containment is one of the main goals of its Russia policy? That word drives the Kremlin crazy.
Putin's comments in a speech at FSB today are a case in point 1/
Putin speech earlier today: "We are confronting a policy of containment of Russia. We're talking about an aggressive policy aimed at slowing our [economic] development, creating problems along our borders & provoking internal instability..." 2/
Putin (cont'd): "In the end, it's aimed at weakening Russia and subjugating us [once again] to the control of foreign powers." 3/
What does the Kremlin think #Navalny's weak points are and how does that inform its current pressure campaign? Fascinating piece by @baunov. Quick thread 1/ carnegie.ru/commentary/838…
Baunov points out the effectiveness of the Kremlin's ongoing effort to disparage Navalny as a tool of Western intelligence services bent on provoking a street revolution. "This [claim] may sound preposterous, but it will resonate with certain segments of the public." 2/
Well-publicized state-sponsored violence and forced video confessions may shock people in the West, but they're also a deliberate attempt to make Russians think twice about the higher cost the regime will make them to pay for engaging in unsanctioned political activity. 3/
Don't let the hoopla over first Biden-Putin phone call overshadow the fact that White House is underlining the fact of Russian interference in the 2020 presidential election (not/not 2016) 1/ whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/…
The Kremlin, relying on a network led by a known Russian intelligence agent named Andrii Derkach, successfully mounted an influence operation to tilt the outcome of the election by spreading false information about @JoeBiden and his family. 2/
That operation (outlined here: home.treasury.gov/news/press-rel…) didn't rely on the sexy online and social media tools seen in 2016 but it successfully ensnared Donald Trump, @RudyGiuliani, @DonaldJTrumpJr, and many parts of the pro-GOP media apparatus. 3/
How were the #Navalny demonstrations across Russia on Saturday different from past waves of mass protest? @Baunov breaks it down and challenges some of the wishful thinking that is now in circulation.
For example: @Baunov says the protest was less about supporting Navalny personally and more about public anger "about the Kremlin's lawlessness and the usurpation of power of allowing President Vladimir Putin to effectively remain in the job for life"
The make-up of the demonstrations is also important: "the most militant protesters didn’t look like the typical supporters of pro-democracy protests...[they mostly] work in the service sector or office jobs and are [people] dissatisfied with their jobs, salaries, and prospects"
Are we listening enough to average Russians? Nope! Thread on @CarnegieRussia-@levada_ru focus groups on political change, enduring appeal of paternalism, "strong hand," govt control over economy, wealth redistribution 1/ carnegie.ru/2021/01/14/how… @AndrKolesnikov/D.Volkov/A.Levinson
Anger over official corruption was a constant theme. But not necessarily in the way you'd expect -- eg the desire for Chinese-style solutions and "Stalinist methods" among tradition-minded participants. 2/
These folks support Putin's foreign policy, no questions asked. But they want the government to pivot to addressing domestic ills laid bare by the pandemic. 3/
1/ Surely a coincidence that Putin is asked at the 22:30 mark of today’s interview whether the US election result is actually legitimate.
2/ “The legitimacy or illegitimacy of the authorities is first of all up to the Americans themselves”
3/ “[The legitimacy] of the election is an extremely important thing because upon that depends the trust of the people on both sides [of political system] toward their leadership.”