So, it's Friday and the sandcastle guy is gonna talk about aircraft carriers again.
I thought it would be worth it, in the general context of the recent rumors surrounding the QE Programme, the upcoming Defence White Paper and various social media reactions to the above./1
I hope that the last several years spent outlining why these ships, and other aircraft carriers, are the way they have percolated through to my audience.
That said, there are still a great many people who seem convinced that the whole programme is a delusional nonsense./2
Clearly, if you've followed me for any length of time then you'll know that I disagree with that view. Having studied the subject for a good while I have come to the conclusion that aircraft carrying warships remain very useful implements for defence and wider UK state policy./3
Discussions in the wider social media arena around the ships' air group appear to be operating under the assumption that the QEC were intended to operate with their flight deck looking something like this./4
It seems as if we need to have a discussion about what CV decks actually look like under real world operational conditions, as well as what the constraints on the number of aircraft you'd want to embark for live operations are.
Operational flight decks don't look like this:
/5
Aircraft carriers, fundamentally, have two places they can put their aircraft. In the hangar, or on the deck - in the various zones that make up the "deck park"./6
In order to move aircraft from the hangar to the deck, and vice versa, you have deck elevators. The QE Class have two elevators (able to move 2 F-35s at a time) on their Starboard side. The previous generation of light carriers had two much smaller elevators on the centreline./7
The QE's hangar can, when fully loaded, accommodate about 24 F-35B sized aircraft. Obvservent readers may notice that the hangar pictured below is beginning to look rather cramped./8
In order to move aircraft around the ship, to get them to where they're needed, you have teams of aircraft handlers and aircraft towing tractors. When on deck aircraft can also be moved between certain positions under their own power./9
This is where we return to the issues with that very full, cramped, hangar. Once you embark enough aircraft, where they're put starts to become very important indeed. It becomes a giant puzzle of aircraft movements.
e.g. How many would need to move to get this jet on deck?/10
This is where deck efficiency and intended air group sizes come in.
The QE Carriers are perfectly capable of embarking in the region of seventy F-35B sized aircraft. However, as we may realise if we've been paying attention this is a very bad idea./11
Jamming the deck and hangar with so many aircraft means that you reduce the number of free spots you can use to shuffle aircraft around. The puzzle becomes exponentially harder. You need to use ever more moves in order to get things where you want them./12
This is bad for a couple of reasons. Firstly, because it takes time and degrades how quickly your ship can launch and recover, fuel, arm and strike aircraft down into the hangar. Your sortie rate, the number of aircraft that go out and come back in a set period, is degraded./13
The other reason is that you need people and kit, in the form of aircraft handlers and tractors, to perform all these additional movements. Every carrier only has a finite number of these. The more jammed your aviation spaces are, the more movers you'll need./14
As such, the QE Class were designed to operate up to around 40 aircraft *efficiently*, including helicopters. Because the ships are large it allows them to use their avaition spaces more efficiently, because there's supposed to be a bit of "spare room"./15
For those complaining that the QEs will rarely be sailing about with 36 jets and 4 Merlin CROWSNEST helicopters embarked I would like to highlight that this is more or less the QEC's 'maximum strike configuration', which would involve significant deck parking./16
If you've been at sea around the UK you might understand that the Royal Navy's usual stomping ground for training and NATO activities can be "a little unpleasant" in terms of the elements at times. Do we *really* want a dozen F-35s sat on deck in this all that often?/17
It's no secret that the size of the QEs also allows them a little more freedom to operate in heavy weather conditions, providing a more stable platform than smaller avition ships. You wouldn't want to have to try and land on a ship doing this, for example./18
It's also been a rather trendy take to solely focus on the number of F-35s in the air group, when the ~40 efficient maximum total always included helicopters (There were still a number of Merlins included in the maximum strike oriented package)./19
The air group's rotary component is far from a vestigial addition, or 'simply there to make up the numbers'. Merlin Mk.2 and Wildcat perform a critical functions as the Carrier's extended anti-submarine protection. Merlin CROWSNEST acts as its persistent early warning sensor./20
The Merlin Mk.4 is present in the group as its Maritime Intra-Theater Lift (MITL) asset, which is otherwise known as 'Carrier Onboard Delivery'. Moving critical stores over long distances from shore - ship and vice versa, as well as transporting personnel or troops./21
While the group's helicopters have the advantage of being able to disperse amongst the carrier group's other units - frigates, destroyers and fleet auxiliaries - the best place to do intensive maintainance or repairs will likely remain the carrier./22
The reasons why the Royal Navy opted for a medium-sized aircraft carrier design of 65,000 tonnes are, in my view, rooted in its extensive experience of operating smaller aviation ships over a period of more than thirty years./23
The aforementioned issues with deck efficiency, notional maximum air group sizes versus what was actually possible under real world conditions meant that small carriers usually underperformed in relation to contemporary medium designs compared with the investment./24
The impression that UK policymakers went a bit crazy and built a US-style carrier that we could never afford to put any aircraft on is wrong. QE is not a Nimitz/Ford, she was never intended or designed to be that and isn't bad because of it./25
I think I'll round out here by saying that, overall, the UK continues on the path towards a very tidy, and sensible, aircraft carrier capability for a country in its position. The QE programme has produced an efficient medium aircraft carrier design./26
While it's being brought into service with a baseline level of capability this will, in all likelihood, continue to develop and change to best suit the needs of defence over time. As all UK carriers have through their service lives./27
Engaging Strategy, Out.
Also, because it's my thread and I can do what I want.
This is not where you put deck elevators.
Engaging Strategy, Over and Out.
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Right, it's THREAD time on the Royal Marines' Future Commando Force, amphibious shipping, budgets and options.
I'll preface everything I say here with a couple of caveats. This is very much a 'first contact' impression and some somewhat rough thoughts, I'm not possessed of all the facts & amphibious warfare practitioners within the RN & RM who do have them are free to correct any mistakes
Second, this isn't a forensic analysis of the budget (although direction of travel and some options will be discussed) and as such any proposed structures and concepts may be taken with a grain of salt.
Frigates, Destroyers and some cool graphics explaining why the recent "15 RN escorts" stories in the newspapers aren't telling the whole story in some rather important ways.
First of all here's the key for these graphics.
Blue = In the water, avalable for tasking (including working up and training).
Black = In refit, out of the water and not available for tasking.
Grey = Laid up without a full crew (including units allocated for Harbour Training).
Orange ships are those which have received significant power and propulsion upgrades. These include the Type 45 PIP and Type 23 PGMU upgrades.
The numbers at the top and bottom represent the number of escorts and OPVs in the water & crewed. i.e. the number of blue/orange ships.
A hackneyed opening that dismisses carriers as "vulnerable white elephants" after zero engagement with the very live debate around their modern utility.
"Originally scheduled for 2012"
Yes, that rather inconvenient recession got in the way.
Presumably other maritime capabilities, such as the UK's existing amphibious shipping, nuclear deterrent and mine warfare forces do not require protecting with big expensive surface escorts.
As for the "only strategic purpose" line, flippant and laughably wrong.
THREAD:
If you've ever taken any one of a number of ferries from Portsmouth International Port that shuttle back and forth to the continent you may have looked out and seen a rather sad-looking hulk. Stripped of her weapons and radars, she sits quietly alongside Whale Island.
/1
You may even have taken a moment to wonder what that funny looking grey ship was, how did she get there and why?
This is the story of HMS Bristol, monument to a fleet that never was, one of the last testaments to the "white heat" of a promised technological revolution.
/2
Our story begins on a cool, clear day in June 1953. Amidst the pomp and circumstance of the coronation of a new Queen the Royal Navy had, as it had for centuries, turned out in all its finery with over 300 ships for a grand fleet review at Spithead in the Solent.
/3
Our first metric, and most basic starting point, is a flat comparison of the number of ships and submarines of various types in-service with the four navies.
From this we can see a pretty clear hierarchy with the Russians leading by a substantial margin in 4 of the 6 fields.
However, anyone looking carefully should pretty rapidly see the shortfalls of this metric.
For example, in the 'patrol vessels' category a 30 ton patrol boat and a 2,000 ton OPV both count as 1.
Back due to popular demand, a long-form THREAD on the story of aircraft carriers and the Indian Navy.
The Indian Navy's carrier story reaches back to before the creation of the modern Indian Navy, into the period immediately after partition. While the Raj was dissolved in 1947 it took almost a decade for the British-led Royal Indian Navy to transition into an Indian-led service.
From independence until 1958 the post of Commander in Chief of the Royal Indian Navy &, after 1950, the Chief of the Naval Staff of the Indian Navy was held by a series of British officers:
R.Adm John Talbot Hall
V.Adm William Parry
Adm Charles Pizzey
V.Adm Stephen Hope Carlill