Thinking again about the UK's European policy and why it doesn't work
tl;dr EU doesn't think UK has a credible alternative to making things work in long-run
1/
To recap, since Johnson's entry to No.10, UK has not only picked at the scabs of the Brexit process, but has actively sought out points of conflict and tension
IMB; non-implementation; unilateral delays; EU Ambo status; EU office in NI; etc; etc
2/
Today's announcement about EU starting dispute proceedings against UK is unsurprising, in the context, and much more likely to result in UK giving way than the EU
3/
And this has been the pattern: UK action, followed by more UK action to back-peddle
Hasn't been a single case where UK has successfully forced EU to accept new situation
[last week's extension of non-enforcements was not w/in WA/TCA framework BTW:
We'll park the 'why?' of British policy elsewhere: maybe it's a way to keep the EU as a scapegoat (@rafaelbehr), or because UK hasn't realised it's a 3rd country (@APHClarkson)
But let's focus on the 'how?' for now
5/
As I discussed a couple of years ago, UK isn't able to do a convincing 'madman' approach to the EU
From EU's perspective, UK has signed up to 2 legally-binding treaties that underpin current relationship, plus UK has host of other international treaty obligations (e.g. WTO, GFA, etc.), plus it's economically exposed to EU
9/
If UK doesn't seem to have a credible alternative to its situation, then that implies it needs to live with its situation, which EU will take as a powerful corrective/constraint on UK action
10/
Yes, long-term economic entanglement can be reduced, and UK trade redirected, but not in any hurry
But geopolitical situation is pretty permanent (even an improving Russia would be offset by waning US interest in region)
And as for undermining international treaties?
11/
However, none of this changes that UK is continuing on this course, despite evident costs to international credibility, business certainty and anything in coming period that UK might need EU help with
12/
EU will continue to use the tools it has to hand to protect the treaties it holds with UK and UK is likely to find those tools force it either to retreat to status quo ante or to escalate further (despite all the things we've just discussed)
13/
If you're looking for a way out of this, then there are only two that look vaguely likely
1) Johnson changes approach (because it's too costly) 2) you get a new administration in No.10 (again, to change UK approach)
Neither look as if they're on the cards right now
14/
In sum, we've got a lot more of this
And longer it goes on, harder it will be to rebuild a stable relationship (of any kind) with EU
/end
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To recap: at one level, EU can feel it's done a stand-up job with Brexit
- protected members' interests
- didn't have to compromise on red lines
- secured legally-binding commitments from UK
- UK keeps having to come back to those commitments
2/
In large part, this comes from dominant position that EU holds, as larger party in process
Yes, UK has significant capacities, but can't escape econ/pol/geopol weight of EU system
3/
How does yesterday's UK announcement to unilateral extend grace periods compare to previous challenges to WA/TCA?
1/
Well, like IMB and COM's mention of Art.16, this has not yet come into effect, so it's still more potential than actual
However
2/
COM was looking to use a power it actually held under Art.16 (albeit not following proper procedure and with poor political judgement about acceptability)
UK in both IMB and now is seeking to overturn legal obligations under the treaties
3/
A reminder: TCA itself only has provisional application lasting to end Feb, unless either full ratification completed, or mutual agreement to extend in Partnership Council
UK has completed its arm of ratification, while EU accepted EP needed more time to look at it all properly, before giving its formal approval
Basic problem with Gove's letter to Šefčovič is not the identification of issues, but the connection of these with failure of Protocol (thus necessitating possible use of Art.16)
So, now we've all slept on it, a possibly less hot take
AZ/Art.16 mess highlights importance of UK being closely across EU/COM activity, because it will affect UK and there's no one permanently in place to look after UK interests
1/
UK is now a third country and so will always come after member states in political calculations.
Fortunate to have IE looking after Protocol, and Barnier to still be around, to unpick the situation last night, but might not apply to other situations
2/
Thus UK needs to maintain working links with all parts of COM to head off issues and make sure there's someone to phone if it does go wrong
3/