2/ "Lagged corporate credit spreads have no predictive power for default rates. Results support the view that the spreads are driven by factors like illiquidity."
The authors focus on cap-weighted default rates, which may cause their results to differ from other authors'.
3/ "The latter part of the 19th Century was a period in which massive investment in a number of exciting new technologies (railroads, electricity, etc.) was financed heavily by debt. These technology booms were then followed by waves of financial crises and bond defaults."
4/ "Default rates during the 1873-1875 period (worst 3-year period of the Great Depression) totaled 35.90% (12.88%).
"Default cycles are more persistent than recessions: the average duration of a recession (default cycle) during the sample period is about 1.5 years (3.2 years)."
5/ "The Great Depression was not the worst credit event experienced in the corporate bond market.
"Business cycles and credit cycles are only moderately correlated. The simple correlation between the annual dummy variables for business cycles and default cycles is only 0.263."
6/ "Because government bonds were distorted by gold premiums and liquidity issues, we use the yields on high-grade New England municipal bonds (1866−1914) and the yield for the high-grade Bond Buyer municipal bond index (1915−1918) as proxies for the riskless government yield."
7/ "The stock return and variance of the stock return have significant effects on the default rate.
"In contrast, neither the lagged corporate credit spreads nor the NBER recession indicators seem to have significant explanatory power for default risk."
8/ "The average corporate yield spread over 1866-2008 is 153.3 bps, about 78 bps higher than our back-of-the-envelope estimate of the historical default losses. This implies that the market appears to incorporate a risk premium of roughly 80 bps into corporate bond prices."
9/ "Credit spreads are highly persistent: the first order-serial correlation coefficient during the sample period is 0.883.
"There is no evidence that credit spreads respond to the information in realized default rates.
"Spreads tighten as the stock market rises."
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2/ "Across different CEF categories, I normalize sentiment beta and scale it by the mean for the corresponding category (equity, municipal FI, taxable FI, or other)."
"Liquidity Gap captures the difference between the illiquidity of underlying assets and that of the CEF shares."
3/ "The decrease in AAII sentiment occurs around the COVID-19 outbreak with a sizable magnitude of 26.6%.
"The results in Table 2 complement the graphical evidence in Figure 2, showing that the average CEF discounts increased substantially after the outbreak of COVID-19."
1/ Street Smarts: Adventures on the Road and in the Markets (Jim Rogers)
"History teaches us that appears undisputed today will look very different tomorrow. The most stable and predictable societies have undergone major upheavals. " (p. 29)
2/ "The Austro-Hungarian empire, the glittering jewel of central Europe, was a vast, international center of wealth in 1914. The Vienna stock exchange at the time had something like four thousand members. Within four years, the Austro-Hungarian empire disappeared.
3/ "Pick any year you want, and then move forward ten or fifteen years. Take 1925, when again widespread peace, prosperity, and stability prevailed. How did things look in 1935? In 1940?
1/ Tesla Effect and the Mispricing of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (Saengchote)
"Many mispriced SPACs in 2020 were linked to electric vehicle-related businesses (“Tesla effect”), raising concern whether investors understand what they are buying." papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf…
2/ "Historically, most SPACs have traded at $10 per unit all the way until merger completion. However, many SPACs in 2020 traded at prices far above $10 despite being combined into the new business at approximately $10 per share."
3/ "In 2019, SPACs traded close to $10, on average. For 2020 announcements, the jump in SPAC prices was greater and was more pronounced for EV SPACs.
"The parallel trend provides comfort for the use of the difference-in-differences method for our regression analysis."
1/ Strategic Timing in Closed-End Fund Portfolio Holdings Disclosure (Kallenos, Lesmond, Nishiotis)
"Managers of CEFs trading at high discounts are more likely to disclose earlier to reduce discounts & protect themselves from activist investor attacks."
2/ "In 2004, the SEC adopted a new rule regarding portfolio holdings disclosure. One of the main new requirements is the mandatory quarterly disclosure of portfolio holdings of every registered management investment company within a 60-day period from the period-end date."
3/ "𝐹𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the filing distance variable that counts the days between the report period-end date and the report filing date.
"𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 is the average daily discount between the report date and one day before the filing date."
1/ Common Sense: The Investor's Guide to Equality, Opportunity, and Growth (Joel Greenblatt)
"How can we use the strengths of our government, the dynamism of our private sector, and the power of incentives to achieve more opportunity for everyone?" (p.6)
2/ "Thinking like a long-term investor rather than an accountant at the Congressional Budget Office could come in handy as we try to help our workforce navigate new disruptions." (p. 2)
Greenblatt discusses this book in a March 2021 interview:
3/ "Bill Gates has called education reform more difficult than eradicating polio, malaria, or tuberculosis. Much of what I write is disturbing, but we can work around the current system to create real opportunity for students and adults of all backgrounds." (p. 2)
"Valuation changes unnecessarily reduce the precision of our estimates of true long-term expected market and factor returns. The usual examination of long-run average returns is not all it’s cracked up to be."
"While 6.5% a year is what you actually earned in the S&P 500, 5.2% a year is what you might long-term forecast going forward assuming neither mean reversion in CAPE (i.e., falling from its high ending value in our sample) or continued permanent expansion."
3/ Fixed Income
"A whole lot of the giant (for bonds) 4.4% a year over cash from 1984–2020 comes from the massive long-term fall in bond yields over this period. Again, I don’t think anyone should build that into their long-term estimate of bond expected return going forward."