1/ Beware of Chasing Yield: Bond Fund Yield, Flows and Performance (Jiang, Li, Zheng)
"Investors chase bond funds with higher yields, even controlling for past returns. The return spread is less than half of the yield spread and comes from higher risk."
2/ "We select all actively managed fixed-income funds except money market and municipal bond funds.
"The higher distribution yield comes mainly from the SEC yield being net of expenses.
"The distribution yield is fat-tailed; managers have more discretion over distributions."
3/ "Fund yield is a component of total fund returns. The incremental effect of yield on flows shows that mutual fund investors pay extra attention to the yield component of the return.
"Bond funds with higher yields compared with peers in the same groups enjoy higher inflows."
4/ "Retail investors chase distribution yield; institutions do not. Both groups chase SEC yield.
"This could reflect a difference in sophistication: an abnormally high distribution yield suggests that fund managers dispose fund assets at the expense of long-term performance."
5/ "Coefficients for yields and past returns are large and strongly significant in Columns 1-3 but close to zero in Columns 4-6.
"In a high (low) rate regime, investor may perceive bond funds as homogeneous (be more selective in picking funds, especially for higher yield)."
6/ "Higher yield bond funds deliver higher returns, but the return spread is less than half of the yield spread between the top and bottom decile portfolios.
"Investors may be disappointed if they believe that quoted fund yields represent average future fund returns."
7/ "High-yield bond funds accumulate small gains over an extended period, but when small-probability events such as financial crises arrived, they were hard-hit with extreme losses. This is in line with the conjecture that managers take on hidden risks in reaching for yield."
8/ "High-yield bond funds look less like safe-haven assets and more like high-duration, low-quality bonds and equities. The higher average returns on high-yield bonds (3.31%/year EW and 3.06% cap-weighted) dissipate to below 1%, economically small and statistically insignicant."
9/ "Using Δspread between 10-year and 1-year Treasury yields (interest-rate risk), Δspread between Moody's seasoned Baa corporate bond yield and 10-year Treasury yield (credit risk), and ΔVIX (liquidity risk), high-yield bond funds appear more risky than their low-yield peers."
10/ "When crisis hits the financial market, investors stampede away instead of reaching for yield.
"For example, Column 1 indicates that the slope coefficient for the interaction term is -0.43, which is almost 4x the magnitude of the coefficient for the SEC yield, 0.11."
11/ "The narrative of the performance and investor flows of high-yield bond funds during the COVID-19 crisis reinforces the thesis that these funds are inherently more risky and that investors tend to sell in panic when crisis hits."
12/ Related research:
Rational Reminder podcast episode on fixed-income factor investing (thread with links to papers)
1/ Dividend policy, signaling, and discounts on closed-end funds (Johnson, Lin, Song)
"CEFs that adopt minimum-dividend policies experience reductions in discounts, trade at smaller discounts than other funds, and earn greater subsequent excess returns."
2/ "Minimum-dividend policies are uncommon in bond CEFs, so we analyze equity CEFs.
"135 equity CEFs have data available some time during 1993-2001; 20% have minimum-dividend policies.
"We omit funds in their IPO year and ones that liquidate or open-end in the relevant years."
3/ "Funds with minimum-dividend policies realize greater unrealized capital appreciation and greater NAV returns.
"Discounts range from –29.05% (negative value = premium) to 37.51% with a mean of 10.75%. 82% of the fund-years represent funds trading at a discount to NAV."
1/ Excess Volatility and Closed-End Funds (Pontiff)
"The avg CEF's monthly return is 64% more volatile than its assets'. Although largely idiosyncratic, 15% of excess risk is explained by market risk, small-firm risk, and risk that affects other CEFs."
2/ Sample of 52 publicly-traded CEFs with more than six months of discount data (1965-85)
"If NAV (stock) returns have a larger effect on changes in premiums than stock (NAV) returns, then NAV returns are more (less) volatile than stock returns."
3/ "The average monthly CEF return variance is greater than the average NAV return variance.
"CEF prices also underreact to NAV returns. If the NAV is the fundamental value, this implies that CEF prices are excessively volatile, despite underreacting to fundamentals."
Wealth tax
Higher top marginal tax rate
More SS taxes for higher earners
Higher corp tax rate
No more 1031 exchanges
Increase in LT cap gains to 39.6% for those earning $1 million+
MTM treatment for unrealized cap gains
... accountingtoday.com/opinion/bidens…
From an investor's point of view, high long-term capital gains rates and mark-to-market would seem to encourage higher-turnover trading.
You'd have to be a heck of a trader to make up the difference between the old and new tax rates, but a lot of people would probably try.
This might also encourage traders to adopt high-Sharpe strategies (yes, Sharpe as opposed to Sortino) in order to smooth out their incomes and avoid getting into higher tax brackets.
(So maybe more diversification, carry trading, and *left* tail hedging)
3/ "New York was celebrating a financial boom. New institutions opened on every corner, filling the canyons of Wall Street with retail banks, commercial banks, insurance companies, and brokerage firms. Investors in mining, real estate, and transportation were flush with funds.
2/ "Lagged corporate credit spreads have no predictive power for default rates. Results support the view that the spreads are driven by factors like illiquidity."
The authors focus on cap-weighted default rates, which may cause their results to differ from other authors'.
3/ "The latter part of the 19th Century was a period in which massive investment in a number of exciting new technologies (railroads, electricity, etc.) was financed heavily by debt. These technology booms were then followed by waves of financial crises and bond defaults."
2/ "Across different CEF categories, I normalize sentiment beta and scale it by the mean for the corresponding category (equity, municipal FI, taxable FI, or other)."
"Liquidity Gap captures the difference between the illiquidity of underlying assets and that of the CEF shares."
3/ "The decrease in AAII sentiment occurs around the COVID-19 outbreak with a sizable magnitude of 26.6%.
"The results in Table 2 complement the graphical evidence in Figure 2, showing that the average CEF discounts increased substantially after the outbreak of COVID-19."