After yesterday’s model update () a few people have asked: so if there’s no exit wave, or just a small one, does that mean we could open up earlier? And the answer is: maybe, but it’s complicated. If you’re interested in the details, read on… 1/n
All of yesterday’s modelling assumed that we follow the government’s roadmap to 21st June, when we remove all remaining restrictions and controls, and behaviour returns to normal. (note that point: all controls removed on 21st June, it will become important later on). 2/n
But what happens if we vary this date? I’ve adjusted this in the model, bringing it back 1 week at a time up to 5th April, and also extending it the other way to 26th July, for completeness. As you can see (from blue line below), opening on 21st June looks OK, and you could 3/n
…probably bring it forward a couple of weeks (e.g. to 7th June) without much risk, but as you come back into May, the additional deaths start to ramp up, and any final unlocking before mid-May looks very dangerous (with ~40k deaths in the exit wave). 4/n
The green line on the chart shows what happens if I turn on the “mild seasonality” switch in my model. Here, things look a lot easier, and unlocking in mid-May is probably fine. (but April is still a bad idea if you don’t want 20-50k deaths in the exit wave). 5/n
But what if my model, or the assumptions in it, is wrong? I’ve tried to explore this by adding three more scenarios, which correspond to the assumption groups in yesterday’s sensitivity analysis. So the yellow, orange and red lines below correspond to worse assumptions for… 6/n
… vaccine supply & take-up, R0 and infection rates, and vaccine efficacy respectively. Inevitably, the outcomes are worse, and if you thought you were on one of those lines, you probably wouldn’t want to unlock much earlier than planned (and could argue for a bit later). 7/n
So what to do? Well, as we get closer in we should be able to narrow the range of uncertainty, and hopefully can then dismiss the yellow/orange/red lines as unlikely. With that knowledge, there could be a good argument for bringing forward the unlocking e.g. to 7th June. 8/n
Going further than that would be a bet on seasonality, which the government may well be reluctant to take, as it will be difficult to get data on this ahead of time. (ideally we’d have a well-defined “hot week” of summery weather in April, which would help the analysis!). 9/n
But I think there is a way we can accelerate the timetable while limiting the risks. And that would be to exit earlier (e.g. in mid-May), but into a near-normal state with baseline controls (such as TTI and masks in crowded indoor spaces) maintained up to the end of July. 10/n
We’re not sure what effect those baseline controls will have on R, I’ve seen estimates ranging from 10-30% reduction in transmission. So here are two scenarios, one set at 10% reduction (dashed line) and one at 25% reduction (dotted line), assuming no seasonality. 11/n
As you can see, this brings the risk level down much closer to the model with seasonality (green), and means the govt might feel more comfortable opening up in mid-May. In a pessimistic scenario, that could cause another 10-12k deaths – but more likely it would be 3-5k. 12/n
Is that “worth it”? I don’t know, it’s hard even talking and writing about this, and these are real people’s lives, not pixels on a chart. But the reality, whether we like it or not, is that we face a trade-off between the speed of opening up and covid deaths on the way out. 13/n
Your view on the optimal trade-off will depend on how bad you think the ongoing controls are – and note between mid-May and mid-June we’re not talking about lockdown, this is more like Tier 1 with pubs & restaurants open + rule of 6 indoors (but nightclubs closed). 14/n
Would you impose those controls for a month to save one life? ten? a hundred? a thousand? ten thousand? a hundred thousand? I’m glad I don’t have to make those decisions, but hopefully the analysis supports a debate on where, as a society, we should draw the line. /end

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More from @JamesWard73

1 Apr
I’ve updated my model for recent news, and after a series of assumption changes that mostly net out, it still predicts a very small exit wave with ~4k additional deaths (reduced from 9k previously) – and with a small added dose of seasonality, no exit wave at all. 1/n
The key changes in the model are shown in the waterfall chart below, and explored in more detail in the thread that follows this summary. 2/n
This conclusion feels more solid than before, as no single-factor sensitivity (within plausible ranges of uncertainty) takes the exit-wave deaths over 10k- see 1st chart. To get significantly higher deaths I have to move multiple assumptions at the same time– see 2nd chart. 3/n
Read 17 tweets
24 Mar
I’ve spent a lot of time over the last 2 days going through the most recent paper thelancet.com/action/showPdf… from the Warwick modelling group that feeds into SAGE, and trying to work out why it predicts a large exit wave, when my model (mostly) doesn’t. My conclusions are: 1/12
1. Their model in fact doesn’t guarantee an exit wave: with fast vaccine rollout (4m per week) and high (85%) transmission blocking, and either high (85-95%) vaccine uptake or high (94%) protection vs. severe disease, there is no material exit wave - see the orange line 2/12
2. Their choice of central assumptions is (imo) consistently on the pessimistic side. In fact, my central assumptions frequently correspond closely to their “optimistic” upside scenario. To avoid a very long thread I’ve built a table that compares their assumptions to mine 3/12
Read 13 tweets
23 Mar
My “don’t panic” tweet from yesterday got a lot of traction – but today I’m going to recover my corona-centrist credentials by being more concerned. Again, this is mostly a story about LFDs and schools, and I’m not quite sure yet what to make of it. 1/n
Let’s start by looking at the short-term growth rates in different age groups, so we know where to drill down. They show a clear spike in 5-9 and 10-14 year olds, and maybe a hint of upwards pressure in their parents (35-40s). Cases are falling nicely in the over-80s. 2/n Image
Looking at the 5-9 year olds, we can see the spike on the 15th March which has then tailed away since – so as per my recent tweets, I’m getting less worried about this. We need to keep an eye on it, but it’s not an obvious problem right now. 3/n Image
Read 11 tweets
21 Mar
As it’s the weekend, I’m allowed to have some fun. So here’s the latest in my series of spurious-but-interesting political/covid correlation analyses. Last time we had: vote Labour, get covid. This time it’s: vote Conservative, get vaccinated! 1/n Image
(and please don’t @ me, I do realise why this is). In fact please take this as a subtweet of other analysis showing that vax rates are negatively correlated with covid infection levels, deprivation, or non-white ethnicity: if it’s not corrected for age, it’s meaningless. 2/n
Of course, what’s happening is that the vaccination rate is a near-perfect (92% correlation) proxy for average age. And the Conservative vote % is also strongly correlated (69%) to the average age of the constituency. 3/n ImageImage
Read 7 tweets
17 Mar
Lots of people asking: what does your model say about the delayed vaccine schedule? Can we still unlock on the planned dates?? So here goes with an emergency model update. Summary: don’t panic, it will be OK. 1/n
So just a reminder of my current model ‘base case’ (with R0 for the new variant now set to 4, following comparison with the Warwick/Imperial models). This has a relatively small ‘exit wave’ next winter, with ~10k deaths. 2/n
If we knock 10m doses out of the vaccine schedule in April (reducing my expected 4m per week estimate to 2m per week), we get a slightly stronger and earlier ‘exit wave’. But total deaths after March are not much higher at ~13k. 3/n
Read 13 tweets
16 Mar
As an addendum to this earlier post, some have asked whether similar analysis is available for hospitalisations and deaths, and if so, does it show the same pattern? Happily, I looked at this at the weekend, and the answer is: yes and no. 1/10
To start with, a quick note on methods. To compare cases, deaths and hospitalisations on the same chart we are constrained to use age groups for which hospital data is readily available i.e. 18-64, 65-84 and 85+. So I’ve used the (mostly unvaccinated) 18-64 group... 2/10
… as a benchmark for the other two groups, creating deviation charts similar to my earlier ones for cases. See below for the new charts for cases, admissions and deaths. But it will be more useful to compare the different data for the same age group on the same chart 3/10 ImageImageImage
Read 11 tweets

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