How does the 4th Amendment apply to the "U.S. Private Vaults" case, busting the Beverly Hills store where people could anonymously store guns and drugs (and anything else)?
First, the alleged facts. The store hosted safe deposit boxes at a strip mall. Their selling point was total privacy: You pay big $$$, and you can store anything there and no one will know. According to prosecutors, the business was trying to entice those engaged in crimes.
The store didn't want to know who its customers were. They just wanted the very large payments in exchange for privacy. I gather this is their website, and Youtube plug:
As I understand the story, the government obtained one warrant to search the entire premises, including hundreds of safety deposit boxes. Some have wondered: Can the government do that? Do they need only one warrant, based on one showing of PC, or separate warrants *per box?*
It's not clear, but there's a good arg one warrant was sufficient. When there's probable cause that a business is permeated by fraud -- when illegality is pervasive in what the company does -- courts allow one warrant to seize basically everything. scholar.google.com/scholar_case?c…
The thinking is that when illegality is core to the business model, you can't just go seize the records of illegality. You need to get everything and see the whole picture of the illegal business enterprise.
A potential difference here is that the business rents out safe deposit boxes to customers. Customers ordinarily have 4A rights in their rented places like safe deposit boxes. Does the "permeated by fraud" warrant standard for the *business* extend to individual boxes?
I'm not sure. The closest case I can think of is distinguishable on the facts. See Davis v. Gracey, 111 F. 3d 1472 (CA10 1997) (permitting seizure of entire bulletin board service, incl user e-mails, b/c business suspected of selling obscenity; but user e-mails not accessed).
There's also a possible argument that the users of U.S. Private Vaults had no REP in their boxes b/c of how sketchy the business was. Cf. the mixed cases on sending letters with bogus identities. Not sure how strong that arg is, but it's possible.
I would guess a court would ultimately conclude that the good-faith exception of Leon applies in the context of a motion to suppress. But we will see. /end
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In dicta, magistrate judge concludes that govt use of a cell site simulator is a search requiring a warrant because it might be used to locate a phone in a place where there's an REP. (DDC, 3/25/21) (Faruqui, M.J)
First, why it's dicta: The issue arose when the government applied for a warrant, so no one was trying to conduct surveillance without a warrant. (Also, I don't tend to think Article III allows a merits ruling like this now, as how the 4A applies is not yet a ripe dispute.)
On the merits, the court's conclusion that a search occurs if a search might occur -- if a tool might be used to conduct a search -- seems wrong in light of United States v. Karo, which limited but did not overturn Knotts. scholar.google.com/scholar_case?c…
There's a lot that can be said about the CA6's Meriwether opinion, most of it way outside my expertise. But just one small thought about the para below. If the prof thinks that taking attendance is deeply wrong, wouldn't that make refusal ideological? opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/2…
Calling roll sends a message, that the school is in charge: A student's presence in class is critical, the school says, whether the student wants to be there or not. Many profs disagree w/this message, though. They think students should be allowed to attend or not as they wish.
If a professor thinks it is critical to learning that the environment be open, and not compelled, the professor may think it important to send the message that attendance is *not* required. They may not want to call roll for an ideological reason.
A bit about the federal law of enticement and so-called traveler cases, which may be of interest in light of the story below. nytimes.com/2021/03/30/us/…
Every state has age of consent laws, prohibiting sexual intercourse with a person under the age of consent. The age of consent varies by state, generally being 16, 17, or 18. See the chart here: aspe.hhs.gov/report/statuto…
Federal law makes certain interstate conduct done with intent to commit such crimes a federal crime. For example, 18 U.S.C. 2423 makes it a crime to transport a person under 18 in interstate commerce w/ intent to engage in an illegal sexual act. law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18…
Supreme Court rules 5-3 in Torres v. Madrid that “application of physical force to the body of a person with intent to restrain is a seizure, even if the force does not succeed in subduing the person.” SupremeCourt.gov/opinions/20pdf…#n
An expected result, although a closer vote than I expected, based on the argument. More tweet commentary soon.
A few quick thoughts now. First, this seems like a really narrow ruling. It's always been clear that "application of physical force to the body of a person with intent to restrain" is a seizure when the police succeed in stopping the person, temporarily, and that's most cases.
Here's thread on today's oral argument in Caniglia v. Strom, on the community caretaking exception. Thread will be thoughts on the argument, not an overview of the case, which others have done.
First up, Roberts questioning counsel for petitioner, the plaintiff in the civil case. Roberts starts with what I think is plaintiff's hardest hypo: what about wellness checks on seniors who haven't been heard from? Not a surprising question.
If I understood P's argument, their position is that you can't search to do a wellness check, but eventually, after a few days, there will be probable cause to get a warrant to search for a missing person.