The @OPCW's Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) has issued a new report determining that Syria used a toxic chlorine gas against its own people in February 2018. Damascus did not cooperate or provide relevant access to the IIT. opcw.org/sites/default/… 1/
The IIT provided to member states the names of responsible Syrian officials. It is now up to UN member states (facing a Russian veto) -- and more likely to individual states -- to sanction the Syrian officials who were responsible for the attack. 2/
As @NatSecAnthony & I wrote for @ForeignPolicy, it is time for OPCW member states to vote to suspend Syria's rights and privileges at the OPCW, which includes its voting rights. They can do so at the April 20-22 Conference of States Parties (CSP): foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/08/opc… 3/
Syria has acted with impunity regarding its chemical weapons use for far too long. It only stonewalls #OPCW investigations and works to disrupt the organization's important work. It no longer deserves a voice at the body. 4/
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Only thing that didn’t “work” about max pressure was it wasn’t correctly framed as a long-term effort to contain the regime in Iran’s aggression, push for changes in behavior, and give the Iranian people tools to demand better. Sanctions pressure clearly worked on the economy.
Claiming the main objective was to get a stronger nuclear deal provided ammunition for critics to call the policy “discredited” and a “total failure” after just two years and change, with oil sanctions in place for only part of that period.
Meanwhile, the economic facts show tremendous leverage for U.S. and allies — yes, leverage — to obtain concessions across many fronts if the regime wanted to remain in power. Either way, Tehran would be more contained and weakened over time to carry out its malign policies.
1) Iran's breakout time to produce weapon-grade uranium (WGU) for one nuclear weapon, if it chose to do so, has a range of 2.7 to 3.5 months, where the average is 3.1 months. Iran could produce a second amount of WGU, and have enough for two nuclear weapons, within five months.
2) Iran’s low enriched uranium (LEU) stock now exceeds by fourteen-fold the limit set by the JCPOA. As of Feb. 16, Iran had a stockpile of about 4390.2 kilograms (kg) of LEU (hexafluoride mass), almost all enriched below 5 percent, or 2967.8 kg (uranium mass).
As @laurnorman reports & Iranian officials attest, Iran has notified the IAEA of its intention to start an assembly line at Esfahan to produce uranium metal as part of advanced fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). 1/
It’s worth exploring Iran’s experience with u-metal, a key material that can also be used to produce nuclear weapon cores. We know that Tehran has quite a bit of experience thanks to the Nuclear Archive documents, seized by Israel in 2018. 2/
The Nuclear Archive contained info about Iran’s plans to build a pilot uranium metal production facility, called Shahid Mahallati. There, Iran would become adept at u-metal and nuke weapon component fabrication: isis-online.org/isis-reports/d… 3/
Regarding Iran nuclear site claims this morning from NCRI: what we know about the described sites and/or their activities.
Newly revealed facility in Sorkheh-Hessar region - an administrative-appearing building allegedly used by an SPND Geophysics Group, the "Chamran Group" 1/
Allegedly the team carries out research related to underground nuclear tests, geophysics, and seeks an underground tunnel. Allegedly it has illicitly procured ground penetrating radar and seismometers from abroad. 2/
The site is located south of the Iran Aerospace Organization, and north of the Khojir missile site; this is an area controlled by IRGC. Images show construction began in May 2012, allegedly the Chamran group began using the building in 2017. 3/
Key findings from @TheGoodISIS IAEA Iran safeguards report:
1. Iran’s estimated breakout time as of late Sept 2020 is as short as 3.5 months. Iran may have enough LEU to produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a second nuclear weapon. isis-online.org/isis-reports/m…
2. The second nuclear weapon could be produced more quickly than the first, requiring in total as little as 5.5 months.
3. Iran’s LEU stock now exceeds by ten-fold the limit set in the JCPOA. As of Aug 25, 2020, Iran has a stockpile of about 3114.5 kilograms (kg) of LEU (hexafluoride mass), all enriched below 5 percent, or the equivalent of 2105.4 kg (uranium mass).
The facility "may have been used for the processing and conversion of uranium ore, including fluorination in 2003" and "underwent significant changes in 2004, including the demolition of most buildings," pointing to it being for uranium conversion. 2/
As @TheGoodISIS reported in April 2020, a site called the “New Tehran Plant,” was described in the Nuclear Archive, and was "a plant intended as a follow-on uranium hexafluoride production plant under the Amad Plan." 3/