Thread by @MetrorailSafety

Today’s meeting includes an update on ongoing investigative work, votes and presentations on final #WMATA safety event investigation reports, the WMSC's annual reports, other oversight and audit updates & more

Watch live starting at 12:30

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Safety message from Business Manager Andrea Hogan:

We are all optimistic about the increasing rate of vaccinations, so this is not the time to relax your basic health precautions like wearing a mask, washing your hands, and maintaining a safe distance from others

Now on to public comments (you can always reach out @MetrorailSafety here, on Facebook, Instagram, via email or through our web form wmsc.gov/report/)

Chair Hart congratulates Commissioner Suhair Al Khatib on his appointment to fill the seat vacated by former Commissioner Contestabile, thanks COO Samarasinghe for her brief time as acting CEO during CEO Mayer's absence

Chair Hart on what’s ahead in the meeting:
-Ongoing oversight updates
-Final safety event investigation reports
-CAP and Audit updates
-WMSC Annual Reports & Audit
-Program Standard update

CEO David Mayer begins with an update on a safety issue that the WMSC and WMATA have identified and that Metrorail is now working to address: gaps in Metrorail’s Intrusion Detection Warning System

Metrorail’s IDW systems are mounted to fencing along the right of way to detect any damage that could indicate a vehicle entering the Metrorail roadway or another obstruction that might be fouling the tracks.

However, the WMSC and Metrorail’s Safety Department have found that these devices are not installed in all areas where they are required.

Particularly since information uncovered following a February 11 collision between a Metrorail train and a portion of a fence near Union Station, the WMSC and WMATA’s Safety Department have worked closely together on this critical safety issue

Mayer: I would like to thank the Safety Department for working collaboratively and actively to identify and begin to respond to these hazards and safety deficiencies identified in relation to the IDW system from the time that we raised this issue with the Chief Safety Officer.

The NTSB identified safety risks in the common corridors Metrorail shares with freight or other railroads decades ago, highlighting the importance of IDWs in areas where trains, equipment, or vehicles could enter WMATA’s roadway from adjacent tracks or roads

The IDW system is designed to automatically drop speed commands and institute red signals in the event of damage to a fence protecting Metrorail’s roadway, which mitigates the risk of a collision. The system also leads WMATA to send personnel to investigate.

This protects trains (and people on them) from colliding with a train or object that may be on the tracks, including personal vehicles that may have been driven through a fence onto the tracks, as we saw on the Red Line near Twinbrook and Shady Grove late last year

The WMSC and the WMATA’s Safety Department have found that Metrorail does not have these IDW systems in all the areas that they are needed.

Metrorail’s design criteria calls for these important safety devices in common corridors, including the area between Union Station and Rhode Island Avenue where Metrorail tracks closely parallel those used by CSX, Amtrak and other rail operators.

CEO Mayer: I would like to thank the Chief Safety Officer for moving quickly to ensure that WMATA identifies appropriate paths to mitigate these issues and to identify longer-term solutions.

As an initial mitigation, Metrorail has instituted speed restrictions near Union Station to provide train operators with more time to respond if something did happen. Metrorail is now working toward plans to install an IDW or equivalent long-term protection in this area.

Metrorail must also identify other areas, both on the mainline and in yards, where IDW or equivalent protection systems are required along roadways, highways, parking lots, construction sites, or similar areas.

Mayer: This collaborative effort will be tracked as a Corrective Action Plan to ensure that these important safety improvements are implemented.

CEO Mayer: Mayer: Turning to the March 26th safety event near Rhode Island Avenue, I can provide some preliminary updates on the status of our investigation so far over the last two weeks.

Passengers were stuck on a disabled train just outside Rhode Island Ave Station for approx. 90 minutes. During that time, two passengers self-evacuated and returned to the station platform. Metrorail investigators did not initially identify that this self-evacuation had occurred.

The WMSC quickly identified and communicated that information to WMATA to ensure that that aspect of the event was properly classified and documented. Metrorail later updated its required notification to reflect the evacuation.

The WMSC also identified a second event – a runaway train – that occurred after the remaining passengers had been safely evacuated to the platform through a rescue train that Metrorail eventually sent to assist.

This runaway train was only identified due to the WMSC’s independent investigation work.

We quickly identified this and communicated our initial concerns to WMATA about the train rolling, including providing WMATA investigators with the real-time audio recordings about it, yet the initial WMATA investigation did not appear to fully identify this issue.

The WMSC first raised this the weekend of the event, and continued to pursue this in a number of conversations in the following days to ensure that WMATA properly identified and investigated this event.

That included requiring more complete data, and emphasizing to WMATA that it is their responsibility to properly classify and report these events to the WMSC and FTA.

Metrorail’s required preliminary report submitted 5 days after the event still did not include all of the information from data downloads required to examine what has now been confirmed as a serious runaway train event that is reportable to both the WMSC and the FTA.

Metrorail is required -- as an organization -- to identify and report these events within two hours. That did not occur in this case.

Urgency is required to identify safety events so that improvements can be made to reduce the risk of these events happening again in the future.

Our independent oversight and investigative work in this case demonstrate the importance and the effectiveness of the WMSC interacting directly with people, data and documentation throughout all levels and all departments of Metrorail

This WMSC oversight helps ensure that safety events, hazards and other issues are properly identified, and, most importantly, to ensure that Metrorail identifies mitigations that can help prevent similar issues in the future.

Metrorail must have the same commitment, as WMATA has written in its Agency Safety Plan – that all departments and all employees, from the highest level to the frontline, are focused on open communication to identify and mitigate safety issues

After the WMSC identified and communicated what we had identified to WMATA in the days after the event, WMATA only later officially reported this runaway train aspect just last week after the WMSC specifically highlighted the need to properly report this to both the WMSC and FTA

Under the WMSC Program Standard, a runaway train is defined as a Class 1 vehicle – a passenger railcar – in motion that is not under the control of an operator regardless of whether the operator is physically on the vehicle at the time.

We will examine, and we expect WMATA will examine as part of its own continuous improvement processes, why Metrorail as an organization did not properly identify and communicate the details of this safety event

It is not clear that outside of the real-time communications and the WMSC’s communications with WMATA that Metrorail personnel fully communicated the depth of this safety event with the Safety Department.

The runaway train appears to have rolled more than 100 feet.

The rescue train was later coupled to the initial incident train and was used to move the disabled train back to a rail yard.

Our preliminary investigation related to customer, first responder, and employee safety has also identified concerns related to Metrorail’s communications and emergency preparedness and an overall lack of coordination in the response.

Investigation includes
-Any training or procedural deficiencies
-Any issues with familiarization/troubleshooting of 7000 Series
-Communications with passengers
-Ways to avoid stranding riders for an extended period when other safe options exist

Mayer: On emergency preparedness, we are examining the circumstances and responsibilities related to customer evacuation.

We are also investigating the timing of any third rail power status changes as it relates to the report of a customer self-evacuation, and any potential power restoration issues.

Mayer: The timing of Metrorail’s calling for help from first responders in this event is a concern and part of the focus of the emergency response investigation.

We raised this to WMATA over the last two weeks in relation to this investigation, and have also been focused on this issue for more than a year in relation to overall operations and coordination in the ROCC and as demonstrated by issues in specific safety events.

The delay in calling for required emergency response assistance and related concerns that we have raised over the past year about Metrorail’s 911 calls more broadly, appears to have now led WMATA to make some initial commitments to corrective actions.

Mayer: We look forward to Metrorail providing more information on these corrective actions and others that will be necessary based on the continuing investigation.

Mayer: Some aspects of these emergency response and coordination issues are already required to be corrected under Metrorail’s corrective actions plans related to the ROCC Audit we issued in September that are still in progress.

Mayer: Following additional conversations that the WMSC had with WMATA late last week regarding our continuing concerns, Metrorail has now identified some changes that they are planning.

For example, Metrorail’s existing procedures call for Office of Emergency Management or other MTPD staff in the ROCC during emergencies, however Metrorail now says they plan to have OEM staff in the ROCC at all times to assist with and potentially speed up emergency response.

CEO Mayer: We expect WMATA will submit details to us in coming weeks.

Metrorail is already responsible for implementing Corrective Action Plans that are required under the WMSC’s findings since December 2019 that require significant improvements to incident and emergency response

As we have emphasized to WMATA before, safety must come first – including erring on the side of calling first responders. We appreciate that it appears WMATA may be moving more strongly in that direction.

We are requiring Metrorail to provide additional information related to the runaway train and other aspects of this event, and we are ensuring that a full debrief is held soon with first responders on the event, response, and WMATA’s communications.

Mayer: As always, we will provide additional information on this investigation and present a final investigation report when the investigation is completed in coming months.

Mayer on other topics: Improving WMATA's safety event corrective action tracking

CEO Mayer: Our oversight of Safety Certification processes continues, including Silver Line Phase 2.

Mayer: We have open lines of communication and information sharing with WMATA and the Airports Authority to ensure there are no surprises as we continue our Pre-Revenue Service Review.

The WMSC’s safety certification oversight work also includes other projects, such as the 8000 Series railcars and work in the upcoming summer shutdown area on the Green and Yellow Lines.

Mayer: The WMSC staff’s work is extremely important to ensuring that Metrorail continues to improve safety for riders, workers and others.

Commissioner Lauby asks question on first investigation report regarding a train that was passing through station above the 25 mph speed limit for station bypassing

Investigation Manager Quigley: WMSC is working with operations/safe on speeds for all trains (revenue or nonrev)

Commissioner Lauby asks about whether WMATA management does any efficiency testing or radar speed checks
Quigley: Metro operations does other ridealongs and checks
CEO Mayer notes until 2009 speeds were mostly automated, so need to address modern operating environment

Chair Hart: Several reports today related to roadway worker protection issues and running red signals - both of which are troubling and need some response. Asking WMATA to do more holistic look at RWP and red signals since problem is not the individuals, but systems & processes

Quigley: This investigation involves a Red Signal Overrun and near-miss of a head-on collision or derailment outside U Street Station on Nov. 27, 2020.

Quigley: Green and Yellow Line trains were single-tracking between Mount Vernon Square and U Street due to an unauthorized person on the tracks.

During this single-tracking, Metrorail’s Automated Information Management System, which the ROCC uses as the primary method of tracking train movement and to set switch and signal alignments, displayed two trains with the same Train Identification Number.

One Train 308 was heading southbound and had reached the U Street platform.

Another Train 308 was heading northbound and was entering the Mount Vernon Square platform.

This meant that there was a Train 308 at both ends of the single-tracking area.

The ROCC Radio Controller gave the southbound train at U Street a permissive block to Mount Vernon Square, under the incorrect assumption that they were speaking to the northbound train.

The Operator at U Street then moved based on that direction, passing a red signal at the U Street Interlocking the ROCC had not explicitly given the operator permission to pass.

Northbound Train 308 crossed over to enter the single tracking area, facing the southbound Train 308

After the train at U Street had moved based on the Radio Controller’s direction, the Button Controller identified the risk of a potential miscommunication. The radio controller then asked the Train Operator of the southbound train to stop.

The train had already passed Red Signal E03-08 and moved into and beyond the interlocking on the same track as the other Train 308 that was heading northbound through the single-tracking area.

The train trailed switch E03-3B but remained on rails after pushing the switch point up underneath the train wheels. Switch 3B was the second switch the train passed when leaving the U Street Platform, but the first switch was in the normal position for a straight through move

Switch 3B was in a reverse position to direct the train coming from the other direction through the interlocking and across to Track 1.
This event caused minor damage to switch 3B.

The train was going about 10 mph as it reached the switch, just after the train operator initiated braking.

The train stopped 27 feet beyond the switch.

Passengers were walked back to the platform through the rear cars.

Metrorail is providing additional training for the radio controller and train operator.

Metrorail also developed and distributed a lessons learned document for ROCC personnel.

Quigley: The duplicate train identification numbers were created due to the ongoing service disruptions.

When service patterns become unplanned and schedules are no longer applicable, Metrorail does not coordinate train identification numbers when the trains depart terminals such as Greenbelt and Huntington.

Quigley: Train identification numbers are determined or entered by train operators, ROCC controllers and terminal supervisors. Metrorail could consider utilizing more of the available numbers for train Identification (00-99), particularly during unplanned emergencies.

After debate related to appropriateness/completeness of the urgency, scale and detail of the corrective actions WMATA suggested in response to this near-miss of a collision, the commissioners table action on this report pending additional information from WMATA and related review

WMSC Vehicles Expert Manuel Lopez is presenting the next report related to a train rollback in New Carrollton Yard on Oct. 16, 2020

Two train operators --- one at each end of a four-car consist – were re-arranging those cars in the yard between 6 and 7 a.m.

At the time of the rollback, the operators were adjusting the cars so that an “A” car normal operating end would be at the open end of the four-car consist.

This adjustment was needed because of the way two of the cars were sitting in the shop as it related to the positioning of another married-pair that one of the train operators used to pick up those cars to move them out of the shop.

With train operators now at both ends of the four-car consist, they uncoupled the cars on graded track near the car wash.

After uncoupling, the operator of cars 3172/3173 reported that the other pair of cars – 3282-3283 – had rolled back down the slope and recoupled to car 3282.

The operator only reported this several minutes after the rollback, and only after other attempts to uncouple the consist again.

The consist was later uncoupled and the cars were moved prior to investigators’ arrival.

Metrorail did not have guidance for train operators on train separation requirements when uncoupling cars, including on graded track. Metrorail is developing a memorandum to address this issue.

Metrorail also provided refresher training on coupling and uncoupling to the operator of the married pair that rolled back.

And Metrorail is developing a lessons learned document based on this event and other rollbacks.

Lopez: It is important for Metrorail to incorporate these issues into training programs, rules or procedures to ensure that safety improvements are lasting.

This event occurred just before the WMSC issued a finding on October 20 related to the integrity of evidence in investigations. Metrorail is in the implementation phase of the Corrective Action Plan WMATA developed in response to that finding.

WMSC Operations Expert Bruce Walker is presenting the next report, related to an Oct. 29, 2020 red signal overrun in Brentwood Yard

A Train Operator had permission to move a train up to signal B99-138, but instead passed that red signal, trailing the associated switch

In an interview, the Train Operator said that it was hard to identify their position in the yard and hard to see due to the light rain.

Since the Train Operator did not know they were approaching the signal, they did not perform any safety stops. These stops are not required by rule, but Brentwood Yard requests its operators conduct safety stops approaching red signals on storage tracks.

Metrorail plans to develop and implement a training plan for recently certified train operators that focuses on each rail yard’s specific features and hazards.

Metrorail is also distributing a lessons learned document emphasizing safety stops and approaching red signals.

Bruce Walker also precenting the next report – a Nov. 23, 2020 red signal overrun in the Greenbelt Yard

A Train Operator moved a non-revenue train past a red signal at the end of a third consecutive absolute block

In an interview, the Train Operator said that as they approached the E99-98 signal, they were thinking they had an absolute block to E99-198 instead.

Radio recordings show that the operator had initially incorrectly repeated back E99-198, prior to a correction from the interlocking operator that the block was to E99-98, which the operator acknowledged.

The operator stated that they had shifted their attention to checking the train speed.

When the operator noticed the red signal, the operator attempted to stop the train just before passing the signal. The train passed the signal at 12.4 miles per hour, and stopped approximately 46 feet beyond the signal.

After the red signal overrun, the train was moved nearly simultaneously with the notification to WMATA’s safety department, and prior to investigators arriving on scene.

Metrorail provided additional training to the train operator.

Metrorail also developed a lessons learned document related to this and other red signal overruns, and has since included red signal overrun issues as part of a safety standdown.

Commissioner Lauby and Chair Hart emphasize importance of process and systems solutions

WMSC Traction Power Expert Tino Sahoo presenting the next report – an improper roadway worker protection event near Rockville on Nov. 26, 2020

A Traction Power Maintenance crew crossed a red “hot spot” without requesting or being granted the required foul time protection.

In an interview, the Roadway Worker In Charge stated that they did not know foul time was required for restricted view areas that are marked as hot spots requiring foul time protection.

Other members of the crew also did not identify or raise this safety issue.

The investigation also found that the crew had an outdated version of the quick access guide, and that the two hot spots in the work area were not addressed as required in the job safety briefing.

Supervisors had also not been checking job safety briefings for completeness.

The investigation identified a need for continued improvement to RWP training and communications.

Metrorail is providing RWP refresher training to this crew, conducted a safety stand down for Traction Power personnel based in the Shady Grove Yard, and has committed to ensuring that Traction Power supervisors check job safety briefing forms.

Investigations Manager Adam Quigley presenting an investigation into improper roadway worker protection in the Takoma interlocking on Oct. 20, 2020

An Automatic Train Control Maintenance crew was performing track circuit verification in response to a bobbing track circuit without enough personnel for the job.

One member of the crew remained in the Train Control Room and served as the local control panel operator after the ROCC granted permission to use Exclusive Track Occupancy RWP protection under Local Signal Control. Normally, the crew would have at least 2 people in the TCR

When the crew realized that they had left a shunt strap necessary for the work in the TCR, the Local Control Panel Operator got permission from the ROCC to bring the shunt strap to the next revenue train, so that the train operator could drop it with the work crew

However, the panel operator turned the panel control key off when they left the room. This led to an “invalid” control indication for the interlocking on the AIM system.

The panel operator could have kept the key on and canceled routes when exiting the TCR to ensure red signals were in place to continue to protect the work crew.

The ROCC identified the “invalid” control indication a few minutes later when a Track and Structures work crew asked to pass through the area where the ATC crew had been granted exclusive track occupancy protection.

The ROCC then took control of the interlocking and instructed the ATC crew to clear the roadway.

Metrorail provided RWP refresher training to the Roadway Worker In Charge, and developed a lessons learned document for the ROCC related to Exclusive Track Occupancy protection under local signal control.

Quigley also presenting a Green Line improper RWP investigation into a Sept. 17, 2020 event

The Rail Operations Control Center allowed a three-person Automatic Train Control Maintenance Crew to be dropped off in a designated “hot spot” near Suitland Station.

A “hot spot” in Metrorail’s RWP rules is an area that requires Foul Time protection for workers to safely be on the roadway. Foul Time is when the ROCC stops train traffic in the area

In this case, the Foul Time is required because the area is a restricted-view curve.

The ROCC and the work crew had not identified that this area was a hot spot that required foul time when the work crew requested and the ROCC granted permission to have a train drop them off there to conduct work.

Around the time the ATC crew was dropped off, a separate Track and Structures crew requested and was granted foul time in this area.

The ROCC granted the Track and Structures crew foul time about a minute and a half after the ATC crew had accessed the roadway.

Three minutes after that, the ROCC Radio Controller contacted the ATC crew to request their location.

After confirming the location, the controller had the ATC crew stop work and wait to get picked up by the next train.

About 30 minutes later, the ROCC informed the ATC crew that they would be required to report for post-incident drug and alcohol testing. ROCC management did not remove the ROCC controller for post-incident testing as required by WMATA policies.

Metrorail distributed a lessons learned document in the ROCC related to communication and RWP procedures.

Metrorail is also analyzing rule or procedural changes to ensure personnel are not dopped off in a hot spot.

Metrorail does not have a written procedure governing train drop offs for work crews that is being followed.

This investigation & other WMSC observations indicate WMATA management has directed personnel to take steps that are not documented that are intended to improve safety during train drop offs but that are outside of written RWP protections, and do not have specific safety steps

An unsigned safety bulletin issued on October 31, 2018 regarding pick up and drop off procedures describes what the bulletin refers to as “modified foul time” in a way that contradicts the foul time protections described in RWP rules.

A safety bulletin is not a form that Metrorail has approved to implement or change a rule, and there is no documentation of it in the RWP rules.

Adam Quigley presenting the final investigation report of the day: improper roadway worker protection near West Hyattsville on Sept. 28, 2020

After receiving conflicting information from a supervisor and the ROCC, Traction Power Maintenance personnel entered the roadway from an entry shaft without RWP protection.

A Traction Power technician had requested access to the roadway at 8:43 a.m. to reach a Tie Breaker Station that requires passing a break in the handrail while walking in the tunnel between Fort Totten and West Hyattsville.

Maintenance Operations Control personnel in the ROCC told the technician that the TRPM crew would not be permitted in until after rush hour.

However, a Traction Power supervisor heard that communication, and directed the technician to proceed to the Tie Breaker Station. The supervisor said the MOC had provided separate information by landline and the work crew could proceed.

Phone recordings demonstrate that the Rail Controllers in the ROCC told the MOC at 8:47 a.m. that the crew had permission to enter the Tie Breaker Station during rush hour. However, the steps that should have come next to request and obtain RWP protection did not happen.

The crew worked in the Tie Breaker Station for more than an hour, then informed MOC at 10:05 a.m. that they were clear, again without requesting or being granted RWP protection.

Approximately two hours later, the ROCC identified that the other TRPM technician in the work crew had called to request permission to escort contractors into the Tie Breaker Station, but that the crew had never requested or been granted the foul time required to do that.

The investigation identified that there was no clear designation of a Roadway Worker in Charge within the Traction Power crew, and that one of the technicians who took on some Roadway Worker In Charge responsibilities was not currently certified with the highest Level 4 RWP.

Metrorail developed a lessons learned document on roadway access, and plans refresher training for Traction Power personnel on radio communications.

Next up is Corrective Action Plan updates from WMSC Business Process Specialist Lahiru Karunaratne

As Dr. Mayer described earlier, we are going to be tracking the Intrusion Detection Warning system safety improvements through the corrective action plan process.

Last month, Metrorail submitted corrective action plan proposals on time related to the Elevated Structures Audit that we issued in January. They later submitted documentation related to the one recommendation in the audit related to rocker bearings.

The WMSC has now approved 8 of these elevated structures CAPs for implementation. We’ve provided 2 rounds of feedback on the deficiencies in the 5 other CAP proposals, with WMATA’s next revisions due by April 23.

One of the Elevated Structures Audit findings for which Metrorail has not yet developed an acceptable corrective action plan is the finding that WMATA does not have load ratings for its bridges and aerial structures.

Metrorail’s first revision to its corrective action plan proposal shortened the originally proposed timeframe for determining these ratings, but still did not include any immediate mitigations to determine whether any operational changes are required now.

As with the other remaining proposals that we have not yet approved, the WMSC provided the latest feedback to Metrorail about addressing this safety issue at the end of last week.

Metrorail also has until April 23 to submit corrective action plan proposals and a response related to the recommendation in the Roadway Maintenance Machine (RMM) Audit that we published last month

CAPs are part of the continuous safety improvement process.
More details are in our annual reports and the separate annual technical submission which we submitted through the FTA’s State Safety Oversight Reporting (SSOR) system on March 10, well ahead of the required deadline.

Vehicles Expert Manuel Lopez now providing information on the Roadway Maintenance Machine (RMM) Audit wmsc.gov/wp-content/upl…

We examined Metrorail’s inspection, maintenance, training and operations of these vehicles that move on the rails but that are not designed to carry customers

RMMs range from basic flatcars to complex equipment like the heavy-duty tamper used to maintain track geometry. RMMs are critical to the safe operation of the system.

The RMM audit identified some positive practices, as well as 14 findings requiring corrective action and one recommendation wmsc.gov/wp-content/upl…

WMATA is not performing required safety certification for new RMMs and is not following proper safety approval or engineering change processes for existing RMMs.

WMATA has not completed hazard analyses or other steps to address the findings of a Tri-State Oversight Committee Audit that identified vehicles in use without going through the required safety certification process. Similar concerns date back to at least 2013.

The audit finds that Metrorail must improve training and certification practices for RMM maintenance and operations.

Metrorail also risks key safety and maintenance work coming to a halt due to insufficient succession planning and training.

This is of particular concern for the most complex vehicles that can cause significant damage to track and structures or cause injuries if operators are not fully trained on the required special skills.

In one example, the tamper crew chose different job assignments after a schedule change last summer, which forced a change because the people who ended up assigned to the shifts did not have the training and experience necessary to do the job.

The extensive interviews and document reviews conducted for this audit demonstrated that Metrorail does not have a single, clear, complete safety procedure for the securement of vehicles using chocks.

Metrorail also did not have an in-effect procedure for the inspection of contractor-owned RMMs coming onto WMATA property, and is not effectively collecting or utilizing reliability data for RMMs to identify safety-related trends.

COO Samarasinghe w/other audit updates:
-WMSC sent Draft Automatic Train Control and Signaling Audit to WMATA for technical review
-Fitness for Duty audit team held exit conference Friday, now working on report

COO Samarasinghe further audit updates:
-Revenue Vehicle (railcars you ride) Audit team conducting interviews this month
-Traction Power Audit interviews expected in June

Secretary-Treasurer Debra Farrar-Dyke now presenting the WMSC’s independent financial accounts audit to her fellow commissioners

Commissioner Farrar-Dyke: We’re very proud of our staff and our commissioners for this audit that includes an unmodified, or “clean”, opinion on the WMSC’s financial statements since inception through the end of our fiscal year last June

The auditors concluded that the financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of the WMSC.

They also conclude that the Schedule of Expenditures of Federal Awards is fairly stated in all material respects in relation to the basic financial statements as a whole

This annual audit is required by the WMSC compact, and, upon adoption, will be transmitted as required.

Commissioner Farrar-Dyke: The WMSC Board’s Finance and Operations Committee provided oversight of this independent work and recommends commission adoption.

Commissioners adopt this clean audit

CEO Mayer: Proud that our first audit has resulted in a clean opinion

Now moving on to the WMSC’s annual reports

CEO Mayer: I am proud to present our annual reports. These reports are required by the WMSC Compact, and they highlight the impressive work that the WMSC team completed in 2020, even in the face of the COVID-19 health emergency.

One is a report on our own annual operations. The other is a report specifically focused on the safety of the WMATA rail system in 2020.

Upon adoption, both reports will be sent, as required by law, to leaders in D.C., Virginia, Maryland and the federal government. They will also be provided to WMATA leadership, including the board, and, of course, will be available to members of the public.

The WMSC had an extremely productive year that included expanding the WMSC's expertise, completing and issuing significant audits, and other oversight work such as responding to and investigating safety events, all with a focus on keeping our staff and others as safe as possible

Conducting this work safely allowed the WMSC to continue to make substantial progress and achieve major milestones as we worked with WMATA to help continually improve the safety of the Metrorail system for the riders, workers, first responders and others who depend on it.

For example, the WMSC’s comprehensive, detailed Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Audit identified serious safety issues that Metrorail is now required to address through Corrective Action Plans.

As the independent agency with the primary jurisdiction to oversees Metrorail safety with the support of Maryland, Virginia, the District of Columbia and related federal grants, our streamlined and efficient team also handles finances and other aspects of our operations.

CEO Mayer: I would like to thank Virginia, Maryland, D.C., and federal leadership for helping to continue to make this all possible.

CEO Mayer: I want to especially thank the commissioners for entrusting me and our dedicated team with such an important responsibility for the region and the nation’s capital: ensuring WMATA is continually improving to make the Metrorail system as safe as possible for everyone.

Chair Hart speaks to the Annual Report on the Safety of the WMATA Rail System in 2020

Chair Hart: The WMSC conducted significant work in 2020 that is directing Metrorail toward substantial safety improvements through ongoing collaboration, several significant audits, consistent inspections and oversight, and safety event investigations

Conducting this work safely, while following all possible precautions related to COVID-19, helped the WMSC continue this important work with WMATA to help continually improve the safety of the Metrorail system for the riders, workers, first responders and others who depend on it.

Hart: Given the number and extent of safety improvements that the WMSC is requiring Metrorail to implement in coming years and those changes that have already been fully implemented, I would like to thank the governors of Maryland and Virginia, Mayor of Washington, D.C., (1/?)

...the Maryland and Virginia General Assemblies, the D.C. Council, local and regional bodies, Members of Congress, and the officials in numerous local and federal agencies including the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) who continue to be crucial partners in this effort. (2/2)

The WMSC’s comprehensive, detailed audit of WMATA’s ROCC is just one example of the important work completed by the WMSC in 2020 to identify safety issues and to require Metrorail to implement improvements.

Chair Hart: Some of these important safety changes will take time to fully implement in a lasting fashion.

Chair Hart: The WMSC has the responsibility, commitment, and authority to require Metrorail to implement and maintain much needed safety improvements that can help Metrorail prevent future accidents.

Chair Hart: Our job is to provide an independent assessment of what must be done to improve safety. Metrorail’s job is to identify, develop and implement effective ways to accomplish those improvements.

Chair Hart: It is important for Metrorail to identify and implement improvements in collaboration with employees at every level.

If all those involved are on the same page and working collaboratively, rather than keeping their concerns & remedies siloed and tightly controlled, they will be more able to develop and implement effective safety improvement ideas while avoiding potential unintended consequences

This collaboration is required under the Safety Management System (SMS) approach embodied in Metrorail’s first Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan (PTASP), which the WMSC approved in 2020.

CEO Mayer: We are committed to the safety of every single Metrorail rider, employee and contractor, as well as anyone else who comes into contact with the system.

This Report on the Safety of the Metrorail System in 2020 gives a high-level snapshot of safety performance, and also outlines WMATA’s progress on instituting the required top-to-bottom Safety Management System approach.

CEO Mayer: That approach requires a strong safety culture, with commitment from every single person in the organization, and clear communication to drive continuous improvement.

CEO Mayer: On the Corrective Action Plan front, there is always room for safety improvement – and these CAPs are paths toward important safety benefits.

CEO Mayer: The goal is to eliminate or mitigate as many risks as possible proactively before a risk manifests itself in a safety event, rather than reactively after something bad has happened.

CEO Mayer: This is a big reason that our Audits and Inspections are so important, and why cooperation in these areas benefits WMATA, its riders and all other stakeholders.

All levels of Metrorail must be open to constructive feedback and communication both with us as the independent safety oversight and enforcement authority, and with those from those inside WMATA itself.

Next up: updates to the WMSC Program Standard, being presented by COO Sharmila Samarasinghe

The Program Standard is the governing document that lays out specific deadlines and requirements for WMATA. The WMSC is required to develop, maintain and update the Program Standard at least annually

This is the first major update to the Program Standard since the FTA certified our State Safety Oversight Program in March 2019.

Based on our experience using the Program Standard, we have identified areas where it can be improved to make the document more useful and straightforward.

The last Program Standard update adopted last year focused on the safety event reporting matrix. That has helped to improve long-term data collection and analysis

Today’s Program Standard revision involves updates throughout the document and a consolidation of some areas. It also includes clear and unified statements related to deadlines for WMATA actions.

Samarasinghe: this revision also notes the changes from the former System Safety Program Plan to the PTASP, with an understanding that fully implementing the PTASP will take WMATA some time.

WMSC staff began the intense Program Standard revision process last August, with a number of focused work sessions held through December. The process has resulted in a significantly streamlined and much easier-to-follow document.

The WMSC consulted WMATA personnel with specific roles related to aspects of the Program Standard while developing a final draft.

After the WMSC produced a final draft of the revision, we formally transmitted the draft to WMATA for their review. Metrorail provided additional feedback on the draft on March 3, and WMSC staff asked clarifying questions related to WMATA’s comments as necessary.

The WMSC carefully considered each of WMATA’s comments, and made any changes that are appropriate given the WMSC’s role as the principal safety oversight authority for WMATA

....and given the federal regulations, guidelines and best practices that require the WMSC to interact directly with employees and contractors at all levels of the Metrorail organization.

Samarasinghe: WMSC staff recommends that this revision take effect on June 1st.

Commissioners adopt the Program Standard revision

That completes our public meeting for today, but you can always reach out to us here, on Instagram instagram.com/metrorailsafet…, on Facebook facebook.com/MetrorailSafet…, through our website wmsc.gov/report/ or via email

Chair Hart: We expect to hold our next public meeting May 18, 2021. The meeting will again be held remotely, via video conference. We look forward to seeing you then.