So, in the absence of detail from the recent Defence Command Paper, I thought I would provide a personal view on the British Army's strategy and answer that all important question: WHAT IS IT FOR? I'll start with the principal threats to note the resurgence of peer adversaries.
The UK's four overarching defence commitments translate into a range of roles with varying intensity. The specific tasks the Army aims to perform were not communicated clearly. The important shift in emphasis is a move to high-end expeditionary war fighting.
The four primary tasks are performed by Light, Heavy and Special Forces structures. Again, once you understand the intent, the logic is sound. An increased special forces component is consistent with the missions we anticipate.
The key missing component was the future force structure. Instead of trying to guess what this is, I have suggested what it should be. Heavy and Light Brigade Combat Teams all have the same structure. Six primary combat brigades are supported by eight further brigades.
A recommended change is to place Boxer, Ajax, and Challenger 3 in separate Heavy brigades to avoid mixing wheels and tracks. Light brigades utilise Foxhound and BVS10. The SFSG and 4 x Spec. Inf. Bns. become 2 x Ranger battalions and are rolled into an enlarged SF brigade.
To deliver the above structure, the following combat vehicles are required. Note 200 MBTs not 148. A second tranche of Boxers is needed for two wheeled brigades (allowing FV432 to be retired). Another 600 Foxhounds makes JLTV unnecessary. BVS10 adds extreme terrain flexibility.
This provides detail on artillery systems (based on the programmes that were announced. I have added a 120 mm mortar system to replace the 105 mm light gun. I have also suggested the Uvsion Hero 120 as a potential loitering munition, but Spike NLOS 2 or Brimstone GL would work.
I have also detailed the aviation brigade requirement. This includes RAF crewed helicopters (Chinook and Puma) plus the Watchkeeper RPAS.
Everything I've suggested is achievable within a headcount cap of 72,500. It's not all affordable now, but with an extra £1 billion per annum after 2025, it is achievable by 2030. If what I suggest is viewed as profligate and unrealistic, we might as well give up and go home.
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THE SITUATION IN UKRAINE (Thread)
As Russian troops continue to mass along the Ukraine's Eastern border, we are all rightly concerned. But will Putin really go for another land grab? And if so, what might happen? Let’s look at how a potential scenario might unfold...
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Putin attacks across three lines of advance into Western Ukraine. Whatever his strategy, this time it’s different. Unlike 2014, Ukraine forces are better prepared and much better equipped. Territorial gains within the first 24 hours are less than anticipated.
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Global condemnation swiftly follows. Further sanctions are applied, but this changes nothing at the front. Withering artillery barrages are followed-up by substantial armoured thrusts. Although Ukraine forces lose ground, Russian forces suffer significant attrition.
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BRITSH ARMY HEADCOUNT REDUCTION (Thread)
Looking back at personnel cuts made in 2010, a reduced Army of 82,000 didn’t help Britain regain its financial strength, it simply signified a hollowing-out of our ability to defend ourselves.
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It destroyed the credibility of David Cameron’s Coalition Government then and even more so in hindsight. It was military illiteracy on a grand scale. The problem wasn’t so much the reduction itself, but the fact that there was no real strategy behind it, no future plan.
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Back in 2010, the UK's involvement Iraq and Afghanistan didn’t really serve our national interests (See Ben Barry’s book). If these conflicts were sub-optimal uses of the Army, they raised the important question of what the Army’s underlying raison d’être should be.
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BRITISH ARMY MRVP PROGRAMME (Thread)
The Army wants an inexpensive multi-role protected vehicle so that more of its troops can benefit from protected mobility. This remains an important programme that will ensure a larger % of the Army is deployable.
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As things stand, the Army wants to acquire the Oshkosh JLTV for Package 1 (Command & Liaison / Tactical Support roles). And is holding a competition between GDLS Eagle V and Thales Bushmaster MR6 for Package 2 (Troop Carrying and Battlefield Ambulance roles).
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However, MRVP has come under increased scrutiny and for good reason. JLTV is an excellent and inexpensive vehicle. But helping our post-pandemic economy to recover will require us to invest in military vehicles built domestically rather than imported from the USA.
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WUHAN ONE YEAR ON
On 22 January 2021, it will be a year since China locked-down the city of Wuhan and in doing so alerted the rest of the world to the fact that we were facing a new and deadly illness that has changed our lives.
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There is compelling evidence to suggest that China knew how serious the virus was long before January 2020. Internet searches in the Wuhan area revealed people trying to identify the symptoms we now identify as Covid-19 in October and November 2019.
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Athletes returning from the World Military Games in Wuhan, also in October 2019, reported a strange illness that was unidentified at that time. Isolated cases of an unknown illness also presented at French, Swedish, and other European hospitals in November 2019.
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Yesterday's @RUSI_org speech by @BWallaceMP was one of the most significant made by any UK Defence Secretary over the last decade. Although no detailed announcements were made, there are five reasons why we should take note.
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1⃣ The speech clearly signalled that UK Defence has become a more important Government priority than it has been at any time since the end of the Cold War in 1990. While it is unrealistic to expect a massive uplift in spending, swingeing cuts seem to be a thing of the past.
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2⃣ The Integrated Review promises to be a robust strategic process that will align our aspirations with our resources so that UK defence is RELEVANT and CREDIBLE while being AFFORDABLE and SUSTAINABLE. This means that whatever we decide to do, we will resource it properly.
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WHY HAS BRITISH ARMY RENEWAL BEEN SO PROBLEMATIC?
Having made the point about the need for urgent modernisation, I want to try and explain why achieving this has proved to be so challenging. Our story starts in 2000, a decade after the Cold War ended. 1/
At this time when we were not involved in any major conflict.
Deployments to Iraq, former-Yugoslavia, and Sierra Leone had shown how difficult and expensive it was to generate, position and sustain capable land forces in an expeditionary context. 2/
Since the forward basing of units ties-up forces that can’t be used elsewhere, the need for a medium weight capability to make the Army more deployable and easier to support was identified. This was the impetus behind programmes like FFLAV, MRAV (Boxer) and FRES. 3/