Yesterday's @RUSI_org speech by @BWallaceMP was one of the most significant made by any UK Defence Secretary over the last decade. Although no detailed announcements were made, there are five reasons why we should take note.
(1/7) gov.uk/government/spe…
1⃣ The speech clearly signalled that UK Defence has become a more important Government priority than it has been at any time since the end of the Cold War in 1990. While it is unrealistic to expect a massive uplift in spending, swingeing cuts seem to be a thing of the past.
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2⃣ The Integrated Review promises to be a robust strategic process that will align our aspirations with our resources so that UK defence is RELEVANT and CREDIBLE while being AFFORDABLE and SUSTAINABLE. This means that whatever we decide to do, we will resource it properly.
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3⃣ The underlying strategic focus reflects an understanding of the threats we face and recognition that the character of conflict has evolved. Consequently, there is a willingness to restore tired and lost capabilities, but also to embrace new technologies and doctrines.
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4⃣ Investment in the UK defence industry will drive national prosperity within a post-Brexit, global Britain context. In doing so, stronger defence will serve the interests of our European neighbours and allies. This will build bridges and make us a partner of choice.
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5⃣There is a clear aspiration for the UK to become more able to deter and counter potential adversaries, especially those operating below the threshold of conflict. But we won't invest in grey zone capabilities at the expense of a high end war fighting ability.
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What this adds up to is the need to make some tough choices. While not everyone will agree with them, the law of focus unequivocally supports a concentration of effort & resources to achieve military goals. So, I believe we can be optimistic despite the current challenges.
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WHY HAS BRITISH ARMY RENEWAL BEEN SO PROBLEMATIC?
Having made the point about the need for urgent modernisation, I want to try and explain why achieving this has proved to be so challenging. Our story starts in 2000, a decade after the Cold War ended. 1/
At this time when we were not involved in any major conflict.
Deployments to Iraq, former-Yugoslavia, and Sierra Leone had shown how difficult and expensive it was to generate, position and sustain capable land forces in an expeditionary context. 2/
Since the forward basing of units ties-up forces that can’t be used elsewhere, the need for a medium weight capability to make the Army more deployable and easier to support was identified. This was the impetus behind programmes like FFLAV, MRAV (Boxer) and FRES. 3/
THE ARMY - WHAT'S IT FOR?
During a recent conversation with a senior serving Army officer I asked why so few people understand what the Army's role is? His response was: because the Army does anything and everything. This is right. It performs an endless array of tasks. 1/
Although we rely on the Army to be a readily available source of disciplined and trained manpower, ultimately it needs to be focused around the UK's most essential defence commitments. So, what are these? 2/
Our high-level commitments translate into several levels of engagement based on intensity. These lead to half a dozen specific tasks based on existential threats. 3/
HAS THE INTEGRATED REVIEW BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS? (Thread)
As most of you know, the UK’s integrated security, defence and foreign policy review is designed to reconfigure our armed forces around realistic policy objectives which are consistent with the threats we face.
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The need to do this was based on a growing mismatch between our defence aspirations and the resources available to support them. Moreover, Britain leaving the EU is an opportunity to review our place in the world, to look beyond Europe, and to embrace a global perspective.
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Despite having the world’s 6th largest economy and 8th biggest defence budget, we needed to inject our grand strategy with a healthy dose of reality. We are not a superpower, so instead of trying to do everything badly, we should try to perform fewer defence tasks better.
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The UK Army has been criticised because its 2025 plan is apparently unaffordable. This graphic shows what it set out to achieve: Five brigades including 2 x Strike, 2 x Armoured Infantry and 1 x Air Assault. Everything else was designed to support this core structure.
The above structure has been simplified to aid communication. It combines deployability with resilience, flexibility with focus. It enables high intensity warfare against a peer adversary, as well as low level peace support. It is no more than Italy, France and Germany have.
Component elements of the Equipment Plan designed to deliver this are: Ajax, Boxer, Challenger 2 LEP, Warrior CSP, MRVP, Mobile Fires Platform, Morpheus C4I, Apache E, and various minor upgrades. The only problem is we need to acquire everything at the same time.
DETERRENCE THROUGH MILITARY MOBILITY (Thread)
Everyone gets the Navy.
Frigates. Destroyers. Aircraft carriers. Strategic missile submarines. Attack submarines.
People know what they do.
You have a problem? Send a ship. Job done. We used to call it gunboat diplomacy.
Everyone gets the Air Force too.
Typhoon. F-35 Lightning. P8 Poseidon. A400M. C-17A. Voyager. Chinook.
Air strikes. Delivering aid. Patrolling the skies. The RAF's role is easy to understand too.
But what about the Army?
It sat unused in Germany for 50 years with tanks that couldn't be moved anywhere quickly. Then it fought two wars that seemed to have little direct impact on UK security. So people rightly question what is the Army for?
@thinkdefence's revised article on MRVP is a timely reminder that the British Army does not have a light (under 15 tonnes) armoured vehicle capable of transporting infantry battalions safely wherever they are needed.
This discussion is not about high-end combat vehicles like Boxer and Warrior for heavy armour roles. It is a basic requirement for a general purpose armoured minibus - a protected vehicle that transports up to 10 soldiers from A to B.
Such vehicles do not enter the direct fire zone, but have decent underfloor protection and can resist artillery fragments and at least 7.62 mm bullets. They're easy to operate and support. They are a recognition that unprotected Land-Rovers and trucks are no longer acceptable.