THE SITUATION IN UKRAINE (Thread)
As Russian troops continue to mass along the Ukraine's Eastern border, we are all rightly concerned. But will Putin really go for another land grab? And if so, what might happen? Let’s look at how a potential scenario might unfold...
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Putin attacks across three lines of advance into Western Ukraine. Whatever his strategy, this time it’s different. Unlike 2014, Ukraine forces are better prepared and much better equipped. Territorial gains within the first 24 hours are less than anticipated.
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Global condemnation swiftly follows. Further sanctions are applied, but this changes nothing at the front. Withering artillery barrages are followed-up by substantial armoured thrusts. Although Ukraine forces lose ground, Russian forces suffer significant attrition.
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Casualties on both sides begin to mount. Russian rocket artillery causes widespread damage including civilian deaths. Ukraine forces respond with Israeli-made loitering munitions of the same type used in Nagorno-Karabakh. Thousands of Russian armoured vehicles are lost.
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More important, Russia’s logistical supply chain is targeted so that troops at the front run out ammunition allowing Ukraine forces to counter-attack. Far from achieving a rapid result, the offensive soon gets bogged down and becomes a war of attrition.
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Three months in, Putin’s actions have turned Russia into an outcast. Worse still, the sight of body bags being repatriated starts to sap support at home. As sanctions bite harder, life for ordinary Russians becomes increasingly difficult.
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Ukrainian special forces infiltrate Russia and unexpectedly attack key infrastructures and military installations. Within six months, Russia itself is a country under siege. The Russian economy starts to crumble. Violent public demonstrations become commonplace.
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In response to indirect Western support for Ukraine, Putin’s rhetoric becomes increasingly threatening. His inner circle fearing the consequences of escalation, recognise the danger he now poses. But will this be enough to force him out? Possibly.
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We can explore different scenarios. The thing is, however much Ukrainian territory Putin manages to seize, any attack would be costly politically, militarily, and economically. Attacking the Ukraine is therefore a very risky strategy for Putin.
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Like other oppressive dictators, Putin faces a day of reckoning. If he cannot retire gracefully with the billions he has managed to hide away, he may choose to go out in a blaze of glory. He may be using the West's fear of this scenario to negotiate to his advantage.
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This is a somewhat simplistic view of the situation for Twitter, but not completely unrealistic. What can be said with certainty is that Russia without Putin, without sanctions, and without a broken economy, would be a great trading partner and friend to Europe.
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So, the West needs to stand firm in its support of the Ukraine. But equally, we need to show support for ordinary Russians. We admire their culture and long history. What we don't like is its leader and his regime. They have to go.
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So, in the absence of detail from the recent Defence Command Paper, I thought I would provide a personal view on the British Army's strategy and answer that all important question: WHAT IS IT FOR? I'll start with the principal threats to note the resurgence of peer adversaries.
The UK's four overarching defence commitments translate into a range of roles with varying intensity. The specific tasks the Army aims to perform were not communicated clearly. The important shift in emphasis is a move to high-end expeditionary war fighting.
The four primary tasks are performed by Light, Heavy and Special Forces structures. Again, once you understand the intent, the logic is sound. An increased special forces component is consistent with the missions we anticipate.
BRITSH ARMY HEADCOUNT REDUCTION (Thread)
Looking back at personnel cuts made in 2010, a reduced Army of 82,000 didn’t help Britain regain its financial strength, it simply signified a hollowing-out of our ability to defend ourselves.
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It destroyed the credibility of David Cameron’s Coalition Government then and even more so in hindsight. It was military illiteracy on a grand scale. The problem wasn’t so much the reduction itself, but the fact that there was no real strategy behind it, no future plan.
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Back in 2010, the UK's involvement Iraq and Afghanistan didn’t really serve our national interests (See Ben Barry’s book). If these conflicts were sub-optimal uses of the Army, they raised the important question of what the Army’s underlying raison d’être should be.
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BRITISH ARMY MRVP PROGRAMME (Thread)
The Army wants an inexpensive multi-role protected vehicle so that more of its troops can benefit from protected mobility. This remains an important programme that will ensure a larger % of the Army is deployable.
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As things stand, the Army wants to acquire the Oshkosh JLTV for Package 1 (Command & Liaison / Tactical Support roles). And is holding a competition between GDLS Eagle V and Thales Bushmaster MR6 for Package 2 (Troop Carrying and Battlefield Ambulance roles).
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However, MRVP has come under increased scrutiny and for good reason. JLTV is an excellent and inexpensive vehicle. But helping our post-pandemic economy to recover will require us to invest in military vehicles built domestically rather than imported from the USA.
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WUHAN ONE YEAR ON
On 22 January 2021, it will be a year since China locked-down the city of Wuhan and in doing so alerted the rest of the world to the fact that we were facing a new and deadly illness that has changed our lives.
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There is compelling evidence to suggest that China knew how serious the virus was long before January 2020. Internet searches in the Wuhan area revealed people trying to identify the symptoms we now identify as Covid-19 in October and November 2019.
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Athletes returning from the World Military Games in Wuhan, also in October 2019, reported a strange illness that was unidentified at that time. Isolated cases of an unknown illness also presented at French, Swedish, and other European hospitals in November 2019.
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Yesterday's @RUSI_org speech by @BWallaceMP was one of the most significant made by any UK Defence Secretary over the last decade. Although no detailed announcements were made, there are five reasons why we should take note.
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1⃣ The speech clearly signalled that UK Defence has become a more important Government priority than it has been at any time since the end of the Cold War in 1990. While it is unrealistic to expect a massive uplift in spending, swingeing cuts seem to be a thing of the past.
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2⃣ The Integrated Review promises to be a robust strategic process that will align our aspirations with our resources so that UK defence is RELEVANT and CREDIBLE while being AFFORDABLE and SUSTAINABLE. This means that whatever we decide to do, we will resource it properly.
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WHY HAS BRITISH ARMY RENEWAL BEEN SO PROBLEMATIC?
Having made the point about the need for urgent modernisation, I want to try and explain why achieving this has proved to be so challenging. Our story starts in 2000, a decade after the Cold War ended. 1/
At this time when we were not involved in any major conflict.
Deployments to Iraq, former-Yugoslavia, and Sierra Leone had shown how difficult and expensive it was to generate, position and sustain capable land forces in an expeditionary context. 2/
Since the forward basing of units ties-up forces that can’t be used elsewhere, the need for a medium weight capability to make the Army more deployable and easier to support was identified. This was the impetus behind programmes like FFLAV, MRAV (Boxer) and FRES. 3/