UEFA consists of 55 national federations. To give an example I'm familiar with, the Polish one (PZPN) has 6679 registered clubs and 500,000 registered players (the country of 38m people). There is a pyramid of different levels of competitions - youth, amateurs, professionals /1
That's a lot of teams (my hometown of 300,000 people has 6, but there is a village of 350 people close by that has one & it competes in a league), a lot of money, a lot of vested interests and a lot of politics too. You have good (inclusivity), bad (corruption) and opaque. /2
What we are seeing is partly bargaining between the small number of teams at the top and the rest and partly an attempt to extract more consumer surplus (and maybe grow the market too), with UEFA and national federations insiders threatened in the middle /3
I don't have a strong opinion about the best outcome here, but this is not just like creating new NBA - there are distributional effects with only one that seems unambiguously good to me (reducing the power of often corrupt insiders) and a lot of risks due to the change /4
You may ask - isn't it just a free market? Maybe, but there is a lot of market power here and it seems like the new league is an attempt to strengthen the cartel consisting of superstar teams. UEFA is not an efficient alternative, but we are likely comparing two third-bests /end
Another thought on this: it is interesting that French and German teams are reluctant. My guess is that they have a bigger stake in their large domestic markets. They've not been looking to the international market to nearly the same extent as the Spanish or British teams
And Italian market just seems poorer, so outside opportunities look attractive for their select few best teams. Or perhaps Bayern and PSG are just less professionally run. Or there is politics behind it too (given that at least Macron has been vocally against it)
But if you compare to American professional leagues, you'd think that you want teams all over the continent. I realize that British teams and Real/Barca have following elsewhere but still the business model of football has always been to a large extent about local loyalties
It seems that my domestic market size speculation is trumped by the ownership structure explanation
There are 170,000 gas stations in the US. Did we subsidize building them? Tax carbon and let the market figure out how many charging stations to build and where
As promised: long and boring thread about income vs consumption tax. TL;DR they are not as different as you might think. Income taxation distorts saving and consumption taxes are harder to make progressive in the short term, but they are close cousins
Let’s start with (national) income identity:
Labor income (L)+Capital Income (K)+Transfers (G) -Taxes (T)=Consumption (C)+Saving (S)
where T should be thought of here as taxes other than consumption/income tax that we are about to introduce.
I’ll mostly ignore foreigners 2/29
What would be an income tax? It’d be a tax on the left hand side or it could also be a tax on L+K (not the same from distributional and political economy standpoint, but I’ll put it aside). I’ll mostly ignore T and G and think about L+K. 3/29
Time for my substantial comments about the @gabriel_zucman and Emmanuel Saez tax series. I'll run with numbers for top 0.01%, over 1962-2014. I'm still to fully digest top 400 and projections to 2018. So, first things first: the QJE and the paper show different patterns:
Just to make sure it is not missed: these are very different patterns. Between 1962 and 2014, the QJE series shows 3.3pp drop. The book one shows 18.7pp drop. Volatility differs to.
What makes them different? This (improved) animation illustrates and the thread goes over it more slowly:
I'll post a longer thread with substantial comments later, but for now I'll just describe where the bodies are buried in the comparison of the refereed QJE DINA paper and the book/NYT animation
I'll show everything for top 0.01%. Because the QJE stops in 2014, I'll stop there too and I'll show it starting in 1962 when micro files start and QJE has details.
Note the milder pattern in the blue line and a strong trend in the red one - that's where we are heading.
There are two important things that changed. One is assumptions about incidence. Most importantly, corporate incidence is assumed on shareholders only, rather than all non-housing capital (nothing is on labor in either case)
Following up on the major discrepancy between NYT visualization and the published QJE paper (see the quoted thread). Below is the comparison of what is in the two sources. They generally don't line up and the discrepancy goes in the direction of the trend visible in NYT graphics
Just to be clear: PSZ (2018) is a peer-reviewed paper published in QJE, a top economics journal, gabriel-zucman.eu/files/PSZ2018Q…
The NYT visualization is based on data from the forthcoming book that's supposed to follow the same methodology with just some adjustments. Details unknown.