It is *very* difficult to understand why so much effort is being made to keep the Irish government onside in the OECD talks. If the talks deliver, the business model is bust - and the government's focus should be on finding a better future that doesn't rob others of revenues.
Ireland imposes large revenue costs on others - we estimate this one jurisdiction accounts for some 3.7% of the global losses due to tax abuse. iff.taxjustice.net/#/profile/IRL
As OECD negotiation on 'pillar 1' seem to be moving towards Biden administration's proposal that would not require global treaty change; and 'pillar 2' would be a coalition of the willing on a minimum tax rate - there'd no longer be an opportunity for Ireland or others to block.
So it is extraordinary to see a quote like this:
'Ireland is not a tax haven, it is an investment hub and is a key player in the OECD talks for this reason.'
Extraordinary, that is, because this quote comes not from the Irish finance minister, but *from the OECD*.
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This is quite something. The French government's position on the EU move to public country by country reporting for multinational companies, a key measure to curb profit shifting abuses, appears to have been captured entirely by... the business lobby.
The French government's two-pager on its negotiating position - its critical demands - has been leaked. According to the scoop in @Contexte, the metadata of the pdf reveal the hand not of diplomats or ministers, but of a senior employee of MEDEF - the French business lobby group.
This revelation gives us two things: first, we can look at the position that MEDEF has convinced the French government to take up, and see the priorities of the lobbyists; and second, we can understand a bit more the wider French government position on tax, including at the OECD.
It has long been something of a mystery why the OECD secretariat pushed 12.5% in the 'pillar 2' discussions.
One theory went like this.
The secretariat were committed, or saw the commitment of some major member states, to keep pillars 1 and 2 together. But pillar 1 (as the secretariat proposed it) needed treaty change, meaning Ireland etc could block. So to minimise that risk, pillar 2 had to be 'acceptable'...
History faces forwards as well as backwards. As we prepare for the second day of our #ImperialInequalities conference today, and our new @FPCThinkTank
piece is published, I've blogged on whether and how the UK could move beyond its imperial legacies taxjustice.net/2020/12/04/the…
Registration for day 2 of #ImperialInequalities is still open, and the events get underway in just over three hours
Dr Ndongo Samba Sylla @nssylla opens day 2 of #ImperialInequalities, with a keynote on 'Colonial macroeconomics: Then and now' in which he highlights the commonality between imperial approaches and contemporary economic policies
We're now starting the first panel of our #ImperialInequalities conference, with @JuliaMcClure_ examining the role of 'welfare imperialism' in the Spanish empire.
At #ImperialInequalities, @JuliaMcClure_ highlights how ideas of 'charity' and 'welfare' were central to justifications for empire; and also created opportunities for private individuals to capture benefits, including through the abuse of charitable foundations to hold wealth
This is fantastic - really impressive set of questions and issues raised on the international approach to illicit financial flows. There's a lot to say so I'll thread the replies here, bit by bit...
1. Why did the MDGs overlook non-aid finance? This was by design: the MDGs were driven by aid donors, and were largely conceived of as ensuring better alignment of donors and recipient states - setting common goals so aid would deliver more.
Here's Sakiko Fukuda-Parr on this point - whereas by 2015, the aid focus was widely understood as a central flaw in the MDGs, so the aim of the Sustainable Development Goals was to ensure much broader ownership & applying to countries at all income levels researchgate.net/publication/29…
Matt summarises very well the broadly non-ideological objections to what has just been achieved, in confirming corporate tax abuse as part of the illicit financial flows SDG target, so I'll try to thread a response with each of his points
So first, I don't think there really is much of this confusion around. People largely understand these are quite different phenomena; but they also recognise, rightly, that they depend on being hidden, and they do the same kinds of revenue & social damage
This is a point of disagreement. I saw that much of the pushback was *precisely* not to have corporate tax abuse addressed under either 16.4 *or* 17.1, but to keep it out of the SDGs entirely - on the grounds that the OECD had it covered. (Discuss.)