Thread by @timwalker919

Remaining blind to the maritime dimensions of the Cabo Delgado insurgency creates strategic gaps for any action under SADC auspices. Therefore, I am glad to see that this aspect of the conflict is being given its due (or so it seems so far) #ISSMaritime🧵

dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-0…

While the prospects for adequate regional maritime security cooperation appear limited, maritime forces are set to play an important role in relation to conflict resolution efforts by land forces.

As well as in their own right safeguarding humanitarian aid and fighting the rampant maritime crimes that both drive and profit off the instability in Cabo Delgado.

Cabo Delgado insurgents demonstrated in 2020 and 2021 an adeptness at adapting their tactics to include limited maritime capabilities into some of their operations.

Control of the seas and denial of freedom of movement in coastal areas to your adversary is important to both insurgents and security forces. The absence of 🇲🇿 control gives insurgents opportunities to use the seas for resupply, a source of revenue, and maritime assault options.

Regaining control of littoral areas will help counter-insurgency efforts and conflict resolution, provide benefit for humanitarian assistance initiatives through creating safe channels, and could deter any seaborne threats to remaining offshore liquefied natural gas operations.

I am not arguing that insurgents have already created an effective maritime capability, as there is no evidence to suggest that it has undertaken operations with a uniquely maritime motive or intention yet.

However, their capture of weapons and boats from attacks, ongoing tactical adaption, and the tempting motive to strike at 🇲🇿 last remaining sources of LNG income, increases the probability of multiple and wider-ranging sophisticated attacks from, at or over the sea in the future.

Unless rectified, the long-term strategic implications of maritime insecurity will almost certainly increase the suffering of the inhabitants of Cabo Delgado, prolong the conflict and contribute to the further spread of transnational organised crime in the Western Indian Ocean.

A robust regional maritime response offers decision-makers (1) the means to compensate for some of the limitations of ground forces, (2) degrading and severing a lifeline insurgents are increasingly using, and (3) complement conflict resolution and humanitarian measures on land.

SADC and the AU must urgently take, and be seen to take, actions that show why they matter in this situation because stakeholders are likely to become intolerant of the maintenance of this status quo over the next decade unless significant actions are taken.

Inaction now arguably risks permanent reputational damage if they are perceived as ambivalent or ‘seablind’ to the imperative of securing the maritime domain and thus irrelevant. This obscures, rather than is a true reflection of, SADC and the region’s achievements and potential.

The situation in Mozambique is an opportunity to revive AU-level discussions on the operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF) as a tool to tackle maritime criminal activities - a decade after it was first discussed owing to the emergence of piracy in the Indian Ocean.

Furthermore, SADC has a Maritime Peace Support Operation Doctrine untouched since 2002 that, if revived and provided with requisite capabilities, could significantly assist humanitarian efforts at the least.

The provisions of the 🇲🇿🇿🇦2011 MoU, later expanded in 2012 to include 🇹🇿 permits combined maritime operations in territorial waters to combat any illegal activities that undermine the security and economic development of state parties.

In March 2021 the @PresidencyZA renewed the decision to send as powerful a naval presence as the @SANDFCorpEvents can muster to the waters adjacent to the Cabo Delgado coastline.

Somewhat confusingly, South Africa continually frames the operation’s policy value almost entirely in terms of counter-piracy. The focus on piracy gives a very one-sided view of what this MoU was arguably set up and intended to accomplish.

Moreover, South Africa’s (and thus SADC’s naval capabilities) are arguably worse off in 2021 than they were in 2011 and the suspicion that it is basically too far gone from to play a substantial role in regional security is pervasive – not least among many South Africans...

At the very least, South Africa’s deployment has ostensibly generated a decade’s worth of intelligence about the maritime and coastal operating environment of Cabo Delgado.

Given the fact that the deployment has been renewed for its 11th year, it is reasonable to assume that the intelligence gathered during patrols and that informed renewal decisions was sufficiently concerning to warrant the maintenance of this naval presence too.

The mandate and concept of operations for Operation Copper could be amended to prioritise humanitarian operations by providing escorts and the carriage and delivery of vital goods, with detachments of the Maritime Reaction Squadron onboard to provide amphibious capabilities.

This is something South Africa has already repeatedly done in the past, for instance when SAS Drakensburg conducted two cargo runs from Durban to Beira to deliver humanitarian aid for the survivors of Cyclone Idai.

This has set a strong precedent and the key requirements of presence, logistical and combat support and patrolling basically asks it to resume what it has already done and reports on as indicative of successful attainment of its planning targets to @ParliamentofRSA

The insurgency takes place in the milieu of maritime crimes in the Mozambique Channel. @simonehaysom has shown how the illicit economy to which these criminal networks are linked helped generate the conditions for the insurgency to emerge and may continue to fuel the phenomenon.

Even with some displacement of smuggling routes to southern ports such as Nacala, the absence of a maritime law enforcement presence gives insurgents opportunities to leverage control over coastal landing sites and the port facilities of Mocímboa da Praia to extract revenue

If so, it is possible that continued maritime insecurity in the northern Mozambique Channel could lead to insurgent-held territory becomeing a platform for launching assaults and expanding influence across the wider region.

Venturing to sea could become an insurgency goal if they seek to attack the symbols and sources of 🇲🇿 power - potentially cutting off one of its last sources of LNG associated revenue, although it requires them to possess sophisticated capabilities it has yet to demonstrate.

Offshore LNG sites and associated shipping could make tempting targets the longer the insurgency has unhindered access to the sea and freedom of movement in the littoral to adapt their tactics to these circumstances.

The LNG sector in Mozambique will be restricted, for the foreseeable future, to offshore floating facilities. @Total and @exxonmobil have chosen to postpone, possibly permanently, any further work and decisions.

This leaves @eni, scheduled to commence in 2022 above the Coral South gas field in Area Four, as the only major LNG project operator.

Joseph Hanlon has repeatedly stated drugs (and other illegal cargoes) are divided up into smaller quantities on dhows anchored in international waters, sometimes 30-40 km off the coast and taken ashore by flotillas of smaller boats.

Given this is well known, then surely energy companies and investors have long regarded an effective offshore patrol presence as compulsory? Extensive use of private contractors is thus likely to continue as 🇲🇿 cannot in good faith provide the desired levels of maritime security.

Yes, a completely offshore presence removes an LNG site from the immediate inshore area of operations of the insurgency and reduces the risk of disruption.

But, it will still be accessible from any shoreline areas under the control of insurgents operating against a backdrop in which maritime criminals have demonstrated an ability to operate covertly well out into international waters...

Regaining coastal control provides the most feasible way to safely supply communities of internally displaced people with the huge amounts of aid they desperately need although Mozambique ports north of Nacala lack the infrastructure to offload large amounts of cargo...

@LolaCastroWFP the @wfp_mozambique regional director in southern Africa, stated “A huge humanitarian tragedy is unfolding before us”. Other organisations such as @ICRC_Africa @hrw @AmnestySAfrica @UNICEF_Moz @Refugees @MSF_southafrica and more have stated this at every turn...

Secure maritime routes play a crucial role in providing safe humanitarian channels - especially given access and mobility overland is always challenging when annual rains wash away bridges and transform those dirt roads not in insurgent hands into quagmires.

For many the best available means of escaping from harm is fleeing by seas to islands and coastal towns in Mozambique or to the Mtwara region of Tanzania

Insurgent capability and coordination were demonstrated during their attack on Palma when they launched attacks by boat on two administrative posts of Mucojo and Quiterajo in the Macomia district – approximately 40km apart from each other and both well over 100km south of Palma.

Unhindered access to the sea has allowed insurgents frequent opportunities to capture hostages, steal food and kill people during raids on villages along the Cabo Delgado coast and refugee camps on many of the islands in the Quirimbas archipelago.

The conflict in Cabo Delgado thus has elements that necessitate deliberate maritime actions at national and regional/multilateral levels, as the implications of worsening littoral maritime insecurity could be profoundly destabilising for the entire southern African region.

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