Welcome to a late-night thread about data, terrorism data, and what we think we’re measuring when we’re measuring terrorism. 1/
This thread was sparked by Benjamin Allison’s new article on coding inconsistencies in the CSIS and New America datasets on terrorist attacks in the U.S. As a frequent critic of the CSIS data in particular, I’m sympathetic to the goal here. BUT… universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/conte… 2/
…there are additional questions I want to raise. The first: are the CSIS/New America datasets unique in their somewhat sloppy coding of what is and isn’t terrorism and their judgments about motives in contexts of uncertainty? Not at all. 3/
I cannot stress this enough: every. single. dataset on something called “terrorism” includes cases that will challenge your intuition on what is or isn’t terrorism, depending on where you sit. Think hate crimes are terrorism? You’ll be upset. Think they’re not? So will you. 4/
You can pick almost any attack out of any dataset & argue for why it should or shouldn’t be there. There was such controversy over the Las Vegas shooting at the GTD that poor Erin Miller wrote a whole post explaining that its inclusion in the dataset. 5/ start.umd.edu/news/global-te…
Full disclosure: I used to work at the GTD, & its coding rules have profoundly influenced how I think about terrorism—namely, that it’s what we want it to be, which is a conclusion not many would take from the GTD or that GTD staff would support, I suspect! Let me explain. 6/
I remember my intuition initially chafing at including attacks by Fulani herders, skirmishes b/n Philippine troops & the NPA, & literally everything IS ever did in the database (even w/ variables for recording degree of doubt). That wasn’t how I’d understood terrorism before. 7/
But 2 examples stand out: the Ukrainian & Syrian conflicts. In Ukraine, rebels fired rockets at villages every day for a while. Was that terrorism, or was that war? What’s your intuition? How did you arrive at that? What’s the logic that affects how you answer that question? 8/
Syria was a different problem, bc we knew things were happening. but the quality of info on the ground was so poor & our rules for inclusion were demanding, so for a while we *knew* we were undercounting attacks. (The GTD took steps to address this after I left.) 9/
So here we have a few parallel problems: what is legible to you as terrorism, what fits the rules and what happens when they conflict with legibility, and how the hell do you know anything about anything for certain? 10/
Allison raises numerous issues w/ vague, contradictory, or generally incomplete info in his article. I won’t dispute individual codings; I agree w/ many of his analyses & disagree w/ others. My point is that this isn’t a CSIS/New America problem. It’s a terrorism problem. 11/
And it’s a problem because there are political interests driving what we do & don’t consider terrorism. The term is not objective; there is no discrete violent tactic that is “terrorism.” We can apply a definition, but that definition doesn’t exist in a void absent politics… 12/
…nor does that definition help us delineate a category that *actually helps us understand political violence* vs. one that advances a particular narrative about what violence is legitimate, what is illegitimate, and who gets to decide. 13/
Allison says it is important to code events “properly,” which for him I think means in accordance with available info about motives. There’s a reason the GTD codes motives conservatively and doesn’t code perp ideology: this is so, so complicated. 14/
What codes do you use? Broad ones? Nuanced? Can 1 event have multiple codes? Motivations are not monocausal. If the killer of 6 Asian women in Atlanta does not explicitly voice neo-Nazi sympathies, is his targeting of a racial group unrelated to structural white supremacy? 15/
I don’t have good answers for those who want to build terrorism datasets. My personal preference is to jettison the category of “terrorism” & focus on what we actually care about. Racist attacks? Go for it. Nonstate targeting of civilians? I’m all ears. 16/
But the “terrorist” category is a political project & a subjective one, & it’s measuring a category constructed by dominant groups & 1 we become complicit in perpetuating when we try to lift it from its context & reclaim it as something objective. It’s not. It will never be. /fin
P.S. To be clear, I commend @BenVAllison for applying such careful scrutiny to the CSIS/New America data, which got considerable media coverage. “Why this case and not that” is a crucial question. So let me extend it: why “terrorism” and not something else.
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So the Biden admin released its Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, which de-prioritizes international counterterrorism in favor of great power balancing and statecraft.
Here is a Saturday night thread on why those are actually not separate things. 1/
What this thread is NOT: an argument for expanding the counterterrorism umbrella to include yet more policy areas. It is, however, a plea to observe how the 20+ yrs of "war on terror" discourse have exacerbated problems & expanded the idea of terror whether we like it or not. 2/
Let’s take an example: China. From a statecraft perspective, China is a major strategic concern for the US. If you believe human rights need to at least in part govern U.S.–China relations, however, then counterterrorism has to become part of the equation. 3/
Six years ago, I visited the PhD department that I’ll graduate from this summer. In light of that, here is a thread on Visiting R1 Departments When You Did Not Attend an R1 for Undergrad. 1/
First and foremost: you will meet a lot of fellow prospective students from R1s. That world is so different, & the training they received, the skills they already have, & the knowledge they’ve picked up about academia might feel intimidating to you. It definitely did to me! 2/
(It also might not: undergrad experiences vary so widely, even within specific “tiers” of institutions, and nothing is wrong with you if you are not intimidated. I am simply sharing my experience in case it helps to normalize feeling a bit out of your depth.) 3/
The "black militant" mentioned here as taking refuge in Cuba is Assata Shakur. In 2013, she became the first woman on the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorists list. It is not a coincidence that she is also Black, nor that this happened almost 40 years after her alleged crime. 1/
Shakur was a member of the Black Liberation Army (BLA), a Black Panther splinter group. She was found guilty of killing a state trooper in 1977, though the facts of the case are disputed. This NPR interview is a decent overview. 2/ npr.org/2013/05/07/181…
Throughout the 1980s and 90s, the FBI & other national security bureaucracies did a lot of work to write the BLA, Black Panthers, & other groups into the emerging narrative that identified violence by people of color, particularly Black people, as terrorism. 3/
I study white supremacy in institutions and the perpetuation of white supremacist violence. Here is a thread of terms other white scholars have suggested I use instead of white supremacy. 1/
White entitlement: "Do we really have to use the term 'white supremacy'? Is that merited?" If we don't use it to describe *actual white supremacist violence*, then what are we doing? 2/
Racism: That's not off-base, but it's a consequence of the system, not the system itself, friends. Next. 3/
I went to an #APSA2020 panel on applying for jobs at teaching-oriented institutions—something many R1 grads want but that R1 faculty aren't always equipped to advise them on. Here's a thread with what I learned: 1/
1. Apps for teaching institutions need to look different from apps at R1s. You need to center teaching in your cover letter & CV—don't bury either. Def. don't put teaching at the end of your cover letter like you might for an R1. 2/
2. Teaching institutions know they are often not R1 applicants' 1st choice. If they *are* your first choice, you need to drive that home. Research the institution & explain why you want to work *there* specifically. 3/
I've been moving furniture & subsisting off of applesauce all day, so join me in my delirium & let's talk about how New Zealand designates terrorist organizations, shall we?
(No really, this tells us a lot about counterterrorism, secrecy, & state power.) 1/
Much like the US, NZ maintains a list of organizations legally designated as "terrorist." It is a criminal activity to provide material support to or try to join these orgs. Unlike the US, NZ views its list as an obligation under UNSC resolutions. 2/
UNSC 1267/1989/2253 oblige member states to take action against al-Qaeda, ISIS, the Taliban, and their affiliates. Worth noting the US designates these entities separately. Other entities that default to UNSC resolutions include the EU and India. 3/