In 2017, Ctrip was the undisputed OTA market leader with ~50% of China's online hotel bookings. They quashed competitors and lead a consolidation of the OTA market.
By 2018, they had lost all of that to Meituan.
Wtf happened?
2) The one KPI that rules Chinese consumer super apps - Meituan's secret sauce and their reason for all in on Community Group Buying (CGB)
It's not DAU, it's not AOV, it's not GMV
It's the frequency of use per day
3) I've said this many times, relative to western consumer tech companies, who tend to focus on “serving a function” as their core mission, Chinese companies tend to focus on “owning the user” as their core mission.
4) Owning the end-user and their attention is what led to the rise of the super apps Chinese tech firms (though the initial wedge into the consumer is always through a function - Meituan through group buying, Wechat through messaging etc.)
5) Why is this - China is mobile-first rather than websites first. A customer will only use the handful of apps on their phone rather than continues to download new ones. This has lead to walled gardens in Chinese tech which means CAC is extremely high.
6) Trying to keep acquire customers from other apps is costly, better to make sure the user keeps coming back to you. More on this below lillianli.substack.com/p/owning-the-f…
7) Owning the user means you want high-frequency users who habitually use you for all of their needs. This means massing a portfolio of high use services that makes you top of mind for your users.
This is the reason for why bike-sharing was so hot in 2015 and why CGB is hot now
8) Both of these are high-frequency usage services that prompt the user to open the app at least once or twice a day, forming an app checking habit.
A habit, once formed, is hard to break. No one knows this better than Chinese super apps.
9) So this is what happened with Ctrip and Meituan.
Meituan's meteoric rise in hotel bookings started in 2015, the same year it merged with Dianping and acquired Kuxun.com from Tripadvisor.
10) It channelled it's 600m DAU who were used to opening the app daily for their food needs into their new hotel booking segment.
It was also shrewdly gone after lower end hotels that Ctrip with their high-end branding did not engage with.
11) Meituan a battle-hardened field sales team that had were just as capable of signing up hotels as restaurants to the platform
Coupled with no hotel cancellation fees, Meituan had a clear proposition for consumers. Cheap hotels anywhere.
12) By 2018, Meituan had surpassed Ctrip by a huge margin in terms of the number of hotel nights booked, today it leads the hotel booking market in China.
13) While this can be a story of counter-positioning, most folks in Chinese tech sees it as a war between high-frequency usage versus low-frequency usage. With high-frequency usage winning by a landslide.
14) People don't use a hotel that often, they do frequent restaurant and get food deliveries almost every day. If their food delivery apps offer hotel, the convenience and familiarity is already there, why leave for another platform?
Other superapps took careful notes.
15) Fast forward to today, the need to maintain a high-frequency touchpoint is what drives Meituan, Alibaba, PDD and Didi to compete fiercely in CGB. They are there fore the user usage habits as much as the favourable economics lillianli.substack.com/p/the-hottest-…
16) So next time your favourite super app, be it Meituan or Taobao, Grab or Rappi, is moving into a new and seemingly unrelated area. Ask yourself, how is this improving their frequency of usage? How is this helping them own the user through cross-selling?
I'm writing threads like this for the rest of May, follow me to get these spams on your TL.
Tomorrow I'll talk about $TME
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1) Let's talk about Tencent Music ($TME) which at a market cap of $29.5bn is the largest music platform in China.
Its strategies for success, positioning and where its future is.
2) Tencent Music today is a consolidated entity between three big music brands QQ music, KuGuo and Kuwo (and a few smaller brands).
Each of these brands has a different positioning from its legacy user base. Though an inorganic evolution, this is great brand strategy
3)
- KuGuo - blue-collar, 25-30 year old
- QQ music - White-collar professionals, students
- Kuwo - Married 30-40 year olds typically has kids
Each of these groups has different purchasing capacity, interests and music interests. Having sub-brands allows more precise targeting
I propose a theory of digital transformation journey called Digitalisation-Cloud-Automation journey (DCA journey for short) and argue that each stage of the DCA journey enabled subsequent stages to occur for the West.
2) The journey is sequential as each step unlocks new business models and technology needs that would be unfeasible or unwanted at an earlier stage.
3) This development sequence is the assumed path for cloud adoption and growth of SaaS, but not so for China. China is undergoing all three stages of digitalisation, cloud adoption and automation concurrently rather than sequentially.
1) Prediction: China domestic brands and design will enter into a golden age in the coming 5 years, with at least one DTC brand breaking the $100bn market cap.
This is from a combination of growing demand and supply of innovative brand storytelling and design.
2) On the demand side, the rise of Gen Z heralds a new generation of brand-agnostic consumers who doesn't implicitly hold western brands in high regards. They are focused on expressing individuality and control the spending power of 2 generations from parents to grandparents
3)Western brands are not only too mainstream but also tainted with political allegiances given geopolitical tension.
These brands' haven't been able to provide hyper-local zeitgeist products. Chinese traditional embroidery is table-stakes. Where's the hanfu, lolita and JK stuff?
I took screenshots of Taobao, Pinduoduo and JD’s homepage and ran them through a translation layer so it’s not perfect. But I’ll explain what they are
Let’s go through each of them in turn. Taobao first:
2)With super apps, the landing page should be thought of a the control panel.
As such top two rows are leading to other Alibaba products - these include Tmall (more upscale Taobao), Tmall international (overseas goods), Tmall supermarket, Flying pig (travel booking) and grocery
3) There’s also functions like voucher, gold coins (loyalty points) and categories.
You also the see the prompt message at the top, which always highlight the deals of the week for you to browse.
There’s also the live-streaming portal, which is TikTok like.
1) I want to talk about something that deviates from my normal tweets. I've been hesitant about expressing this since I am not an Asian American.
But I want to talk about Chinese culture's implicit acceptance of pain in exchange for survival. And how that makes us silent.
2) A recent article came out about Viya (China's most success livestreamer who can command 37m viewers per stream). She sleeps 4-5 hours every day and spends the rest of that time working, rarely has time for her kids or a break. She's getting surgery for her vocal cords rn.
3) The article stresses the tough lives these livestreamers live and in fact, the tough lives everyone lives in China. Eating bitterness is taken as given. The cost of not just doing business but surviving.
1) Let's talk about @AcquiredFM's episode on Meituan. Fan disclaimer: I'm a big fan, my Substack is partly inspired by their process.
I thought the episode was good, I have a few different interpretations and a more cautious outlook:
2) My first reframing is the proxy war between Tencent and Alibaba. Meituan, PDD and Didi all have to grow-up in the shadows of this dynamic. It's almost impossible to be neutral.
This means that whatever Meituan did with one, it affected their dynamic with the other.
3) Alibaba is a traffic taker (since it is focused on conversion at the end of the funnel) while Tencent is a traffic giver.
This means that for Ali, Meituan was only there to give them more traffic, whereas Tencent was driving volume to the apps