Interceptors don’t travel in straight lines. Image
Sorry if the above tweet was cryptic: it’s just a good illustration of how interceptor trajectories can be wildly varied and non-linear! (Iron Dome on the left here, obviously.)
Since there’s interest in this: two more high res shots from Reuters of Iron Dome interceptors over Ashkelon (yesterday, IIRC). ImageImage
Lots of interceptors (endo- and exoatmospheric) do this: the battle management system calculates when to launch the interceptor to create the greatest probability that it’ll be in a place where it can maneuver toward the target at the *appropriate speed* (velocity window).
So even though it’s intuitive that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points, it is *not* how interceptors are designed—because the physics of making this happen are tricky enough that relative closing velocities (between the interceptor & target) matter a lot.
And that’s also why BMD/air defense is about much more than just the interceptors: software & sensors are just as important.
Yep: important to understand that these Hamas rockets (low-altitude, relatively slow, and unguided) are pretty much the ideal-type targets for a system like Iron Dome.

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More from @nktpnd

11 May
It would be good if North Korea had no nuclear weapons, but if they’re going to have nuclear weapons, I’d rather they feel confident in the survivability of those weapons. It would be stabilizing for them to have the least incentives to use nuclear weapons early in a crisis.
It’s uncomfortable for Americans, but a North Korea with robustly operationalized nuclear command and control and more than a handful of nuclear warheads at its disposal would, indeed, be more “stabilizing”.
Nuclear stability, of course, can come with its own costs. warontherocks.com/2017/11/nuclea…
Read 4 tweets
11 May
Largest saturation strikes ever on Iron Dome, I think? As impressive as the system is at dealing with these short-range rockets, magazine depth will always have limits.
Quite a bit—but it’s also limiting damage (and the peacetime denial benefits also have value). But as we’re seeing, the attacker can reasonably saturate even under resource constraints.
I’m assuming the IDF rotates reload windows for individual Iron Dome batteries to avoid major temporal gaps in coverage, but these strikes may be large enough to force their hand.
Read 7 tweets
20 Apr
STRATCOM commander Adm. Richard’s 4/20 testimony, as prepared: armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/…
Apparently, this line is punchy enough to merit bold & italics.
I may have missed it, but this seems like a notable elucidation of the “operational requirements” behind the W93 (lower mass for ease of handling, apparently).
Read 13 tweets
19 Mar
Small note amid ongoing debates: in 1986, North Korea hosted the Pyongyang International Conference for Denuclearization and Peace on the Korean Peninsula—the same year the 5 MW(e) reactor at Yongbyon achieved criticality and six years before the 1992 DPRK-ROK joint declaration.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War affected North Korean calculations, but some might be interested in Kim Il Sung’s remarks from ’86 regarding that conference: aindft.com/English/juche/…
No one’s disputing that Kim Il Sung and North Korea weren’t instrumental in offering up the lexical guidance that manifested in the joint ROK-DPRK endorsement of “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” in 1992 (or at least, no one should be).
Read 4 tweets
20 Jan
This doesn't get said enough. Everything can't matter equally and we should be creating incentives for local partners to step up; don't ignore the IOR, but recognize that it's not the fulcrum for US interests in Asia.
This was gnawing at me during the whole First Fleet trial balloon. Resources are already thin and overstretched; over-emphasizing the IOR is a setup for failure. India and Australia should be taking the lead.
Along these lines, I've admired the clarity in some Indian strategic documents (like the Maritime Security Strategy), which notes clear "primary" and "secondary" areas of interest for New Delhi in Indo-Pacific. It's okay to say certain things matter less than others.
Read 4 tweets
20 Jan
There's a big error in this document pertaining to North Korea's ICBMs that I think is worth digging into. It's disappointing for an IC product.
The document notes that "North Korea debuted the Hwasong-14 ICBM in an October 2015 parade." (USIC calls the October 2015 ICBM mockups the KN14, but this designator system is not used in the NASIC report.)
Page 28 of the NASIC report then includes this photograph, from North Korea's July 4, 2017, launch of an *actual* Hwasong-14 ICBM (KN20). The caption notes it's a "modified Hwasong-14."
Read 15 tweets

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