This doesn't get said enough. Everything can't matter equally and we should be creating incentives for local partners to step up; don't ignore the IOR, but recognize that it's not the fulcrum for US interests in Asia.
This was gnawing at me during the whole First Fleet trial balloon. Resources are already thin and overstretched; over-emphasizing the IOR is a setup for failure. India and Australia should be taking the lead.
Along these lines, I've admired the clarity in some Indian strategic documents (like the Maritime Security Strategy), which notes clear "primary" and "secondary" areas of interest for New Delhi in Indo-Pacific. It's okay to say certain things matter less than others.
None of this precludes US activities in the IOR that do have yields that are disproportionately positive to their costs (for instance, sustaining HA/DR & SAR ops, anti-piracy, and exercising with India/Japan/Australia, etc).
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The document notes that "North Korea debuted the Hwasong-14 ICBM in an October 2015 parade." (USIC calls the October 2015 ICBM mockups the KN14, but this designator system is not used in the NASIC report.)
Page 28 of the NASIC report then includes this photograph, from North Korea's July 4, 2017, launch of an *actual* Hwasong-14 ICBM (KN20). The caption notes it's a "modified Hwasong-14."
If DF-41 is no longer CSS-X-20 (the 'X' implying developmental) then this sentence doesn't really make sense. Is the DF-41 past the development phase or not?
Yes. And note that it comes on the same day Pompeo swipes at "multiculturalism." Hard for me to take the concerns of people who wouldn't want a practicing Muslim Uyghur family for neighbors seriously.