Small note amid ongoing debates: in 1986, North Korea hosted the Pyongyang International Conference for Denuclearization and Peace on the Korean Peninsula—the same year the 5 MW(e) reactor at Yongbyon achieved criticality and six years before the 1992 DPRK-ROK joint declaration.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War affected North Korean calculations, but some might be interested in Kim Il Sung’s remarks from ’86 regarding that conference: aindft.com/English/juche/…
No one’s disputing that Kim Il Sung and North Korea weren’t instrumental in offering up the lexical guidance that manifested in the joint ROK-DPRK endorsement of “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” in 1992 (or at least, no one should be).
But the details remain: when Kim Il Sung was drawn to the concept, South Korea’s covert nuclear weapons program was just a little more than a decade out from its termination under Park Chung-hee. And US tactical nuclear weapons remained on the Peninsula.
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This doesn't get said enough. Everything can't matter equally and we should be creating incentives for local partners to step up; don't ignore the IOR, but recognize that it's not the fulcrum for US interests in Asia.
This was gnawing at me during the whole First Fleet trial balloon. Resources are already thin and overstretched; over-emphasizing the IOR is a setup for failure. India and Australia should be taking the lead.
Along these lines, I've admired the clarity in some Indian strategic documents (like the Maritime Security Strategy), which notes clear "primary" and "secondary" areas of interest for New Delhi in Indo-Pacific. It's okay to say certain things matter less than others.
The document notes that "North Korea debuted the Hwasong-14 ICBM in an October 2015 parade." (USIC calls the October 2015 ICBM mockups the KN14, but this designator system is not used in the NASIC report.)
Page 28 of the NASIC report then includes this photograph, from North Korea's July 4, 2017, launch of an *actual* Hwasong-14 ICBM (KN20). The caption notes it's a "modified Hwasong-14."
If DF-41 is no longer CSS-X-20 (the 'X' implying developmental) then this sentence doesn't really make sense. Is the DF-41 past the development phase or not?
Yes. And note that it comes on the same day Pompeo swipes at "multiculturalism." Hard for me to take the concerns of people who wouldn't want a practicing Muslim Uyghur family for neighbors seriously.