Econ Thread: My paper on the strange experiment of playing card money in 17th-18th centuries Canada (image below) with Bryan Cutsinger and Mathieu Bédard was accepted in the European Review of Economic History #econhist#econtwitter
This is a *very* strange monetary experiment in economic history. The governor of the colony printed money on the back of playing cards to finance expenditures when he ran out of coins. The "notes" were backed by incoming coin shipments.
Yet, and this might interest @JohnHCochrane because of the fiscal theory of the price level implications, there was no inflation in spite of massive overissues.
We argue, following points made by @lawrencehwhite1 and @GeorgeSelgin, that the weakness of legal tender enforcement explain the absence of inflation. Under weak legal tender enforcement (or absent even), bad money is driven out of circulation (falling velocity).
Thus, the low credibility of the government promises on the back of playing cards simply translated into falling velocity for cards but no effect on prices as other mediums kept circulating.
However, when the government announced a redemption plan in 1714, it imposed a time limit to redeem the 1.8 million pounds of notes (a per capita amount equal to nominal GDP per capita). If not redeemed before then, they became worthless.
This was a de facto enforcement (because of the wealth tax that was embedded in the features of the redemption plan) of the legal tender. To avoid losing whatever share of wealth they held in the form of notes, households were aggressively trying to get rid of them.
At that point, good money was crowded out and notes dominated circulation until their redemption. It is also in that period that there is rapid inflation (a doubling of the price level in one year).
Our story is one where the institutions (as per Buchanan and Brennan's Power to Tax) matter to understanding monetary developments.
With weak/ineffective legal tender, fiscal theory (backing theory) of the price level is quite effective. With strong legal tender, the quantity theory is stronger.
This was an exceptionally fun paper to research and write. I want to thank @cmicmeissner for being an amazing handling editor at EREH and Joan Roses for his comments.
Thread: Now forthcoming in Public Choice: how rent-seeking explains asylum expansion in America between 1870 and 1910 (co-authored with Ray March). #econhist#econtwitter
Few people know that the asylums in American asylums expanded 10x in terms of absolute numbers and close to 4x in per capita terms between 1870 and 1910.
Most works in social history attribute this to broadly defined contemporary understandings of public interest (some of which are less savoury than others). Very few works have tried to see if there was a rent-seeking component. Ray and I argue there was one!
Given the massive drop in JOE listings on the econ JM, here is some source of hope: if you are a candidate that goes into the private sector this year and you apply to return to academia next year, I will take that as a strong signal of your commitment to research #econtwitter
Last year, I did the job market interviews for my university (@kingsatwestern) and it was painful because I had to say "no" to very decent candidates. One of the main deciding factors for us was the commitment to research and teaching abilities.
Sorting research potential is *particularly* hard and so we looked for signals regarding persistence of efforts in the future. Personally, if somebody accepted a job during the market in the private sector and then tried to return, I would see that as a strong signal.
People have heavily debated whether markets/states can/need provide public goods. Essentially, people have debated whether public goods are market failures and (if they are) how frequently do these failure happen.
The most frequently used example is that of the lighthouse which has many characteristics that make it a public good (non-excludable and non-rivalrous).
My friend @CorneliusEcon asked me about how I read all the books I buy (i.e. my "Book Harvests") and here is the short answer: I dont! At least, not immediately. And this is actually how I end up reading them. Weird? Here is a thread on reading and research #econtwitter
1st: Buying books is important -- they are a capital good. Books are, however, unlike other capital goods. They last much much much longer and their depreciation rate is low as hell. If you accumulate them, you create a high stock on which you can produce
2nd: Once I buy a book, I read the TOC and the table of content to memorize what it says "broadly speaking". Then I shelf the book.
I do not do rant. But, following @TomPhilipson45's resgination from CEA, many people on #econtwitter have taken digs at the acting chair, Tyler Beck Goodspeed. Why? Because his PhD is not in economics and he has few citations. These are cheap shots!
So let me do what I do best which is to simply state some facts about Goodspeed. Obviously, you can dislike his work. You can dislike his politics. You can dislike who he decided to work for. However, his work as an academic is *off-limits* if you want to say he aint an econ
First, if that is your benchmark, get ready to cross out some big names from the field: Roth, Tullock, Kahneman, Ostrom, Herbert Simon, Nash, David Friedman.
Recently, I was thinking about Joel Mokyr's classic "Why Ireland Starved" which basically argued that overpopulation was not a thing in 19th c. Ireland. Loved that book. I decided to google some follow-ups and found this neat piece in "Land Economics" #econhist#econtwitter
The piece is elegantly simple and instructive. It does a simple econometric trick -- add a land quality index to see if overpopulation (proxied by land/pop ratio) was a thing. The author used pretty simple tools to make the adjustment. jstor.org/stable/3146668…
In the end, he found that there were signs of overpopulation.