OFFICER EDUCATION (Part 4)
There is much more to this topic than we can cover in just two threads per week while still leaving time to cover all the other topics we’ll get to, but how about one more thread about Officer Education in the @USArmy during the Interwar Period?
As many people know, the Army is a lot more than just Infantry, Armor, and Artillery. And Army missions involve a lot more than just closing with and destroying the enemy. The things that officers learn in school help make sure the Army functions as a whole organization.
For the 20 years or so between World War I and World War II, the officer education system focused on establishing a foundation of competence – so that staff officers would know how to do the things they needed to do to make sure the Army functioned overall. (@1stCavalryDiv)
Having that competence as staff officers meant that these men would be much more confident in their work. (@173rdAbnBde)
The education system also worked to train decision making skills – and when you look at the modern officer education system, you can still find these elements built into the lessons and lectures and course work and so forth.
In 1931, General Pershing wrote in ‘My Experiences in the World War’:

“We were confronted with the task of building up an army of millions that would require as many trained staff officers as we had officers in the whole Regular Army at the beginning of the war.”
At the start of WWI, the @USArmy had about 9,000 officers but would need somewhere close to 80,000. Numbers would be even higher for WWII.
And those few with experience from WWI, and/or who had attended officer schools during the Interwar Period, would influence the officers among the growing numbers in the Army, so it was important that they had the education to share.
We often talk about training to fight the last war, and this is not a uniquely Army problem.
Officer education during the Interwar years would rely heavily on the lessons learned from WWI. Things like – firepower was the biggest killer on the battlefield, we lacked experience and skill in handling large formations, and officer incompetence is often paid for with blood.
In a lecture Dr Schifferle gave about his book he asked the question: Can you as an officer do the things needed of a staff officer or unit commander to get a division of maybe 20,000 soldiers into combat at the right time and place? And during WWI the short answer was no.
So, going into the Interwar Years, we knew that we had to make some changes.
For those who are curious, Dr Schifferle explains what @USACGSC was like in the Interwar period. Classes would run from 0800-1130 and 1300-1700 and students would engage in an impressive variety of learning that included lesson types for “readers, listeners, thinkers, and doers.”
CGSC students would attend 1-2 lectures per week involving the whole class. Small groups would each attend 2 conferences per week. On Friday mornings even smaller groups (10 students and 2 instructors) would have a “committee meeting” discussion.
Every afternoon students would engage in problem solving exercises and individual work. And they’d have PT (physical training) several mornings per week as well.

(Okay, this is actually from Captain America but it’s a good gif 🙂)
As we got closer to the mobilization period preceding WWII, and then into the war, the @ArmyWarCollege closed and remained closed until 1950, leaving @USACGSC the main officer education point.
The courses at @FortLeavenworth got shorter, more condensed, and more specialized – teaching officers what they would need to know for specific jobs, similar to the condensed course the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) ran in France during WWI.
Dr Schifferle points out that during WWII, in Europe, none of the Division Commanders had graduated from the traditional long course at @FortLeavenworth and none of their subordinate officers had either. Just the shorter, condensed, specialized course.
Leading up to WWII, more and more students were selected to attend @USACGSC at @FortLeavenworth with an average class size of 225 officers, and an average age of 42 – which is a little bit older than what the typical age is now, by about 10 years.
School is tough. It’s a commitment to learning and doing work that is quite different from what the average person imagines Army life is like. This was just as true in the 1930s. Compared to the typical half-days of troop duty at the time, school was a significant change.
Dr Schifferle notes that there were no female officers attending @USACGSC during the Interwar period, and that Army wives were told to "support their husbands" and that "families would return to the easy life when their husbands got” back to troop duty.
There has been a lot of discussion in recent years about this. In general, families will PCS (permanent change of station) to @FortLeavenworth to allow the officer to attend school for a year at @USACGSC or maybe @us_sams because the courses are longer than a few months.
As the @USArmy continues to adapt and evolve, #PeopleFirst and other campaigns are gathering more and more momentum and we are seeing a variety of efforts to help facilitate things like family stability and help make it more realistic for Army spouses to have careers as well.
If you're just tuning in or you've missed any of the previous threads, you can find them all saved on this account under ⚡️Moments or with this direct link twitter.com/i/events/13642…

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Combined Arms Center

Combined Arms Center Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @usacac

18 May
OFFICER EDUCATION (Part 3)
As we’ve mentioned, all parts of the @USArmy suffered from limited funding throughout the Interwar Years, and a significant factor contributing to that was the general isolationist sentiment throughout the country.
Some officers criticized the lack of available resources (including soldiers), while others made efforts to help maximize use of the resources they had.
Read 32 tweets
15 May
OFFICER EDUCATION (Part 2)
When World War I ended with an Armistice, many @USArmy officers were surprised. The situation seemed “unfinished” and there was concern that another war was imminent.
“Among many of the front-line troops in the Allied armies there was… an ambivalent mood, elation at the end of hostilities yet frustration that the victory was somehow muddied by a sense that Germany was still on its feet, bloodied but unbowed.”
Read 37 tweets
11 May
OFFICER EDUCATION (Part 1)
“To do the right thing under the extreme pressure of combat requires certain personal characteristics and leadership, but it also requires professional knowledge and decision-making skills – and the resulting professional self-confidence.”
During the Interwar Years, there was really only one place that offered the professional education and training necessary to be a proficient @USArmy officer – @FortLeavenworth – positioned “on the bluffs overlooking the Missouri River in Kansas.”
Read 39 tweets
8 May
GROUND SUPPORT & STRATEGIC BOMBING
High-altitude precision strategic bombing first started gaining momentum in the mid-1920s at the @USArmy Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS), which was at Langley Field in Virginia at this time. By 1930, it would be the foundation of instruction at the school.
Developing doctrine for strategic bombing would be the ultimate expression of independent Air Power and talk of this began dominating discourse in the 1930s. This is Guernica, destroyed in 1937 by German forces testing their doctrine in the Spanish Civil War.
Read 46 tweets
4 May
THE AIR-GROUND DILEMMA
In 1941, there was a real push to create a battle-ready PMP (Protective Mobilization Plan) army that would encompass both Ground and Air Forces.
At the time, and increasingly throughout the Interwar Years leading up to this time, the perception of Air Power among much of the general public was a bit overly optimistic when compared to the actual capabilities of the then-contemporary air forces.
Read 34 tweets
1 May
LOGISTICS (Part 1)
“You will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics.” – Eisenhower
Logistics is involved with every part of the military. The core functions include supply, maintenance, deployment and distribution, health services, logistic services, engineering, and operational contract support.
Read 22 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Too expensive? Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal Become our Patreon

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!

:(