This thread is about the Israeli Iron Dome missile defense system - based on both recent events & my July 2014 Chicagoboyz blog post - that addresses the "Asymmetrical War" & Cold War ABM defense myths applied to Iron Dome versus its reality.
1/
I named that Chicagoboyz post as follows:

Iron Dome: Winning Asymmetric Warfare Through Superior Cost Accounting

...for some good reasons I'll expand on in this thread.
2/
web.archive.org/web/2020102115…
Graphics like this represent the innumerate "Magical Thinking" that passes for true cost - benefit analysis regards asymmetrical warfare.

It simply does not work this way.
3/
To begin with, that infographic of the cost of Hamas rockets excludes the cost of digging & outfitting the underground production facilities or smuggling price mark up to get the precursor explosive & rocket chemicals through Egyptian & Israeli border security.
4/
I count 42 Tamir rocket exhausts in this photo.

At $25,000 US dollars for each new Tamir, that works out to $1,050,000 for the pictured interceptors.

Each Tamir is being guided to a Hamas rocket trajectory by an Iron Dome radar & computer that have been identified will be

5/
...impacting in a programed "keep out zone."

These keep out zones are priority defense locations, key infrastructure & highly populated areas.

Considering all the value of Israeli lives, serious injuries & property saved by these Tamir "Defense Blossoms." That is a bargain

6/
But don't take my word for it.

To evaluate Tamir defense versus Hamas rocket attack in terms of cost-benefit, you start with the fact that Iron Dome is ignoring Hamas rocket trajectories that land in places like farm fields & rural roads with low/no people. This 21st century
7/
...digital selectivity stacks very well with Israel's civil defense warning system of sirens & cellphone apps.

Next, you have to ask what is the price of a life or a serious injury prevented. Thus you need a insurance actuary or a life insurance table for that cost.
8/
I wrote that 2014 Chicagoboyz blogpost because there was an easily available document that did just that.

It is called "The True Cost of Road Crashes: Valuing life and the cost of a serious injury" (cover photo & doc link attached)
9/
web.archive.org/web/2021051207…
A good friend took that report's actuarial cost model (attached photo) and did the calculations of the official

* Value of Statistical Life (VSL) and
* Value of Serious Injuries (VSI)

for Israeli rocket injuries the 2006 Lebanon War & Gaza rocket fire from 2000 to 2010.
10/
I've placed the page link, the screen captured text & calculations here.

Trust me when I say click the link to read there and save your eyes from the screen captures.

alternatewars.com/BBOW/ABM/ABM_E…
11/
Considerations of digital selectivity and the economic cost avoidance that Iron Dome provides to Israeli policy makers was utterly missing from the 2014 criticisms of MIT physicist, media talking head, and so-called ‘missile-defense expert’ Ted Postol.
12/
web.archive.org/web/2014071710…
There are many problems with Prof. Postol's criticisms. But at heart, it is the one that most defense intellectuals share.

They are, one and all, learned cynics who "...know the price of everything and the value of nothing."
13/
Prof Postol made his bones with criticisms of the US Army Patriot missile's performance versus Scud missiles in the 1991 Gulf War and in 2003. He applied his Patriot critique in 2014 (see figures) to the Tamir, his focus was on the 'failure' to engage & destroy warheads...
14/
...by both missiles.

Postel's specific point was his analysis suggested Tamir's were not getting nose-to-nose, Tamir to rocket, warhead impacts 100% of the time and thus was a technical failure.
15/
Prof. Postel's arguments here are a tarted up version of the Late Cold War ABM debate with nuclear weapons.

Only destroying the warheads counted and anything less than 100% perfection was failure.

16/
This was the kind of straw man arguments defense intellectuals of the late 20th century loved to use in the "Star Wars" ABM debates.

You set up impossible to meet performance system requirements and say the system failed when they don't.
17/
Newsflash: Hamas rockets don't carry nukes!

If you can knock a rocket off course 300 yards into an empty field or highway by tagging it's tail.

That is mission accomplished.
18/
In a very real sense, Iron Dome is Asymmetric Warfare by a technologically advanced society on an irrational/suicidal opponent that has converted suicide terrorism into an economically affordable war of attrition that trades suicidal robots — Iron Dome’s Tamir interceptor
20/
missiles plus traditional guided missiles from Jets or unmanned drones — for suicidal Hamas rocket crews & the civilian “human shield” infrastructure that hides them at a cost-trade off beneficial to the advanced western economy supported Westphalian Nation-State.
/End

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More from @TrentTelenko

26 May
@CBI_PTO_History Justin,

Regards US intelligence blind-spots Japanese air and sea power, the USN had a persistent & horrid weak spot on IJN radio-navigation.

Check this horrid bit of bureaucratic misdirection with Lorentz beams and IFF is from the USN NAVTECHJAP reports. Image
@CBI_PTO_History The navigation equipment throw away line about direction finding equipment refers to the Type 1 Air Mk III Direction Finder and Homing Device.

When you cross check with CINCPAC-5-45 "Japanese Radio Communications and Radio Intelligence" you find this...

ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/r…
@CBI_PTO_History ...note:

* Course-indicator does not operate over great distances, has many defects. Appears that Japanese use this receiver in fighter aircraft to direct them to a rendezvous with enemy planes. Gear identical with that designed by Fairchild Aerial Camera Company. The antenna is Image
Read 7 tweets
23 May
@ArmouredCarrier @Bruce437t @thehistoryguy Jamie,

Here is a bit more context for you. It turns out that the British Pacific fleet was well aware of the IJN's radar pathfinder planes we have discussed.

The called them "Gestapo planes" because they thought they were "minders" there to report on the personal...
@ArmouredCarrier @Bruce437t @thehistoryguy ...performance of each Kamikaze for possible secret police retribution against Kamikaze pilot families.

This in the kindle edition of David Hobb's "The British Pacific Fleet: The Royal Navy's Most Powerful Strike Force."

See:
amazon.com/dp/B00K5B2VZ6/…
@ArmouredCarrier @Bruce437t @thehistoryguy This particular viewpoint was so horridly wrong WRT Japanese culture that I don't know where to begin.

Suffice it to say that the wartime UK Military was not well attuned to Japanese thinking.

They had a lot of American company.
Read 4 tweets
23 May
@ArmouredCarrier @Bruce437t @thehistoryguy Jamie,

I've spent 6-years sussing out Japanese Okinawa electronic warfare razzle dazzle in context.

There were a total of 19 fighter director teams on the USN DD's screening Okinawa. By day 46 of the operation -- which was 82 days long -- the USN had lost 12 of 19 teams.
@ArmouredCarrier @Bruce437t @thehistoryguy That is a 63% attrition rate, with four teams gone from stress, and most of the remaining eight teams being dead or severely wounded.

This is intense infantry combat rates of loss.

The USN flew in four replacement fighter director teams and grabbed a team off of one of
@ArmouredCarrier @Bruce437t @thehistoryguy ...one of the AGC command ships (Mt McKinley) by day 46.

Japanese Flag Ranks were engaged in "fantasy reality" power games at Okinawa. They simply could not be responsible for the Japanese success in killing fighter director teams.

We have Adm Ugaki's diary after all.
Read 9 tweets
21 May
@EugenPinak @CBI_PTO_History That is far too simple an explanation because it lacks the multiple intelligence intuitions -stupid- involved.
@EugenPinak @CBI_PTO_History How the USA did long range air navigation in WW2 was fundamentally different from the rest of the globe (See link). The Japanese Navy used UK Royal Navy/Continental European style interwar radio-navigation.

THE ARMY AIRWAYS COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE
ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/V…
@EugenPinak @CBI_PTO_History From what little bits I've put together, the IJNAS radio navigation in the SCS somewhat like the German one in continental Europe described here:

The British Meacon System
weaponsandwarfare.com/2016/02/06/the…
Read 15 tweets
19 May
@EugenPinak @CBI_PTO_History Eugen,

Just because you have a piece of kit doesn't mean you have the TTP to use it properly.

The Japanese Operations 100, 101 & 102 strategic bombing campaign in the summers of 1939-40-41 against Chongqing/Chungking were where the IJNAS got fighter escort signals techniques.
@EugenPinak @CBI_PTO_History Sussing out what the IJNAS was doing signals wise requires an operational template to understand equipment limitations at the time.

This is a good one:

Colgate calling: offensive strategic fighter control, ETO, 1943-45.
cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collec…
@EugenPinak @CBI_PTO_History This wikipedia page actually has some of the best operational template data on those raids to compare with the Colgate template.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_o…
Read 8 tweets
14 May
@IntelCrab @IntelCrab, you may have just made the single most important observation of the 2021 Gaza War.

Underground fiber optic cables are extremely & uniquely vulnerable to the seismic shock from high order detonations. They stop transmitting light when subjected to them.
1/
@IntelCrab This fact was used in the 1991 Gulf War Scud Hunt. Saddam used fiber optic cables to communicate to Scud hide sites.

Many air strikes US SF teams called down in the western Iraqi desert were to "sanitize" an area of fiber optic cables after flushing a Scud launcher.
2/
@IntelCrab The collapsing Hamas commercial internet bandwidth, decreasing Hamas ability to coordinate large rocket launches, and the IDF's sustained bombardment of North Gaza combined with that GW1 fact tells me the IDF is destroying underground fiber optic cables.
3/
Read 4 tweets

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