Regards US intelligence blind-spots Japanese air and sea power, the USN had a persistent & horrid weak spot on IJN radio-navigation.
Check this horrid bit of bureaucratic misdirection with Lorentz beams and IFF is from the USN NAVTECHJAP reports.
@CBI_PTO_History The navigation equipment throw away line about direction finding equipment refers to the Type 1 Air Mk III Direction Finder and Homing Device.
When you cross check with CINCPAC-5-45 "Japanese Radio Communications and Radio Intelligence" you find this...
* Course-indicator does not operate over great distances, has many defects. Appears that Japanese use this receiver in fighter aircraft to direct them to a rendezvous with enemy planes. Gear identical with that designed by Fairchild Aerial Camera Company. The antenna is
@CBI_PTO_History ... a single rotatable loop with sense antenna.
That is not how any of that worked. Those loop antenna's found a plane's direction from known location coded radio beacons.
Central Bureau handed a list of such IJN beacons to Section 22 in Sept 1944...
@CBI_PTO_History By way of explaining my "USN meacon jam" comment, this is the only good diagram I've found showing masking beacon jamming of Luftwaffe non-directional radio beacons in WW2.
This is from Brian Johnson's book "The Secret War" which accompanied the BBC TV series of the same name.
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This thread is about the Israeli Iron Dome missile defense system - based on both recent events & my July 2014 Chicagoboyz blog post - that addresses the "Asymmetrical War" & Cold War ABM defense myths applied to Iron Dome versus its reality. 1/
I named that Chicagoboyz post as follows:
Iron Dome: Winning Asymmetric Warfare Through Superior Cost Accounting
I've spent 6-years sussing out Japanese Okinawa electronic warfare razzle dazzle in context.
There were a total of 19 fighter director teams on the USN DD's screening Okinawa. By day 46 of the operation -- which was 82 days long -- the USN had lost 12 of 19 teams.
@ArmouredCarrier@Bruce437t@thehistoryguy That is a 63% attrition rate, with four teams gone from stress, and most of the remaining eight teams being dead or severely wounded.
This is intense infantry combat rates of loss.
The USN flew in four replacement fighter director teams and grabbed a team off of one of
Japanese Flag Ranks were engaged in "fantasy reality" power games at Okinawa. They simply could not be responsible for the Japanese success in killing fighter director teams.
@EugenPinak@CBI_PTO_History That is far too simple an explanation because it lacks the multiple intelligence intuitions -stupid- involved.
@EugenPinak@CBI_PTO_History How the USA did long range air navigation in WW2 was fundamentally different from the rest of the globe (See link). The Japanese Navy used UK Royal Navy/Continental European style interwar radio-navigation.
@EugenPinak@CBI_PTO_History From what little bits I've put together, the IJNAS radio navigation in the SCS somewhat like the German one in continental Europe described here:
Just because you have a piece of kit doesn't mean you have the TTP to use it properly.
The Japanese Operations 100, 101 & 102 strategic bombing campaign in the summers of 1939-40-41 against Chongqing/Chungking were where the IJNAS got fighter escort signals techniques.
@EugenPinak@CBI_PTO_History Sussing out what the IJNAS was doing signals wise requires an operational template to understand equipment limitations at the time.
@EugenPinak@CBI_PTO_History This wikipedia page actually has some of the best operational template data on those raids to compare with the Colgate template.
@IntelCrab@IntelCrab, you may have just made the single most important observation of the 2021 Gaza War.
Underground fiber optic cables are extremely & uniquely vulnerable to the seismic shock from high order detonations. They stop transmitting light when subjected to them.
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@IntelCrab This fact was used in the 1991 Gulf War Scud Hunt. Saddam used fiber optic cables to communicate to Scud hide sites.
Many air strikes US SF teams called down in the western Iraqi desert were to "sanitize" an area of fiber optic cables after flushing a Scud launcher.
2/
@IntelCrab The collapsing Hamas commercial internet bandwidth, decreasing Hamas ability to coordinate large rocket launches, and the IDF's sustained bombardment of North Gaza combined with that GW1 fact tells me the IDF is destroying underground fiber optic cables.
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