1. In the long version of the audio released in Hausa before his death on 18 May, Abubakar Shekau, the leader of #JASDJ #BokoHaram, gives interesting bits about the events that were leading to his ultimate defeat. He also sheds light on more long term issues. A thread…
2. Shekau confirms that ISWAP (never named) entered Sambisa, and that some fighting took place. He also insists that ISWAP flipped over a number of JAS members.
3. He notes that ISWAP was pressing him to pledge allegiance to Abu Ibrahim, the current Islamic State Caliph, adding that they promised him he would be acknowledged as wali of “the whole African continent” if he did.
4. What can one make of this attempt to negotiate a solution and end fitna? Did ISWAP really believe it was a possibility? Was it just a show? Were they trying to look good to the IS, which was never happy about fitna in Borno? Were they trying to look cool to other JAS members?
5. Interestingly, Shekau does not distance himself from the IS Caliph. He insists once more the Caliph was not well informed, that ISWAP was manipulating info. Maybe with ISWAP at the door, he was trying one last trick: convince the Caliph of his good faith.
6. Shekau also goes over the history of jihad in Borno… First, just like Abu Musab in his recent audio, he mentions ghanima, war booty.
7. Ghanima is a key question for both ISWAP and JAS, as they do not pay salaries – the income of fighters comes primarily from ghanima. Debates (and more) about the fair sharing of ghanima have been haunting BH.
8. Shekau’s difficulty in openly distancing himself from the Caliph is very interesting. I think it confirms that the idea of the Caliphate (with a Caliph who comes from the bloodline of the Prophet, as he insists) has a lot of appeal among jihadis.
9. Shekau reiterates a fundamental of his beef with ISWAP. People living under control of the Nigerian state cannot be Muslims. They are not even apostates. They never were Muslims to begin with. They are kafir and can thus be attacked and enslaved, just like the military.
10. Shekau also goes over the history of his relationship to the global jihad, Al Qaeda and then IS. He insists that he paid allegiance to Al Qaeda (so probably Ben Laden?), something I had heard also in interviews.
11. As @Humangle notes, he mentions 50 million Nairas received from AQ – probably the 200,000 euros that AQIM leader Droukdel ask be sent to Nigeria in a July 2010 correspondence. It is now confirmed the money was received.
12. Also, the money caused a bit of stir, though it is not clear why. In his book, @bokostan mentions the money may have been a reward for involvement of Nigerian jihadis in an AQIM hostage op in Mauritania.
13. He also says that some AQIM officials were not happy that the money went out to JAS (a distant organisation?). Maybe also the Nigerians involved in the operation, who were much closer to AQ and AQIM than Shekau was, had other views about how to use the money in Nigeria.
14. Shekau mentions unidentified people who wanted to use the money for matters of religion. He probably means that they thought that in Nigeria, it was still the time of da’wa, not the time of jihad.
15. Shekau insists a lot on an important but little known figure, Uqba (Ibrahim Uqba al Muhajir). It was Uqba that he « used to send to Mali » (so, several times).
16. Uqba was a Maiduguri man, a deportee from Saudi Arabia. According to interviews, two of his brothers died in the Kannama episode of 2003. He trained in Somalia before 2009.
17. According to interviews, Uqba created the Fallujah training camp near Maiduguri and was an instructor there. And then he created a major camp in Sambisa, which bears his name.
18. Shekau also seems to mention a “brother” who came from Yemen to Mali to bring a letter from AQ saying AQ was in trouble and that Shekau should do what he thinks best – and so Shekau "forgot about Al Qaeda". Maybe this was AQ’s polite way to cut links with Shekau…
19. Shekau also discusses the relationship to the IS. He confirms for instance that he submitted a letter explaining his creed and that he was approved by the Caliph.
20. He mentions another episode: Arab visitors in Sambisa, explaining the value of Western education, and Shekau rejecting that, insisting on the content of Nigerian national anthem & pledge (as shirk). Time is not clear. Probably IS, not that of AQ.

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More from @VincentFoucher

27 May
1. This is #BokoHaram thread-day, it seems… This time about the situation now prevalent in the Sambisa. I indirectly got some feedback from the #JASDJ side… It looks like, with Shekau gone, the incorporation of JAS into ISWAP is well on its way.
2. First, some info about the recent events gets additional verification. Yes, there was fighting in Sambisa (and JAS fighters did not lose it all). Yes, Shekau blew himself up, killing some ISWAP members. Yes, Abu Musab is ISWAP’s leader.
3. JAS now counts 20 subgroups, each presumably under a qaid (did some qaed die during the ISWAP push? Not known. Also, is Bakura counted as one of the 20?)
Read 16 tweets
5 May
If you have an interest in the political economy and governance of jihad, and its interaction with pastoralisms (or cattle-rearing), a good piece by Florian Köhler about #ISWAP #BokoHaram and cattle-rearers in the Diffa region of Niger… a thread… tinyurl.com/99mzasc6
If you are impatient with the growing mass of gnosis and dribble that gets published about #BokoHaram, commentaries of exegesis of interviews with diplomats, security experts and NGO workers, read that piece – it includes actual fieldwork. Yes. Interviews with pastoralists.
(I know. Amazing. I too was moved).
Read 11 tweets
10 Jan
Pretty fascinating story... Traditional king in Mlomp (Ziguinchor region, southern Senegal) sets market prices for a number of goods, apparently for local produce. So curious to know more, #Casamance & #Senegal heads. xibaaru.sn/oussouye-le-ro…
I assume it is an attempt to protect local agriculturists from traders. The king acts as a de facto union organiser...
Fascinating that Diola kingships, often been disregarded, are gaining traction. In a way, the Diola have found their marabouts - decades ago, the Murid khalif general had intervened to get better prices for groundnut farmers, among whom he counted many follower
Read 6 tweets
8 Jan
Finally getting down to reading one of the recent rare reports on #GuineaBissau - on its part in the global cocaine trade and that part's part in its politics. globalinitiative.net/analysis/cocai… (thanks to @FrancoisPatuel) (a Portuguese version is available too)
It makes for a sad read, I must say. And it echoes with what I have been hearing this last year. Now as before, some networks within the military and the military-controlled Guarda Nacional keep the Judiciary Police at bay and protect the trade.
Either these military leaders vouch for the traffickers, or the traffickers bring on board a number of civilian politicians and officials too. I did not know that the son of Interior Minister Botché Candé was the head of one Bissau's police corps...
Read 14 tweets
28 Jun 20
This is big. Hearing from two different sources of an other major overhaul of the #ISWAP command. Khalifa steps down as wali, replaced by Ba Lawan. Abu Musab al Barnawi (not dead!) as amir ul jaysh. Krimima new head of the sharia. Abubakar Mainok head of finance.
I dunno for amir amniyya and amir hisbah. Any one has the rest of the line-up?
So it seems the two main factions have reached a deal, trying to get every one on board... Impressive how that organisation can handle very VERY serious internal tensions (until the next internal purge, I guess).
Read 6 tweets
5 Jul 19
Hearing a fascinating account of #ISWAP operations in the area of the Komadugu-Yobe... a few weeks back, a Kanuri village on the Nigerian side of the river was attacked by Fulani herders. @Pastoralist1 @alouibrahim92 @FulanNasrullah @jhjezequel
Subsequently, since the Nigerian state was not providing security, dozens of young men from that village decided to join #ISWAP, to get protection. In Nigeria as elsewhere, chaos and state weakness are opportunities for jihadi governance projects.
This (specific) case goes against the general idea of a systematic Fulani/Jihadi association, which a number of people cling to in Nigeria and elsewhere. Local configurations are key.
Read 4 tweets

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