Thread by @VincentFoucher

1. This is #BokoHaram thread-day, it seems… This time about the situation now prevalent in the Sambisa. I indirectly got some feedback from the #JASDJ side… It looks like, with Shekau gone, the incorporation of JAS into ISWAP is well on its way.

2. First, some info about the recent events gets additional verification. Yes, there was fighting in Sambisa (and JAS fighters did not lose it all). Yes, Shekau blew himself up, killing some ISWAP members. Yes, Abu Musab is ISWAP’s leader.

3. JAS now counts 20 subgroups, each presumably under a qaid (did some qaed die during the ISWAP push? Not known. Also, is Bakura counted as one of the 20?)

4. Then, the news. #ISWAP has reached out to Shekau’s surviving commanders, and a big discussion has taken place around issues of doctrine and policy.

5. Five main points up for debate. Among these, as expected, the treatment of non-affiliated Muslims living in gvt-controlled areas (“Nigerians”, as JASDJ calls them)… ISWAP has insisted that the target should be the military, that civilians must be preached to.

6. Another big issue: the ID card, a tenet in Shekau’s doctrine. Shekau considered bearing an identification document of a country a case of idolatry towards that country. He argued over this with Senegalese jihadis who had come to him in Borno and wanted to keep their passport.

7. Destroying identity documents… a very powerful way to burn bridges between the jihadi community and the rest of the world… one has to pick a side, and stick to it! Great symbol for a radically sectarian organisation…

8. Apparently, an agreement was quickly attained on all issues but that of the identification documents. Two of the 20 JAS subgroups remained reluctant on that last issue, and have demanded guidance from the IS on this.

9. Max Weber would say that there is a radical Wertrationalität at play here, a desire for absolute parsimony over principles, a decided refusal of pragmatics and politics, and one that still holds (some) sway over (some) JAS members.

10. And so where does this leave us? I know Shekau had stolen the scene for years. He led truly atrocious violence. And for long, he had this provocative, aggressive (psychotic?) swagger. He became the bogeyman. But #ISWAP is a far bigger danger.

11. ISWAP was the underdog at the time of the split in 2016. But they have made clear that they were the real military threat. With the advice of the Islamic State, they have rethought, upgraded, reorganised, refocused.

12. ISWAP has been way more tolerant of Muslim civilians than Shekau, which has served it well. So, ISWAP taking over is probably good short term news for Muslim civilians near Sambisa, if ISWAP is able to rein in the raiding habits of ex-JASDJ fighters

13. I think ISWAP can provide some discipline. After all, there was lots of raiding in northern Borno until they took over in 2016...

14. All the same, ISWAP will keep going after the security forces, NGOs and the Christians relentlessly. ISWAP killed most of the soldiers and vigilantes who died in Borno these last 3 years.

15. Long term, ISWAP is not such a good deal for Muslim civilians. In fact, Muslim civilians know that: most of those who live in ISWAP territory, even while they recognise ISWAP is relatively dependable, feel that the war is not good and would want the state back in control.

16. ISWAP with more territory, men and weapons, and without Shekau raiders threatening its territory... it is going to be a really tough challenge for all the states involved, especially Nigeria, which has a lot on its hands otherwise.