Left parties in many countries have exchanged support from low-education voters for high-education voters since 1970, but without becoming parties of the rich; the right in many places has become a coalition of the rich & the uneducated
The reversal of the educational cleavage in most countries is strongly linked to the emergence of a new sociocultural axis of political conflict & the rise of Green & anti-immigration politics
While the shift is global, the US stands out as moving from almost no left/right division on education & a large division on income in 1970 to a large division on education & almost no division on income by 2010 (by this measure)
The increasing education division between the left & right in rich democracies is being driven by larger splits in younger generations but also by changes over time within generations wid.world/document/brahm…
The European trends look different if you separate out the mainstream left & right parties:
Long way to go, but more traditional NSF funding & DOE national lab funding have successfully attached themselves as solutions to today’s focus problem of Chinese technology competition; also, the distributed locations of national labs & grant-seeking universities still matter
Compared to other issue areas, significant science & tech policy changes involve more leadership from administrative agencies; but the policymaking network is sparsely connected with no core; there has long been high international but low public influence amazon.com/Artists-Possib…
There is now a good chance that we'll more than double traditional NSF directorate funding (while creating a new directorate & funding national labs) under the guise of an anti-China technology competition bill
Senate bill now more closely tracks the House bill, but with more $
Polled issue opinions are associated with ballot initiative outcomes but popular policies underperform; voters systematically prefer the "no" option #polisciresearch dropbox.com/s/zn2uf6kyv8id…
CW among consultants is that an initiative should start with 2/3 support in the polls to pass (with 50%), usually explained not just as status quo bias but responsiveness to negative information; eg, con spending on initiatives is more important than pro: amazon.com/Populist-Parad…
Democrats lost vote share among Latinos, from 71-29% in 2016 to 63-37% in two-way, but gained among white voters with a college degree, from 50-50 to 54-46% in 2020
The run-for-President successful Republican agenda is apparently:
- restrict mail voting
- fine social media for bans
- riot / protest restriction
- ban vaccine passports
- ban transgender in girls sports
- spend the federal stimulus miamiherald.com/news/politics-…
Noem is pursuing a similar focus on symbolic cultural politics & appeals to conservative media: nytimes.com/2021/05/02/us/…
In Red State Blues, I find that Republican control of states polarized cultural politics but didn’t shift state economic policy much: amazon.com/Red-State-Blue…
Meanwhile, Democratic state governments are continuing to move leftward on economic & cultural issues, though without reinvention: seattletimes.com/seattle-news/p…
Federal $ means size & scope of gov will continue growing across Dem & Rep states, continuing long patterns I found
Biden’s reconciliation-driven spend without strings or reform policy agenda seems to reverse Obama-era technocratic trends in Democratic policymaking, with a return to old Dem pol constituency distribution objectives. But it also reflects updated & diversifying academic advice
Economists have largely changed their balance of concerns on deficit spending & on cash benefits. Biden is also relying on more diverse & sociologically-inspired academic advice, visible in defining infrastructure to include social care & greater attention to racial equity.
Points 3 & 4 in @ezraklein's column are similar, but he emphasizes economics losing credibility & change in public mood: nytimes.com/2021/04/08/opi…
Point #2 about the new generation of staffers also applies to the academic help: more diverse, liberal, & less tied to traditional econ
Infrastructure plan is likely to substantially raise both high-income individual taxes & the corporate tax rate. Biden’s 2nd most likely major agenda item is going to be more difficult to pass & not primarily due to the filibuster axios.com/corporate-tax-…
Business opposition & high-income voter opposition are both associated with difficulty enacting proposals, even if they are supported by the public as a whole. Democratic leaders are not aligned with business, but business still has the power to block most change
Much discussion of bills with near zero chance of passage, but even the next most likely bill to pass (infrastructure, after COVID) faces big obstacles