The EU Commission @PaoloGentiloni has just issued a communication on EU economic policy and its coordination - the fiscal rules and those governing so-called macroeconomic imbalances. ec.europa.eu/info/system/fi…
Mostly light, but some shadows.
Thread 👇
1/n
I'll look quickly in turn at
- Next Generation EU
- the (suspension of the) fiscal rules
- monitoring of macro imbalances
2/n
NGEU
Not much new here. COM welcomes the fact that all MS have approved the increase in own resources & almost all have submitted recovery plans. The borrowing-and-disbursing process can begin following COM plan-approval and endorsement by the Council (within 1 month).
3/n
COM is right that the Recovery & Resilience Facility will ease fiscal constraints on the hardest hit MS; RRF is highly redistributive (imk-boeckler.de/de/faust-detai…).
It's too small overall tho and a longer-run pan-European investment program is missing imk-boeckler.de/de/faust-detai…
4/n
MS fiscal policy and fiscal rules
The overall messaging on the need for a cautious pivot and country-specific differentiation is v. welcome. Had we had this in 2011/12 much pain could have been avoided.
Premature withdrawal is indeed not good. 5/n
The general escape clause of the SGP (eurospeak: suspension of fiscal rules) will apply *throughout* 2022. Welcome! Altho fiscal monitoring will, rightly, continue, MS have another 18 months b4 compliance issues arise.
And 🇪🇺 as a whole has 18 months to reform the rules.
6/n
While the COM does not enter into the rule-reform debate here, the language on the fiscal side - incl. on issues such as the need to maintain investment, avoid unhealthy tax competition etc. - is encouraging.
Macroeconomic imbalances
Unfortunately the positive appraisal does not extend to the monitoring of macroeconomic imbalances - which, as I have argued for many years (imk-boeckler.de/de/faust-detai…), is as least as important as the fiscal rules themselves.
7/n
COM runs through the long list of indicators for a long list of MS. Claims that, despite the shocks caused by the recent crisis "revision of the classification of imbalances is not warranted". This misses the point. The monitoring system is fundamentally flawed, crisis or not
8/n
There are too many indicators of in some cases dubious relevance, so that no clear picture and recommendation for counter-action is derived.
And the indicators are skewed ("asymmetric") to focus on debts and deficits, with inadequate attention to surplus countries.
9/n
(This notwithstanding that DE & NL are told - once again, in all likelihood without consequence - to reduce their surpluses.)
10/n
What is needed is a clear and symmetric focus on the cross-border imbalances *between MS*. These relate in particular to diverging rates of price and unit labour cost inflation (competitiveness) and current account positions within EMU. (Rof theW is a different matter.)
11/n
)
Last not least the European Fiscal Board has also called for MIP reform and better integration with the fiscal rules.
13/n
To conclude: COM gets a lot right on econ policy & governance in its latest statement. But it needs to rethink its stuck-in-the-mud approach to macroeconomic imbalances
It is great to see #Vietnam moving up the value chain and developing its own tech, selling it in foreign markets.
OTOH selling hi-end EVs to Americans seems an odd focus. And not just for the reason cited here: it might be a costly failure. 1/4
🇻🇳 ppl currently rely overwhelmingly on motorbikes for private transport, but cars are increasingly common as the middle class expands . Trade agreements are also leading to cuts in hi import duties. Congestion and air pollution are huge problems in urban areas.
2/4
At the same time🇻🇳 has gr8 potential for solar and wind power.
It could become a world leader in electric motorbikes & small affordable EVs. These cd be exported but wd more importantly address pressing domestic economic & ecological development issues.
3/4
imk-boeckler.de/de/faust-detai… @SDullien and I have updated our vacccination forecast for Germany first published in March.
Developments since then require some adjustments, but basically 🇩🇪 remains on track ... with some risks.
Short thread on the main findings 👇
1/
Our mid-March forecast was that 75% of German adults (52.5m people) could be completely vaccinated by end of July. At the time this was highly controversial, but the marked acceleration in vaccinations since has largely borne out the prediction. 2/
Overall the delivery schedules are such that dispensing the requisite number of shots by end July shld not be a problem.
There are two problems, however: the gap between 1st and 2nd shots & issues relating to the vector-based vaccines from #Astrazeneca and #JohnsonandJohnson
3/
Completely agree with @sjwrenlewis economic analysis of EU fiscal rules. Fiscal policy should be about macroeconomic stabilisation not government-debt limitation. Happily, I disagree somewhat on the politics: Feasible reforms cd get us nearer where we need to be.
Thread 👇
1/19
The basic economic insight is:
“<when> the economy is growing rapidly relative to the EU average individual countries need to contract fiscal policy, and in relative downturns … need fiscal stimulus <because> monetary union takes away effective national monetary policy.”
2/19
I'd just make more explicit what is implicit: countries in the former (latter) situation tend to have above-average (below-average) inflation, thus below (above) ave real interest rates, a loss (gain) in competitiveness & thus a tendency to current acc. deficits (surpluses).
3/19
How much does the EU and how much does each member state have to do to achieve the agreed vaccination target (70% of the adult population fully vaccinated by 21st September)?
A short thread 👇, first the results then some discussion of the calulations.
💉🇪🇺
1/8
Starting with the EU, the graph shows that in the 205 days left, a tad over 0.5% of the (total) population needs to get a jab every day. The current rate is a little under 0.2 per day. This implies a needed acceleration by a factor of around 2.7 (right-hand scale). 2/8
Comparing countries, Malta is an outlier, barely needing to accelerate at all (by 4%), whereas Belgium must raise its recent poor performance more than four-and-a-half times. 21 countries need to at least double the rate at which jabs are administered to meet the target.
3/8
Rather there has been a persistent effort over an extended to open up the legal space to make the recent ruling possible.
Let me unoffically translate one long sentence (written, to repeat, in 2014) which encapsulates what is problematic about last week's ruling:
2/4
"That a few independent German judges, basing themselves on the German interpretation of the democracy principle and on the limits this and our interpretation of A123ff TFEU set on the legitimate powers of the independent ECB, take a decision with incalculably far-reaching...
3/4
Useful thread with links on the upcoming ruling by the German Constitutional Court #BVerfG.
What is not sufficently emphasised imho is the risk to the entire legal framework of the EU. It's not just a matter of EMU. The primacy and thus the consistency of EU law is at stake.
1
If countries can subvert agreed EU procedures and institutions, on which the highest EU court, the ECJ, has made a ruling, using national (constitutional) courts, & deriving a legitimacy from their own national constitutions, we are on a slippery slope indeed.
2
Update based on first report of the decision (spiegel.de/wirtschaft/ezb…)
We are indeed on a slippery slope. Let us be clear: The GCC (a majority of 7:1 judges) is of the opinion that the ECJ has made an error in interpreting EU law. This is not just a technical mon pol issue.