2/n: ...mismarking, FTDs, and the complete lack of regulatory enforcement and oversight."
Short sale mismarking? No epidemic of this. It happens. Internal, independent auditors, and the SEC find these things. People get fired. The SEC charged BTIG last week with 90 instances
3/n: dating to 2016-2017 from a single HF which had a history of abuses. One or more BTIG employees screwed up. The HF abused BTIG, and the market, and admitted it. The SEC found that BTIG didn't push back hard enough when the HF lied.
4/n: FTDs? Most of the general public would say "no, it is "FTD" no s - you know... the flower thingy... with the prancing naked guy?" The 'general public' is not up on "Failure to Delivers" or "First to Defaults". But we can talk about those. The most recent 10 days reported
5/n: showed ~60,000 FTDs. Half <$15k. 93% for <US$1mm. The vast majority are simply B.O. laziness/screwups - The top 25 are 23 relatively liquid ETFs, TSLA, and a stock on the list for months because it has been taken over. The next 75? GOOG, SNAP, JNJ
6/n: lots more ETFs and some ADRs which obviously crossed from one party to another but didn't get created in time. Also some execs exercised options but the company didn't deliver.
Enforcement? You got me there. In some countries, FTDs are simply not tolerated. Period.
7/n: But back to short-selling abuses. WHAT short-selling abuses? Serious question. Does that mean a lot of people short it at the same time? If they say bad things about it while they are short is that "abuse"? If mgmt says they are lying, are the short-sellers abusive then?
8/n: Like Wirecard, Hanergy, Steinhoff?
If people say good things about stocks they own is that "long holding abuse." If they lie? And induce others to buy because of that lying? What if a bunch of people buy at the same time b/c they read an article, blog, or watched a YT vid?
9/n: $GME and $AMC have not been that. People buy stocks en masse because they like things about them. People sell and short sell certain stocks en masse because they think they are really bad businesses doomed to fail.
10/n: There is some HIGHLY informed research on social media. There is, however, FAR more ill-informed commentary and malign disinformation on social media.
As to the "public disgust and upheaval"... about the GFC, most of it will go away, some will shout at kids on their lawn.
11/n: [and some like Steve Bannon will decide to foment racist populist insurrection because his Dad lost money on AT&T and got upset].
But there was bitterness after 2000-2002, 1973-1974, 1969, 1949, 1942, 1934, 1918, 1915, 1907, 1903. Heck, 1881-1900 was Not A Fun Time.
12/n: I've been in the finance industry for 2+ decades and neither I nor well-meaning pros who have two decades on me have any great ideas on how to best apportion GFC "blame". Do you blame appraisers who over-appraised properties? RE agents who knew it was stupid? RE agents
13/n: who didn't? People who bought 3 properties on 100% LT"V" no doc option ARMs expecting to sell before the re-rate? Politicians who encouraged lenders to make no-doc mortgages? Instos who begged to be able to buy packages of crap? Moody's & S&P who rated MBS using a model
14/n: which implied a national housing downturn wasn't possible?
Personally, I find most of FinTwit does not make fun of those with less training or experience. They make fun of those who have the experience who then say/do stupid stuff.
15/n: As to "something is rotten in these highly-shorted names" I would suggest...
a) 'highly-shorted-names' are a tiny fraction of the float available to buy in the market,
b) downside manipulation is MUCH harder than "the general public" thinks it is
c) every share shorted is
16/n: c) cont... bought by someone else.
d) short sellers know they are fair game for other participants. "Short squeeze" is a well-used term.
e) as is now obvious on some of these "highly shorted names", upside manipulation is a lot easier than people generally think it is.
17/n: If AMC and GME or any others of these rapidly-rising stocks with high short interest are examples of the well-meaning "general public" fighting back against dastardly short-seller abuse, that would seem to me to be extraordinarily short-sighted.
People forget that AMC
18/n: and GMC fell for a long time before 2020.
If a name has a lot of shorts, it isn't necessarily "abuse". If it falls and it has a lot of shorts, it isn't "abuse". If a member of the general public owns a stock which goes down, that doesn't make their counterpart "abusive".
Postscript: I am really interested and curious as to what short-selling abuses are out there. If people will supply tickers, I will try to come up with something.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Modelling the approximate "Blow Out Portfolio" of 9 blocks sold Friday.
Blue is the portfolio value if long-only (in USD mm).
Greenish is the portfolio vs a 100% NDX hedge (as of 31Dec19).
Red is 15 day realized EWMA (0.94) volatility.
Delta-neutral portfolio volatility (against NDX) was at the high end of its range (averaging 24+%ytd) AND the Basket performance vs NDX was super strong.
The long-only portfolio was up 62.4%ytd as of 19 Mar.
A delta-neutral (daily re-hedge vs NDX) was +61.4%ytd to 19 Mar.
The question is... were there warning signs?
The answer: Being blunt, yes.
A tech-y basket hedged delta-neutral to a tech-y index was up 61.4%ytd against 24.6% vol which annualises out to an information ratio which should boggle the mind (61.4% rtn in 78d - do the math).
I would have tried that recipe but I was in want of every single ingredient listed except for a slab of rump steak, an onion, and celery so my own version this even used balsamico + honey instead of treacle. The sauce was the sous vide juices, with a butter/wine reduction (syrah)
I read the Ark model on TSLA.
One thing one has to give them credit for is they aren’t shy about their assumptions.
After 11 yrs of car-making, they made 500k cars in 2020. The ‘bear case’ for 2025 is 5mm units. Assuming capacity grows 1mm cars a year from 2021-2025 that gets
them to their bear case of ~11mm cars on the road by end 2024 and 13mm on average in 2025.
The bear case assumes 40% of all Teslas sold will be on a human ride-hailing platform. That’s 5.4 million human-driven ride-hailing Teslas on the road in 2025.
The bull case is
of course, more aggressive at 10mm units sold in 2025, suggesting avg 22mm TSLAs on the road in 2025, 13.2mm of which are used for human-driven ride-hailing, and there is a 50% chance that 13.2mm is only 8.8mm with the *other* 13.2mm used as robotaxis.
Carson Block of @muddywatersre writing in the FT lays the blame of stonk gyrations like GameStop (sub $20 on 12 Jan, up 18-fold in 10 trading days) squarely on low rates and passive investing.
This is Hogwash, Blatherskite, Buncombe, and Taradiddle.
That fall into the close on Tesla is classic ‘big name inclusion trade unwind’ pattern - people say “let’s not leave it all for the close, just in case” and put their ‘sell ahead of the close vs sell at the close’ ratio higher than the buyers do.
Now I’ve jinxed that. 🤓
Closing cross on S&P funding trade was about 8-9% larger than the S&P Global model would have suggested (I had it a trifle larger than even that but indexers might trade the tail. If they trade the tail on both sides, they’re already screwed going into the weekend b/c TSLA AH up.
This is a take. The thread is worth reading for the take.
I expect it overstates things.
Couple of problems.
1) while vanna can drive moves, I expect it is more gamma curvature and density than vol (in real trader terms, vanna of one-week options is meaningless).
2) if this were the case, it would be the case for other stocks too, but TSLA did not have the highest realized volatility of S&P500 (or S&P+TSLA) for the 52wks to 13Nov announcement. It's #21. Sure airlines and oilcos and cruise companies were on the list. But banks are too.
3) What really drives that number - volatility - over time is volume, and volume is best understood by how much of a company's float is traded every day.
Every time someone buys/sells S&P500 and dealers/arbitrageurs have to buy/sell the shares, increasing intra-correlation