Paul Woodage's [@WW2TV] had a very nice video stream today with Kevin Hymel using information from his forthcoming book on Gen Patton.
This thread will expand on a piece of it regards Operation Huskey's friendly fire incident that killed 400 troops 1/
Operation Huskey's 2nd set of air drops resulted in 23 C-47 & C-53 troop carriers, & some gliders, being shot down with 400 US & UK paratroopers plus air crew aboard them. 2/ amcmuseum.org/history/a-very…
The friendly fire incident was due to the lack of a plan for centralized control of fleet and the just landed shore based anti-aircraft weapons.
The Report of Allied Force Airborne Board on Operation “HUSKY” is online (link) fold3.com/image/1/270149…
3/
These are pages 32, 33, & 34 of the 42 pages of "The Rpt of Allied Force Airborne Board on Op. “HUSKY” on Fold3.com.
Short form - The Allied Navies were given time, course & speed of the paradrop when agreed & they didn't pass the information on in time. 4/
Every single Allied invasion convoy the troop transport stream flew near shot at them.
This was a comment at the end of the report:
"C-in-C A.F.H.Q.
I am in general agreement with this report. To my opinion the operation as planned was not operationally sound. It involved
5/
...the troop carrier flying along some 35 miles of actual front. Even if it was physically possible for all the troops and ships to be duly warned, which is doubtful, any fire opened either by mistake or against any enemy aircraft would almost certainly be supported by all 6/
...troops within range — AA firing at night is infections and control almost impossible.
s/
A. Tedder"
Captain E.W. MacMillan, one of the fighter controllers in Operation Husky amphibious landing fleet, begged to differ. 7/
Captain E.W. MacMillan taught a USAAF course titled "Fighter Control and Aircraft Warning in Amphibious Operations" in January 1945 at the AAF School of Applied Tactics, AAF Tactical Center, Orlando, Florida.
This is the Gela Beachhead Fighter Control graphic for Operation Husky. The ships marked "Sector" are to act as Fighter Sectors. The Sector ships L to R were USS Biscayne, USS Samuel Chase and USS Ancon. The Flagship is USS Monrovia w/USAAF Air Defense Control Center. 9/
The graphic was created by Capt. MacMillan for his course. He was on the USS Monrovia the night when the 82nd Airborne Division was blown out of the sky.
Pretty much anything that could go wrong with communications did, at the worst possible time. 10/
But Capt. MacMillan's front line lesson learned as to the No. 1 factor in killing those paratroopers & air crew was the lack of a centralized amphibious anti-aircraft control authority.
The attached slide is the transcribed text from his JAN 1945 course. 11/
Capt. MacMillan explained later in his course that the Navy & Ground AA liaison officers were placed on USS Ancon for the Operation Avalanche landings at Salerno, Italy and fixed most of the friendly fire problems compared to Operation Husky.
This command set up was used at
12/
...Anzio, Normandy and Southern France.
None of these lessons learned from Europe made it to the USN in the Pacific. Much to it's regret when the Japanese kamikazes came calling.
/End
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
This is a thread on Normandy/Overlord airpower, signals & invasion stripes.
There was a neat post by @militaryhistori about D-Day to D+1 airpower talking about how many aircraft sorties the Allies racked & stacked over Normandy 6-7 June 1945.
This MAD sensor data can cue really powerful ground penetrating radars to determine the size of the underground voids associated with the traced electricity.
Then they can use AI to associate that with Hamas personnel movements in the
@TheDEWLine ...IDF version of Gorgon Stare wide angle video movement sensors to associate people with underground facilities.
This in turn cues Israeli Humint to get close to those people.
@sfrantzman@Jtruzmah The apples to apples comparison is the 2006 Lebanon War vs the 2021 Gaza war.
In 2006, after taking ~4000 rockets, Israel suffered 43 dead, 101 seriously wounded, ~ 1,300 who received 'light wounds' & the 2,770 who were treated for shock and anxiety.
Over 500 Israelis have been wounded in the 2021 Gaza fighting. However, applying the 1/12 ratio of seriously to lightly wounded in 2006 means ~42 were seriously wounded Israelis compared to 101 in 2006.
@mercoglianos Sal,
Ammo ships were specialized vessels.
And who "owned" shipping tonnage & ocean going vessels in WW2 is one of those not really looked at hard beyond institutional histories subjects.
The War Dept. used the War Shipping Administration as a beard for "their hulls."
@mercoglianos The War Department pre-war Army Transport Service (ATS) vessels were, under a 1941 reorganization, integrated into the Water Division of the US Army Transportation Corps. The Water Division operated a lot of coastal shipping crewed by the Coast Guard or foreign ships, only some
@mercoglianos of which were War Shipping Administration hulls.
MacArthur's SWPA was primarily operating with the British Admiralty and the Dutch to get hulls up to late 1943/Early 1944.
After a several weeks hiatus, this thread is revisiting the logistical disaster known as Operation Iceberg.
Specifically, it is looking at the planned versus executed beach clearance capability in the campaign. 1/
The opening tweet to this thread showed the "beach clearance standard narrative."
There was a lot more going on covering a much larger area of Okinawa and Ie Shima battle space.
The interactions between these beaches clearance supply capacity & operations is unexplored. 2/
This map is a big part of the unexamined beach clearance narrative. It is the map of the operations of the US Army 1st Engineer Special Brigade. One of the very few ETO units that made the trip to the Pacific and fought there as well. 3/
Regards US intelligence blind-spots Japanese air and sea power, the USN had a persistent & horrid weak spot on IJN radio-navigation.
Check this horrid bit of bureaucratic misdirection with Lorentz beams and IFF is from the USN NAVTECHJAP reports.
@CBI_PTO_History The navigation equipment throw away line about direction finding equipment refers to the Type 1 Air Mk III Direction Finder and Homing Device.
When you cross check with CINCPAC-5-45 "Japanese Radio Communications and Radio Intelligence" you find this...
* Course-indicator does not operate over great distances, has many defects. Appears that Japanese use this receiver in fighter aircraft to direct them to a rendezvous with enemy planes. Gear identical with that designed by Fairchild Aerial Camera Company. The antenna is