Thread by @RepRiggleman

As I’m reading the Senate Rules Report on #January6th I will tweet some observations.

I am struck by the statements in the early pages on bureaucratic incompetence, decision-making paralysis & inter-agency communications and intelligence breakdowns.

Free speech & actionable credible threats of violence are not mutually exclusive

It boggles the mind that an excuse for inaction from FBI and DHS is not being able to discern enough between speech and actionable intelligence... and blame the “intelligence community”. Hmm

FBI, DHS and USCP have their own authorities and intelligence shops. Look internally for blame. USCP should have the confidence, resources, capabilities & expertise to release their own intelligence bulletins/reports. Mobilizing resources should be contingent on that expertise.

How many are employed in the USCP Intelligence unit? What’s their comms plan for coordinating info and action? Are they under-resourced (my guess is they are). Sounds like the good old “rice bowl” paralysis and “afraid to make decisions” dance.

I’m interested in the breakdown on the timeline for Guard troop deployment & the lack of streamlined request comms paths for guard deployment. Seems like a cluster. Looks like a 30 minute window from workable request to SecDef authorization. Looking forward to breaking that down

Seeing “miscommunication and confusion” for Guard response operations in protecting the Capitol Complex is unacceptable and chilling. I would think streamlined comms and clear executable orders would be a priority for the most important political institutions in the US

Interestingly, the initial summary is what I thought it would be in some respects... but how does an intel shop not react with urgency when it is well within their authorities to do so? This is as much a fear & competence breakdown as it is a process breakdown. People are process

Not saying I’m a prophet but:

“The decentralized nature of intelligence resources led to vital information not being shared with senior USCP intelligence officials or USCP leadership.”

By the way, I know for a fact they had the intel... and weeks before. That’s why I’m angry.

My Goodness. Only 160 out of the 1,840 sworn officers are trained in advanced civil disturbance tactics and use of “hard”‘protective equipment.

That means only around 9% trained in advanced tactics for protecting 535 folks. 9 PERCENT

Priorities, resourcing & officer safety

I’m skipping forward a bit because this thread could go for days, but the lack of authority for USCP direct request for DCNG support is a foul

Amazing too that USCP (having intel in hand) on Jan 3-4 confirmed they did NOT need DCNG assistance. That pump should have been primed.

The comms breakdown between USCP, DCNG, SecDef & City officials is sadly fascinating. This breakdown, I humbly submit, is also attributable to a lack of advance mission planning through ignoring/diminishing intel & the authorities confusion & incompetence during preceding weeks

Let me add something here for authorities & coordination. If, indeed, the DOJ was the federal agency in charge of security preparations & did not coordinate a response, heads should roll. I wonder who designated the DOJ & if that is an established authority? More research for me

The reason I’m doing this real time & trying not to read ahead is that I wonder what the conclusions will be... same ole, same ole, I suppose... streamline comms, directed requests, resourcing, liaisons, coordination, training, QRF.. but shouldn’t DHS be the pivot? More research

So I went through all the conclusions... yep. Standard. But correct! As I look through resourcing, I’m going to try & find the % of intel to ops funding in the USCP’s $500M budget. It’s important in the data/tech age to have resourced intel shop

Authorities, comms and competence

The joint use of intel agencies & experts on a USCP board must happen—and a digital fusion center with agency liaisons. There is a lot of funding that could be re-appropriated. For example:

Why in the hell does the Architect of the Capitol (AOC) have a security force of 24 also?

I need a bourbon... now

I know many despise armchair quarterbacks... however, this is not armchair quarterbacking. A commission and findings such as these are a staple of the intelligence business and operation debriefs. This is a battle damage assessment (BDA).#January6thCommission is needed also

DHS I&A, FBI, USCP, DCNG & others should be comms constant on priority intel flow. The issues are based around what was there to collect, prioritize & analyze. I am attaching our Jan 9th @ncri_io report about 1/6. This was no false flag. Intel was there

networkcontagion.us/reports/assess…

Having “a wall of people” arriving at 1245pm & the pipe bomb report at about the same time-along with a vehicle discovered with a firearm and 11 Molotov cocktails is what I call “indicators”. 12:53 was initial breach. A QRF with clear chain of command should have mobilized then

I like to check footnotes when something catches my eye. (Yes, I like to see sourcing). Why would Newsweek be a source for when VP Pence gaveled in (footnote #81)? Why not CSPAN or official records from transcriber? Just very interesting. Maybe, I’m missing something here...

As I’m scouring timelines, it’s hard not to think of the USCP officers who were fighting for their lives during those times

It’s also stunning to see the lack of specific crisis comms from SAA & authorities to congressional staff & employees. This could have been so much worse

Words used against law enforcement: Nazis, Traitors, pawn of China, racial insults...

Far-right agitators, white nationalist groups & QAnon believers were the drivers for 1/6. Network analysis should be conducted on disinformation influencers as part of the #january6commission

140 law enforcement officers reported injuries during the attack.

Three officers lost their lives following the attack.

I know I’ve hit this topic but there was NO joint intel bulletin issued. Sund stated that there was a lack of intel indicating a coordinated attack

I would counter by saying there was a lack of communication, planning and competence between intel agency partners. Intel existed!

There was a Situational Information Report (SIR) emailed on 5 Jan at 6:52pm by the Norfolk field office (FBI)... an email alone or uploading to an intel DB is not sufficient. Call every minute. March your hind-parts down to your colleague’s office and kick the door down!

Looking at DHS I&A reporting, strategic reports are fine in some cases, but specifics for 1/6 were needed. It is quite telling that “DHS I&A never produced an intelligence product, bulletin or warning specific to the January 6th joint session of Congress.”

Congress was a target

The acting Under Secretary of DHS I&A, Melissa Smislova stated that it was unclear to her why consumers of I&A’s intel products “were not better prepared” for the attack. So here are some reasons general intel reports and documents are ignored: next thread...

1. I&A strategic intel products did not identify targets or dates

2. I&A reports are rubbish- no confidence

3. Product customers are not trained to ingest and analyze strategic reports

4. Distribution is spotty or ignored

5. Stove pipes create competing products

6. Incompetence/laziness/stupid

7. Improper priority on courses of action

8. Training deficiencies

9. Resource limitations

10. Mission creep/commander intent confusion.

Tomorrow I will pick up with USCP intel failures & possible internal stove pipes, title authorities and why professional analysis is so much harder than people think

I urge everyone to read the Senate Report yourselves, understanding that unconscious bias can slip in anywhere.

Thanks for reading and caring enough to be part of my tweet experiment on the 1/6 commission report. Tune in tomorrow!

Now where is that bourbon....??