Interesting set of responses to that question. The best answers note that inward mobility from the EU may not be in the national interest simply because the volume will be larger.
But that response raises further questions about the current government’s position.
1. The govt now accepts that it’s in UK national interest to have outward mobility for young people/creatives/business etc to 🇦🇺.
So it must follow that (absent a good reason) that the government accepts that it would also be in the national interest to have equivalent outward mobility to the EU (and even more so, given that many more can take advantage of it)?
2. So what is the “good reason” for the current government’s refusal even to entertain such a thing, with the EU?
3. If the answer to that is that our interest in outward mobility to the EU is outweighed by the costs of equivalent inward EU mobility, where is the economic analysis - or polling, if it’s a point about public opinion - to back that up?
(Critical to remember that we are talking about temporary/sectoral/limited mobility, *not* free movement).
4. Doesn’t the negotiation of a mobility chapter with 🇦🇺 show that the “we treat all immigration the same, no matter where it comes from” mantra is no longer government policy?

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More from @GeorgePeretzQC

18 Jun
This is an interesting talk. A few comments (they deserve an essay but I’ll do my best).
1. The thesis that the rule of law is a difficult concept that may be being over-extended has some force. But that may be because it’s being used to do jobs that in a mature constitution would have been properly articulated: such as the boundary between courts and legislature.
2. These claims are not alternatives: they can be (and are) both true. The U.K. executive in the 50s/60s had an extraordinary amount of power (Hailsham’s “elective dictatorship”). It was constrained by “good chaps” understandings of how that power would be used. Image
Read 15 tweets
18 Jun
Not obvious to me that this is a legally relevant consideration in imposing quarantine on return from an amber country on the double-vaccinated under *public health* powers. Image
The basis for imposing quarantine on a person under section 45F of the Public Health Act 1984 is that the requirement is for preventing danger to public health.
If quarantining P isn’t justified on the basis that (unless quarantined) P poses a danger to public health, then P can’t be quarantined: it’s irrelevant that it’s “not fair in many ways” that P isn’t subject to that obligation while others (who do pose that danger) are.
Read 5 tweets
16 Jun
A series of points on the Ireland/Northern Ireland Protocol.
1. It sets out binding obligations under international law - as an integral part of the Withdrawal Agreement.
2. It is also incorporated into U.K. law (s.7A of the EU Withdrawal Agreement). It binds the U.K. government as a matter of domestic law (subject to legislation clearly overriding it, which would be unlikely to clear the House of Lords).
Read 21 tweets
15 Jun
This would be a good quote for an exam question: are ministers more like bosses, or clients, of the civil service?
A good answer would focus on the civil service code and on Part 1 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.
In favour of “boss”: Ministers’ power to manage the CS; the requirement that the CS code “to carry out their duties for the assistance of the administration as it is duly constituted for the time being, whatever its political complexion.” (ss.3(1) and 7(2)).
Read 10 tweets
13 Jun
One under-discussed aspect of threats by the U.K. government to breach/ignore the I/NI Protocol: it needs to be remembered that non-compliance with the Protocol is also non-compliance with *domestic* U.K. law which the U.K. government has no *domestic* power to over-ride.
See s7A of the Withdrawal Act.
Subject to issues of standing (which are these days rarely decisive) the U.K. courts could be asked to make orders (declarations/injunctions) to restrain any government attempt to waive or legislate to remove Protocol obligations.
Read 8 tweets
11 Jun
I think it’s important to explain why this take by @Dominic2306 is wrong (particularly as the thread goes on to call for - unspecified - JR reforms, on the basis that this shows why JR is damaging to good government). (Long thread)
First, when reading his criticisms of the detailed procurement rules, remember that the judge actually found that (apart from the apparent bias issue) the government complied with those rules and was entitled to use the emergency procedures.
(Judgment here: see grounds 1 and 2 - paras 71-131.) drive.google.com/file/d/1zf_3NX…
Read 31 tweets

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