Not obvious to me that this is a legally relevant consideration in imposing quarantine on return from an amber country on the double-vaccinated under *public health* powers.
The basis for imposing quarantine on a person under section 45F of the Public Health Act 1984 is that the requirement is for preventing danger to public health.
If quarantining P isn’t justified on the basis that (unless quarantined) P poses a danger to public health, then P can’t be quarantined: it’s irrelevant that it’s “not fair in many ways” that P isn’t subject to that obligation while others (who do pose that danger) are.
(Typo in 2nd tweet: should be section 45B, though s45F is the general power to make breach of a s45B requirement an offence.)
Brings up a general point on “vaccine passports”: since the powers at issue all depend on danger to public health, if that danger is significant for the non-vaccinated but not significant for the vaccinated, it’s hard in law to justify not recognising that difference.
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1. The thesis that the rule of law is a difficult concept that may be being over-extended has some force. But that may be because it’s being used to do jobs that in a mature constitution would have been properly articulated: such as the boundary between courts and legislature.
2. These claims are not alternatives: they can be (and are) both true. The U.K. executive in the 50s/60s had an extraordinary amount of power (Hailsham’s “elective dictatorship”). It was constrained by “good chaps” understandings of how that power would be used.
Interesting set of responses to that question. The best answers note that inward mobility from the EU may not be in the national interest simply because the volume will be larger.
A series of points on the Ireland/Northern Ireland Protocol.
1. It sets out binding obligations under international law - as an integral part of the Withdrawal Agreement.
2. It is also incorporated into U.K. law (s.7A of the EU Withdrawal Agreement). It binds the U.K. government as a matter of domestic law (subject to legislation clearly overriding it, which would be unlikely to clear the House of Lords).
A good answer would focus on the civil service code and on Part 1 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.
In favour of “boss”: Ministers’ power to manage the CS; the requirement that the CS code “to carry out their duties for the assistance of the administration as it is duly constituted for the time being, whatever its political complexion.” (ss.3(1) and 7(2)).
One under-discussed aspect of threats by the U.K. government to breach/ignore the I/NI Protocol: it needs to be remembered that non-compliance with the Protocol is also non-compliance with *domestic* U.K. law which the U.K. government has no *domestic* power to over-ride.
See s7A of the Withdrawal Act.
Subject to issues of standing (which are these days rarely decisive) the U.K. courts could be asked to make orders (declarations/injunctions) to restrain any government attempt to waive or legislate to remove Protocol obligations.
I think it’s important to explain why this take by @Dominic2306 is wrong (particularly as the thread goes on to call for - unspecified - JR reforms, on the basis that this shows why JR is damaging to good government). (Long thread)
First, when reading his criticisms of the detailed procurement rules, remember that the judge actually found that (apart from the apparent bias issue) the government complied with those rules and was entitled to use the emergency procedures.