Fischer's analogy to Cold War 1.0 is a red herring. The threat which the Chinese Communist Party poses to peace within and outside 🇨🇳 can not be directly compared to the former USSR. It is a different kettle of fish. What I find worrisome is how Fischer misrepresents the CCP /2
Fischer describes 🇨🇳 as "a market economy under Leninist auspices". This "hybrid character" supposedly explains China's "success story" and its ability to overtake the 🇺🇸 technologically and economically by 2030. The many costs of China's political system do not feature at all /3
Fischer seems unaware of the increasingly predatory nature of the Chinese party-state, with rampant rent seeking and systemic corruption in state & society; business; food industry; education; health care; journalism etc. Neither does me mention Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Taiwan /4
But Fischer does not concern himself with the way China is governed. He views 🇨🇳 exclusively through the prism of US-China great power rivalry. He ridicules any attempts to either change or contain CCP-led China and suggests unconditional cooperation as a simplistic solution /5
Fischer justifies unconditional China engagement with reference to climate change & pandemic mitigation. China's over-reliance on and investment in coal isn't mentioned, neither does he seem concerned about the initial cover-up of Covid-19 in Wuhan. He is completely uncritical /6
Fischer could have discussed the systemic competition between democracies & autocracies independently from US-China great power rivalry. This would have required him to critically assess the relationship between 🇩🇪 and 🇨🇳. But he does not comment on this crucial relationship /7
Fischer's silence on Sino-German relations is odd. While he mentions "economic dependencies" on China's market he fails to offer remedies. But doesn't Made in China 2025 directly challenge 🇩🇪's Industry 4.0? Doesn't Covid-19 show the weakness of global supply chains? @Der_BDI /8
And what are Fischer's views on the Chinese Communist Party's hybrid interference in 🇩🇪? What we are witnessing is what Mikael Wigell @MWigell calls a "'wedge strategy' (...) a policy of dividing a target country or coalition, thereby weakening its
counterbalancing potential" /9
We can already see that the CCP's globalised censorship regime leads to self-censorship. 🇩🇪 culture, academia, media & publishing (the CAMP sectors) are all vulnerable to hybrid interference by state and non-state actors under CCP control. Is Fischer unaware of these threats? /10
Former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer has a special responsibility to inform the public about threats to our democratic system. His op-ed in @China_table is not only ill-informed but also obfuscates the challenge at hand. This undermines our #democratic#deterrence /11
In my @china_table op-ed from 6 April 2021 I argued for a paradigm shift in German China policy (see Twitter 🧵 below). In the following I will add specific policy recommendation for Germany's economic and political relationship with CCP-led China /12
To reduce 🇩🇪 dependency on 🇨🇳's market we need partial decoupling and reshoring of key industries, e.g. pharmaceutical manufacturing. German companies in key sectors like education, health, energy, water, transport & communication should be protected from Chinese takeovers /13
And to dissuade the Chinese Communist Party's hybrid interference in Germany we should heed the advice by @MWigell and develop "counter-measures against the hybrid influencing toolbox of clandestine diplomacy, geo-economics and disinformation" /14 fiia.fi/en/publication…
As @MWigell rightly points out "liberal democratic values (...) can be turned into strengths and tools for a credible deterrence response against hybrid aggressors, all the while making our Western democracies more robust and resilient." /15
Wigell recommends a two-pronged democratic deterrence strategy which relies on "deterrence by denial: improving democratic resilience" and "deterrence by punishment: discovering democratic compellence". They both require a whole-of-society approach & the drawing of red lines /16
Let me conclude. Fischer's op-ed in @china_table is emblematic of the very superficial China discourse among members of Germany's political establishment, both past and present. His musings are also largely divorced from the real-world challenges we face with CCP-led China /End
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The Board of the German Association for Asian Studies (DGA) has published a new statement about the state of Asian studies in Germany. Their explicit commitment to #academicfreedom is welcome. But many problems with the DGA's approach remain /1
In the opening paragraph the DGA statement bemoans the supposed "return of dangerous stereotypical categorization patterns and woodcut-like world order models" without initially offering important context or country-specific examples /2
In the second paragraph, however, it becomes fairly clear that they are primarily concerned about the "power and system rivalry between the USA and the PR China" as well as "democratic backsliding / democratic regression in parts of Southeast Asia" /3
Have you ever wondered how the Chinese Communist Party's censorship regime works at home and abroad? What follows is a short thread 🧵 /1
The CCP's sharp power works with the help of the *simultaneous* use of carrots and sticks. In my book "The Struggle for Democracy in Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong" I called the carrots rule by bribery and the sticks rule by fear /2
A key instrument is the psychological warfare technique of ‘decomposition’ (Zersetzung) against domestic and international opponents of the regime /3
Whereas in March 2021 European Research Institute Directors roundly denounced the CCP's sanctions against @merics_eu Berthold Kuhn suggests that 'young scientists and business experts in particular are more likely to refrain from working with Merics' /2 statement-china-sanctions.vercel.app
While I welcome robust public debates about the logic & limits of Magnitsky sanctions I am dismayed that Berthold Kuhn's discussion of the Chinese Communist Party's sanctions against @merics_eu isn't prefaced with an unequivocal defence of #AcademicFreedom and #FreedomOfSpeech /3
My op-ed "The case for a paradigm shift in German China policy" has been published in @china_table. It is a response to @ESandschneider's critique of "China bashing" from 31 March 2021. What follows is a translation of my German-language article /1 table.media/china/2021/04/…
In my op-ed I argue that Sandschneider overlooks the totalitarian turn in China under Xi Jinping. His demands for dialogue and cooperation may sound plausible. However under the conditions of "Document No. 9" there can be no open-ended intercultural dialogue with China /2
When reading Sandschneider's op-ed I had a sense of déjà vu. In an article for APuZ in 2012 - at that time he was director of the German Council on Foreign Policy - he formulated a very similar criticism of a value-based German foreign policy /3 bpb.de/apuz/75784/deu…
“[The sanctions against Merics] should be taken into consideration by all the universities and think tanks that are co-financed by the Chinese state through Confucius Institutes or Chinese companies”
The Foreign Policy Coordinator of the European People's Party is right /1
“‘Academic freedom is for all or none,’ [Michael Gahler] said. ‘Those who engage in appeasement are also responsible.’”
I agree with Gahler. Universities will have to wean themselves off from Chinese party-state funding, as it induces self-censorship /2
We need to talk about Germany - again. Today a highly problematic essay by former German Council on Foreign Relations @dgapev director @ESandschneider was published in @china_table. This daily briefing is widely read among German professionals /1
In his article Sandschneider criticises what he calls a 'moralising foreign policy'; 'double standards' in US and European China policy, which are supposedly driven by geopolitical or economic concerns; and suggests that tensions in the Taiwan Strait are provoked by the USG /2
He criticises western Magnitsky sanctions against Chinese officials for 'blocking dialogue channels' and calls for 'silent diplomacy'. Whilst labelling attempts to 'manage China's rise' a form of 'megalomania', he nevertheless considers western China policy a 'management task' /3