OK, the OECD statement is out - and *now* it's clear why so many countries have expressed reservations. oecd.org/tax/beps/state…
Circulating beforehand were suggestions that in pillar 1, over 30% of the 'residual' profit could be apportioned to the sales jurisdiction.
No joy for lower-income countries (or anyone who favours a more ambitious move to curtail arm's length abuse): it's left at "20-30%".
Also floated, the idea that the review period could be reduced to less than 7 (SEVEN) years - just in case it turns out not to deliver anything for lower-income countries.
No joy: "review beginning 7 years after the agreement comes into force" - not even 7 years from now...
A little joy on nexus for smaller economies: "For smaller jurisdictions with GDP lower than 40 billion euros, the nexus will be set at 250 000 euros"
No joy: binding dispute mechanisms.
"In-scope MNEs will benefit from dispute prevention and resolution mechanisms... Disputes on whether issues may relate to Amount A will be solved in a mandatory and binding manner"
A small possibility to avoid this for some lower-income ctys
As assumed from 2019, carveouts for finance and extractives.
As for pillar 2... blimey. There's nothing here for lower-income countries. Rate stays as low as "at least 15%", and the STTR that potentially gives something to host countries is only in via multilateral instrument.
So proposal still likely gives >60% of revenues to G7.
*Many* reservations expressed but you'd never know:
"This document sets out the Statement which has been discussed in the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS. 130 member jurisdictions have agreed as of 1 July 2021. It is noted that not all IF members have joined as of today."
So, what does this mean? Where are we, and where do we go next?
For now, the US and the OECD have their way. The G20 is unlikely to blow this up on 9-10 July - after all, this is 'their' process in theory at least. And the arm twisting that got 130 'supporters' at IF is even more extreme at the G20...
So the Biden administration can push on with legislation, making the fair point that this won't disadvantage US multinationals. The major EU states can push on too (although a directive via unanimity may be difficult, given all the reservations already). And other G20 states too
It seems likely that this will, indeed, mark a major turning point against corporate tax abuse. The $1.38 trillion of profit shifting by the biggest multinationals alone is likely to start shrinking, *for the first time*.
This really matters.
But - the deal is weak, complex and deeply unfair; and it has only got to this point by the most aggressive, threatening behaviour that anyone can recall in international tax negotiations.
Can a global minimum tax really survive, if it gives so disproportionate a share of the revenue benefits to the richest headquarters countries?
And can the OECD maintain its position as a rich country club, setting the rules for everyone, when what it delivers is so unequal?
To force this through
by brute strength
during a global pandemic
when the need for revenue to support public health, and economic recovery, is greater than ever
when lower-income countries lose the greatest share of revenue to tax abuse
and the deal makes that inequality worse?
Fascinating and nuanced reaction from @ATAFtaxataftax.org/130-inclusive-…
Welcomes progress, notes on Amount A, "this does not seem like an equitable outcome" - and cautions it's "important that countries join because they want to join it & not because they have been coerced"(!)
The Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Tax (ICRICT) is... not impressed with the OECD. Not even a little bit:
India's response to the OECD Inclusive Framework statement is out - very interesting. Recall that India has been under enormous pressure, not least as a forthcoming G20 chair, not to rock the boat (e.g. by agreeing publicly with Argentina on the need for a much better deal)...
Recall too that OECD cut back the Inclusive Framework process so that, as we hear it, members were basically able yesterday to support (everything) or reject (everything). That meant that while many countries had expressed serious reservations in writing, they had to say 'yes'...
...and that allowed the OECD to announce 130 'supporting' countries, which the US emphasised as 90% of the world economy, leaving media to focus on the other 9 that openly refused - Ireland etc., but also genuine supporters of better, including Nigeria (kudos).
India's statement makes absolutely clear that, first, they do not think the OECD deal as it stands is ok; and second, that they expect significant changes before this is a done deal. (h/t @prabhakarks2017) pib.gov.in/PressReleseDet…
@prabhakarks2017 Take the five paragraphs of that statement one by one. The first says 'a majority supported the high-level statement' - but also, and more importantly, emphasises that it was only on the *outline* of a solution. Nothing more.
@prabhakarks2017 The second paragraph explains the proposal - but makes clear the Indian interest in each by specifying elements, namely the extent of reallocation to market jurisdictions under pillar 1, and the scope of the subject to tax rule under pillar 2. Pointed.
@prabhakarks2017 The remaining text gives the lie to the OECD's "130 countries signed up to our solution". As far as India is concerned, we are very far from a deal - and the key elements that 'remain open' are those that would deliver a less unfair share of the benefits to lower-income countries
The fact that a group of G20 and other IF countries chose to support the process continuing, sometimes under huge diplomatic pressure, should not be misread as the OECD having obtained a consensus on the current, deeply unfair proposals.
Fascinating - both that ATAF is empowered to table its own proposal, following discussions with the US rather than the OECD, and also the detail: pointing towards a comprehensive apportionment of global profits of large multinationals...
Thinking more about @ATAFtax proposal, it seems highly significant. It returns to the spirit of G24 proposal which Inclusive Framework backed in early 2019 for OECD to evaluate (as 1 of 3). It was never evaluated, just discarded in favour of the secretariat's 'unified' proposal.
This new iteration creates a problem for the OECD, and for the G7 members who drive decisions there. It has become evident, again, that others are simply ignored. But the others are no longer standing quietly by...
As frustrated members made clear in 2020, the OECD Inclusive Framework does not make the decisions in the corporate tax negotiations they nominally lead, and nor even is it the G20 that gave the OECD the mandate - it is (still) the G7.
So where do they stand on Biden's 21% plan?
There are two important elements to this. First, do countries support a 21% minimum corporate tax rate? And second, do they support a fair distribution of the right to tax the undertaxed profits?
Starting with the US: safe to say, Biden administration supports Biden plan. That includes the 21% minimum rate; and at least opens the door to a distribution that doesn't give first bite at revenues to the headquarters country (hence GILTI/BEAT reforms). taxjustice.net/2021/04/08/300…
It is *very* difficult to understand why so much effort is being made to keep the Irish government onside in the OECD talks. If the talks deliver, the business model is bust - and the government's focus should be on finding a better future that doesn't rob others of revenues.
Ireland imposes large revenue costs on others - we estimate this one jurisdiction accounts for some 3.7% of the global losses due to tax abuse. iff.taxjustice.net/#/profile/IRL
As OECD negotiation on 'pillar 1' seem to be moving towards Biden administration's proposal that would not require global treaty change; and 'pillar 2' would be a coalition of the willing on a minimum tax rate - there'd no longer be an opportunity for Ireland or others to block.
This is quite something. The French government's position on the EU move to public country by country reporting for multinational companies, a key measure to curb profit shifting abuses, appears to have been captured entirely by... the business lobby.
The French government's two-pager on its negotiating position - its critical demands - has been leaked. According to the scoop in @Contexte, the metadata of the pdf reveal the hand not of diplomats or ministers, but of a senior employee of MEDEF - the French business lobby group.
This revelation gives us two things: first, we can look at the position that MEDEF has convinced the French government to take up, and see the priorities of the lobbyists; and second, we can understand a bit more the wider French government position on tax, including at the OECD.
It has long been something of a mystery why the OECD secretariat pushed 12.5% in the 'pillar 2' discussions.
One theory went like this.
The secretariat were committed, or saw the commitment of some major member states, to keep pillars 1 and 2 together. But pillar 1 (as the secretariat proposed it) needed treaty change, meaning Ireland etc could block. So to minimise that risk, pillar 2 had to be 'acceptable'...