- Denmark's off the ball movement crucial in the final third
- Czech Republic lack central passing options in the middle to final third
- How Denmark exploits Czech Republic's poor press
When #DEN get into the final third, their front three occupy the central defenders, while the wingbacks force the #CZE fullbacks to mark them.
The Danish forwards would drop from the forward lines into the middle third to drag their man markers out of position.
Damsgaard for #DEN in this example drops deeper, dragging Celustka with him.
This creates space for Dolberg to run into, while also pulling Kalas out of position.
Now that the back line is shifting, Braithwaite can attack space left behind defenders following their markers.
The #CZE would press with a front three so that they could go man for man against the #DEN central defenders.
Denmark would counter this by abandoning their tactic of playing out from the back and choose to kick it into the wide areas where they have created 1v1s or 2v1s.
Denmark are more than capable of playing out from the back. However, they're also able to rely on the individual qualities of their players, like Maehle, Wass, and Damsgaard, to win their 1v1 and 2v1 duels.
The #CZE lacked much width at times. An overreliance on Coufal, who albeit had a great game, was obvious for all to see. With no central passing options, Coufal struggled to make use of the space in the wide areas.
Centrally, #DEN could shield the the Czech forward players.
The #CZE were able to score quickly after the second half began, but it was largely due to a change in personnel shocking #DEN . Afterwards, Denmark settled & were able to remain calm in defense.
With no players to link play between defense & attack, chance creation is minimal.
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🔴If can't defend - do not just sit back and expect numbers to work in your favour
🔴England press reset button at half time and go for the jugular
🔴Gareth's faith in Kane - Justified!
Shevchenko turned what is a lightweight but proactive Ukrainian side into a low block 5-3-2 side. These players lacked the natural instincts and familiarity with the set up to make it work.
England had men who go inside and outside - Spain take notice of how to beat low block.
After the first goal, Walker did not get forward enough which did enable Ukraine to frustrate us in the first half as it allowed their defence to stay more compact.
Shame they failed to do this with the first goal..
- Verratti useless until Mancini's tactical change
- Belgium's pressing structure starts off strong but falls short
- Belgium thrived in transitions but nowhere else
Belgium would press in a sort of 3-4-1-2/3-5-2. This was done so that Italy could not play through the middle.
The emphasis was on shielding Jorginho or Verratti while having the front three still able to press the Italian "back three"
We've seen the Italian build up structure all tournament. The issue with Belgium's press is that KdB cannot be expected to shield Verratti & Jorginho, while tasked with pressing Bonucci.
KdB was overworked when pressing, leading to a failed press.
🔴No inverted wingers for Spain backfired
🔴Swiss played brilliantly with 10 men (4-4-1)
🔴Morata isolated (Pedri too deep)
🔴'Poor' Torres - Do not want at United
Despite Sarabia impacting the side from RW, Enrique deployed him at LW, in an effort to stretch the Swiss backline.
I can see the thinking but a hybrid would ensure there is more inside and outside threat. Morata isolated.
Spain looked unstable at the back. Their high line is suicidal as 3 out of the back 5 are ancient so struggle with negative transitions and Pau Torres is immobile.
Only Laporte looks comfortable but they need to drop off quicker or have a lower line if facing better sides.
🔴Enhances the right flank? yes to a degree...
🔴Freedom to roam (is AWB a good fit?)
🔴Likes to switch flanks...
🔴What formation/signings will maximise his potential?
Pre Sancho signing, United have really struggled down the right hand side. At one stage they even put Rashford there but he did not look happy at having to vacate his favoured left sided role.
Greenwood and Mata, came inside often and AWB did not bomb on enough...
Sancho when he does stay out on the right, can drive at men and beat them in all manner of ways (drop of shoulder, skills, quick one two and get in behind). Therefore he will definitely improve the flank.
However as he has evolved as a player, he drifts away from this flank...
🔴Sterling a world-class talent when in the mood
🔴3-4-3 pinned the Germans back
🔴Low's leaky backline bites again
🔴Grealish Game-Changer
🔴Back 5 helped English midfield (options)
Starting lineup thoughts, the Saka decision was brave and the correct one as he can penetrate space inside and outside. Perfect for a counter attack set up.
Abit too perfect as its effectiveness ended up pushing the Germans back...
As we can see the beauty of the 3-4-3 is that by matching the German formation, England went man for man and the Germans were forced to match them.
This freed up Saka and Sterling from double marking and they were dangerous in the 1st half. Germany got caught out several times.
Key points:
- Lack of width from France
- Switzerland bully Lenglet and Varane
- Rabiot is not a defender; barely a midfielder
- Both sides style of play is a reflection of their mentality
To accommodate Rabiot filling in at LWB, #FRA had to adjust their defensive structure.
They started in a back five but would have the ball sided wingback press the player in possession, joining the midfield line, forming a 4-4-2 as #SUI are forced to go backwards.
In doing this, #FRA give #SUI time to switch to the opposite flank, isolating the French central defenders as they change positions, making crosses into the box easy... as we saw.