🟥MEV negative externalities🟥
This Polygon bot has been active since June 29th & has sent ~2m transactions, failing *almost* all the time

These failures cost close to nothing but bloat the state, while the few successes pay for the failures many times over Image
Success transaction:
polygonscan.com/tx/0xfc3d1b688…

One of the many failures: polygonscan.com/tx/0x989a72bce…
The tricky thing for this bot is it needs to land right behind another user's tx to succeed

Since it can't express those ordering preferences and because the costs of a transaction are so low, it chooses to spam the network with transactions and hope one lands in the right place
It performs a check of the reserves of a Quickswap/Sushiswap pair to ensure it has landed in the right place. Otherwise it cancels itself to save gas. That's why this bot has so many txs that do nothing!

But these consume gas & take up space while adding nothing to the chain.
As others (@shegenerates, @_marcinja) are noting in the replies MEV-Geth would help reduce the negative externalities of MEV extraction here by moving the auction for blockspace/ordering off-chain and keeping wasted chain space like the above off-chain.
To clarify a bit here by failures I meant transactions that failed to land where they wanted, but didn't revert because of a check in contract for that ordering.

Also should have said wasted block space, not state.

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More from @bertcmiller

7 Jul
All 8 transactions here - including some from unexpected places - are a part of one sandwich!

A thread on the increasingly complex sandwich bots we're seeing Image
A normal 🥪 bot looks like this

🥪 frontruns a user, buying the asset they intend to and increasing the price. The user gets less tokens now.

The user's buy is then included, pushing the price up more

🥪 sells after the user's tx at the higher price, thus capturing profit Image
🥪 bots will watch the mempool for users trading with high slippage that they can frontrun. Until recently 🥪 bots would only do this with one trade, and with the Uniswap v2 or Sushiswap router.

But they've leveled up.
Read 13 tweets
24 Jun
It's a golden age for searchers. Late enough that Flashbots and DeFi exists, but not so late that massive institutions are competing for MEV.
Even still the barrier to entry for the top strategies is getting higher very quickly. It's probably a few months of work to catch up to the best backrunning arb bots now.
It is funny to think about the early days of Flashbots when there was literally 1 market maker, 1 ESD bot, and 2 arb bots sending bundles. Unbelievably good opportunity to make money back then.
Read 4 tweets
22 Jun
Sorry everyone, long overdue, but its time for a new MEV thread

Today we look at the Flashbots auction and the searchers that were able to game it using a super clever exploit in how we priced and merged bundles

Let's go 👇🏻🧵
For our journey today you will need a deep knowledge of Flashbots bundles

Bundles are groups of transactions executed in the order they are provided. Either the entire bundle is executed, or none of it is

That allows users to express transaction preferences very granularly
For some time we could only support a single bundle per block, but recently Flashbots introduced the ability to merge independent bundles!

Here's a thread on that release
Read 17 tweets
9 Jun
A thread of all my MEV related threads in chronologic order 👇🏻
The first Uncle Bandit pulling off a multi-block heist and launching a new category of MEV strategies
Read 8 tweets
1 Jun
Yesterday Flashbots published MEV-SGX, our proposal for using secure enclaves to provide a private mempool and a sealed bid MEV auction.

Thread on how MEV-SGX works and why it matters 👇🏻
ethresear.ch/t/mev-sgx-a-se…
Flashbots' focus is to enable a permissionless, transparent, and fair ecosystem for MEV extraction.

To date we've made progress on this by releasing two products: Flashbots Alpha and MEV-Explore.
Flashbots Alpha is composed of MEV-Geth and MEV Relay

MEV-Geth is a client that allows users to communicate granular transaction order preferences through transaction "bundles"

MEV-Relay is a gateway that Flashbots runs today, for reasons we'll discuss below
Read 18 tweets
24 May
Today Flashbots releases v0.2 and introduces bundle merging. That means that Flashbots miners can now mine multiple bundles per block.

A thread digging into this huge release and what that means 👇🏻
Flashbots gives users a way to communicate their transaction ordering preferences to miners via "bundles."

Bundles are groups of transactions executed in the order they are provided. Either the entire bundle is executed, or none of it is.
Bundles are typically very sensitive to ordering: you don't want other transactions to come before you & make a transaction your bundle fail

How did we deal with that sensitivity? We limited bundles included to 1 per block placed at the top of the block
Read 15 tweets

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