"Today, the gravest threats to U.S. national security come not from foreign adversaries and strategic competitors but from extremists and domestic terrorists who are attempting to subvert American democracy in support of Donald Trump." I started writing— foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/07/uni…
on the 6th of January, while I was shaking with rage and shock in watching the news, and after frantic, obsessive revisions, published this piece the next day, six months ago. I wonder sometimes if this is the most important commentary I've ever written, or perhaps the only piece
of work that I've produced that truly matters. And I am no less frightened at present for the future of our democracy. I fear that we continue to fail to reckon with the forces that subvert our founding principles and institutions in ways that have caused lasting damage already
"Over the past four years, American strategy has concentrated on “great-power competition” as a priority. But from today we should be more concerned about great-power self-destruction... after such attempted sabotage of our democracy."
I'm still struck by the cognitive dissonance when we talk about national security in a manner that centers external threats from foreign adversaries, while failing to reckon with and often blind to harms and threats from systemic racism, far-right and white supremacist extremism
, and the normalization of tactics of voter suppression that are inherently undercut claims to be and attempts to build a true democracy. Arguably, these trends have only worsened in the past half-year and may yet worsen further in the months and years to come given recent events
and personally, I still struggle with the question of how to stay engaged civically, as a citizen, and as someone engaged in/with the endeavor of "national security," beyond donating what I can and volunteering when I have time, even while recognizing that's never nearly enough.
I don't know. Frankly, I've debated changing the focus of my life/work dramatically sometimes. For the time being, I hope there are ways those of us in this space can have positive impact in personal and professional capacities and remain engaged in these fights on several fronts
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We've just concluded three days of fantastic presentations and discussions in the course of the first U.S.-China Futures Summit (@YPFP_USCFP), which was the culmination of the work of series of task forces launched last summer. ypfp.org/u-s-china-futu…
Thanks so much to the @ypfp team, especially @joshuamarcuse! I've appreciated the opportunity to serve on the Steering Committee, along with @Ali_Wyne, @KKoleski, @chenniferann, and @1AlexanderTitus. I've learned so much from my colleagues and fellow participants along the way.
Our task forces tackled topics including geopolitical competition and international institutions, military-civil fusion and defense competition, technology governance, the bioeconomy, next-generation telecommunications, and opportunities to revitalize America going forward.
At Black Knight, @CyberGent_101 is an Incident Response Analyst. His proudest achievement so far has been leading a cloud security project from a threat hunting, forensics, and defensive standpoint. #ShareTheMicInCyber
In March 2020, @CyberGent_101 had the opportunity to speak at the SANS BlueTeam Summit hosted by @SANSDefense, where he presented a log analysis talk, entitled “Computer Love: Love Letters and Log Analysis.” #ShareTheMicInCyber
This is a good observation on the role of the PLA in China's diplomacy.
This is one of the more nuanced definitions and characterizations on MCF that I've seen in official American assessments that have been publicly released so far.
I am struggling to articulate a coherent response to this direction in American diplomacy, which is at once unsurprising and a continuation of recent trends, yet terribly consequential nonetheless. wsj.com/articles/secre…
First, there are indeed compelling reasons for intense concern about the actions, intentions, and objectives of the Chinese Communist Party, especially considering the trajectory on which the Party has taken China under the leadership of Xi Jinping.
I can recount the issues in play and at stake, but we're all familiar with the core concerns at this point.
I've been so stressed and overwhelmed all week I hadn't noticed my research on military-civil fusion (from an essay in @Strategy_Bridge) was quoted in this piece by @ewong and @julianbarnes yesterday. I wanted to share a few thoughts on this latest policy. nytimes.com/2020/05/28/us/…
By way of disclosure and/or background, I am among those who has argued for some time that the U.S. government should undertake targeted countermeasures in response to the threat of tech transfer that PRC plans and practices have presented for years. cnas.org/publications/c…
By "targeted," I mean precise and careful, responding to an accurate understanding of the near-term threat and long-term challenge, rather than ill-informed or indiscriminate, and ideally avoiding overreach or collateral damage to U.S. values and competitiveness in the process.
I don’t believe the likes of Steve Bannon ought to have any voice or platform in discussions of U.S. policy on China. His ties to the alt right and links to white supremacists are appalling and disgraceful, truly dangerous and un-American. thewirechina.com/2020/05/24/ste…
I can understand why @thewirechina team might choose to interview him, given the extent to which his views and impact in debates on U.S.-China relations have been noteworthy--and deeply damaging, in my opinion. But I was also troubled by how this Q&A was framed and featured.
In particular, I was troubled to see this profile posted without directly addressing his links to the alt right and promotion of intolerance and xenophobia. Instead, he's framed as more or less a 'China expert,' which could convey legitimacy beyond that his views ought to merit.