Reading the apocalyptic headlines in Lebanese newspapers today, one can reach certain clear conclusions. First, that the political class, starting with Hezbollah, has no clue about how to resolve Lebanon's escalating economic and financial problems.
The mode of operation in the past 31 years has been to resolve all problems by dividing the spoils among the political-financial-sectarian cartel and otherwise leaving all problems as they were, bringing in governments to keep this unsustainable system alive.
Now it has all gone tits up—a perfect storm of misery is hitting the country and nothing can contain it. The only ones trying are Western and Gulf countries and international financial institutions, but the idiots here are still paralyzed, fighting over control of a corpse.
Hezbollah, the most powerful political actor in the country, is perhaps best equipped to survive the maelstrom, but even then it offers nothing but more misery if it takes Lebanon into a confrontation with the West and the Arab world, especially the Gulf states.
The only way out is to secure an IMF loan to begin to think of emerging from this. But it's been a year and a half that the cartel has done nothing in this regard. It still refuses to give anything up, and its members have no mechanism to even bargain over mutual concessions.
Our president is semiconscious, if that; we have no prime minister, while the caretaker PM in office is the personification of uselessness; and the speaker of parliament merely wants to revive the previous elite arrangement by bringing Hariri back to power.
The only way out of this monumental mess is an explosion that forces the incompetent and useless cartel to accept that the game is up. They're resisting reform, but without reform they won't be able to control what happens, so widespread is the anger.
Does this mean reform is inevitable? Perhaps, but it may take time. The cartel will try to buy time and ultimately resolve this in the only way it knows—by bringing in one of its own as PM, to maintain control over the process and deal with international financial institutions.
Hezbollah would not be happy with such a direction, but there is little it can do. Even Iran has had to deal with the IMF, so Hezbollah will have to go along with it, because the alternatives the party offers are nonsensical and resolve absolutely nothing.
Will this shake Hezbollah's control over the system? That is already visible, as the party's remedy for the crisis has been to deal with matters in a Shia-specific context. Nasrallah's handle on the situation is at best tentative, each of his speeches showing his ineffectiveness.
Anyway, how can Hezbollah control a system when the system itself is collapsing? Its miscalculation in 2019 was a failure to understand that it could not protect the order in place that had robbed the country. Today its resistance agenda sounds out of touch and irrelevant.
While I remain optimistic that in the end Lebanon will have no choice but to deal with the IMF, in the interim there will be more suffering, more costly and ineffective patch-ups to buy time, causing rising tensions. This will only waste time, to no avail.
That the French, the U.S., and the Gulf states are the only ones bothering with Lebanon will show the Lebanese that there is no hope for the country if it isolates itself in the suicidal Axis of Resistance, which has brought only destruction and failure to the countries in it.
But Iran will not go away, nor will Hezbollah. However, the party has poisoned the well it drank from. It cannot impose order; it has no solution to Lebanon's problems; the only alternative is to find a new modus vivendi with what comes afterward. This may mean concessions.
The reality is that since the port explosion, Lebanon has become increasingly a shared enterprise. France, Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, even the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have all involved themselves in the country, watering down Iran's hegemony to an extent, or allowing this.
The army is the sole institution that retains national credibility and that can contain the possibility of chaos in the future, hence international aid for the institution. What the army gains, Hezbollah loses, regardless of what right-wing ideologues in the U.S. tell you.
Ultimately, it will be difficult for Lebanon to avoid change, and it will be difficult for Hezbollah to prevent change, if only because when it di so in 2019, it trapped itself and heightened the contradictions of the political cartel that are now causing its downfall.
The dynamics unleashed will not be smooth, and Hezbollah will try to hinder them. But even the Shia are tired and impoverished, as many benefited from the state. We're reaching a climax and one thing is certain: the postwar system is definitely transitioning to something else.

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More from @BeirutCalling

26 Jun
Reports are that Hariri will return tomorrow to Beirut. Given all the false starts, one hesitates to predict a cabinet soon, but Nasrallah’s speech yesterday and the fact that Bassil’s efforts to undermine the Berri initiative have floundered suggest this may be different.
Indeed, Bassil’s theatrics last Sunday were most likely designed to torpedo Berri’s efforts, precisely because they were nearing a positive conclusion and Bassil saw he could not get a blocking third. Hezbollah didn’t fall for it and in recent days shot down his protests.
They reportedly backed Hariri in his right to name a Christian; they did not accept Bassil’s effort to name the two remaining Christian ministers, saying this was tantamount to a blocking third; and they reaffirmed support for Berri’s plan.
Read 5 tweets
2 Mar
I'm wondering if the protests today across Lebanon are not only a natural reaction of people in distress, but also a concerted effort by the political leadership opposed to Aoun and Bassil to raise the pressure on them both to greenlight a new government: bit.ly/3dWfaEa
The sudden proliferation of protests across different geographical and sectarian areas makes me think that there is a political dimension as well here: Is this a new May 7, which brought down Rashid al-Solh's government in 1992? But this time directed against Aoun and Bassil?
Both Aoun and Bassil seem to believe, perhaps rightly, that if there is a Hariri-led government in which they don't have a blocking third, they will be marginalized by the other forces in it, particularly if Hariri prioritizes a partnership with the Shia parties.
Read 8 tweets
26 Feb
Saad Hariri, in his interview with Marcel Ghanem last October, signaled a radical change in his political approach, composed of two parts: First, a decision to base his domestic political strategy on a partnership with the main Shia parties, Hezbollah and Amal.
This he showed by denouncing his erstwhile allies Samir Geagea and Walid Joumblatt, who had spent months criticizing Hariri. He effectively told them that if he and the Shia parties agreed, Geagea and Joumblatt could follow if they wanted, but if they did not, tough luck.
Two days later Joumblatt shifted his position, realizing that he risked being isolated. Geagea didn't, but is today marginalized domestically, as if confirming that those who are aligned with Saudi Arabia in Lebanon are destined to write themselves out of the story politically.
Read 12 tweets
10 Feb
The deadlock in the Lebanese government-formation process may not be as permanent as it seems. The dilemma of Gebran Bassil shows why. Aoun's refusal to sign off on Hariri's cabinet is based on one aim and one desire:
The aim is for Aoun and Bassil not to be weakened in any new government; and this is tied to their desire for Bassil to succeed Aoun as president. The two feel the first can only come by having a blocking third. The second is more problematical.
The reason is that for Bassil to become president, he needs two things: Hezbollah's support, so the party can do for him what it did for Aoun in 2015-2016 and blackmail the political class into voting for him. And he needs to have resolved his problems with the U.S.
Read 6 tweets
15 Oct 20
It's not surprising that Aoun delayed parliamentary consultations a week. The reason is that Hariri was about to be named by the Future bloc, the Shia duo, Joumblatt, and their allies, with the FMP left out. Aoun bought Bassil an extra week to come to an arrangement with Hariri.
But Bassil is politically weak and his margin of maneuver with Hariri is narrow. Hezbollah's and Amal's denunciation of the negotiating team with Israel yesterday—a team selected by Aoun—was a further sign of deteriorating relations between Hezbollah and the Aounists.
It seems that Hezbollah will not torpedo Hariri's chances so as to save Bassil's political skin. Hariri can form a government with independent Christians and Franjieh, and his interview last week was a clear sign of his willingness to ignore the Christian parties' reservations.
Read 8 tweets
13 Oct 20
One very strong message came out of Saad al-Hariri's interview with MTV last week, namely that he was ready to make a deal with Hezbollah and Amal, and that his former allies could come along if they wanted to, but had no latitude to interrupt the process.
In other words if the Sunnis and Shia are in agreement, the minorities must go along. Even the FPM in this phase are mere adjuncts to the Shia duo, while the Lebanese Forces and Walid Jumblatt are on their own. That's why Walid effectively gave up on Geagea last night.
Suleiman Franjieh got the message and, today, announced that he would vote for Hariri in parliamentary consultations. He thus effectively becomes Hariri's favorite as president to succeed Aoun, at Gebran Bassil's expense: bit.ly/3iTslo4
Read 10 tweets

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