1/ The UN🇺🇳 & @_AfricanUnion🟩 have now both conducted "independent" assessments of how best to provide international support to #Somalia🇸🇴 after 2021. The 🇺🇳 team recommended continuing with a reconfigured @amisomsomalia, the AU🟩 team a hybrid AU-UN multidimensional mission.
2/ The AU🟩 team's envisaged AU-led-UN-hybrid mission (AU-UNMIS) would be 50% police (IPOs + FPUs), 35% military, 15% civilian personnel with expanded political powers for the head (Joint🇺🇳🟩 Special Representative). Overall personnel numbers r unspecified.
3/ The @AUC_PAPS appears to want the hybrid AU-UNMIS to be comprised of only #African personnel but financed💰 entirely by the UN's🇺🇳 assessed peacekeeping contributions. I was unclear about the logistics & mission support model the AU🟩 team envisage.
4/ The UN🇺🇳 assessment team also considered a future hybrid / joint AU-UN mission for #Somalia🇸🇴. But they rejected it as undesirable for the following reasons 👇
5/ The #Somali🇸🇴 Federal Government has also apparently rejected the AU🟩 team's report. This comes after the FGS not engaging with the AU assessment team until after the final draft was concluded.
6/ In Dec. 2020, the UN🇺🇳 team assessed 4 options for #PeaceOperations in #Somalia🇸🇴 post-2021
- A UN🇺🇳 stabilization operation (eg @UN_MINUSMA🇺🇳🇲🇱)
- A Joint AU-UN operation w an #African identity
- An ad hoc regional coalition (eg #G5SahelJF)
- A reconfigured @amisomsomalia
7/ The UN🇺🇳 team recommended the last option: a continuation of #AMISOM but in reconfigured form with a new CONOPS, and with its principal focus being operational support for the #Somali🇸🇴 security forces (ie SNA, SPF, NISA).
8/ So with 2 different recommendations coming out of the UN🇺🇳 & AU🟩 review teams and the FGS rejecting the AU🟩 one, we'll wait and see what happens next. Also worth noting: the original UN🇺🇳 plan was for a single independent assessment not 2 separate ones.
9/ Whatever #PeaceOperation comes next, it will need answers to some big, tricky questions:
-What source(s) of financing?
-What mandate & force posture?
-What no. & type of personnel?
-What logistics & mission support model?
-What relationship to #Somali🇸🇴 security forces?
TBC...
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
1/ What military options are available if you’ve got a nasty insurgency attacking parts of your country & citizens? If you're, say, #Mozambique🇲🇿, it turns out the menu of potential options is quite large. Of course, they might not work but here’s the menu as I see it...
2/ In no particular order. Option 1: #Mozambique🇲🇿 could handle its insurgency alone with its own national security forces.
3/ Option 2: #Mozambique🇲🇿 could supplement its national security forces with bilateral security force assistance #SFA programs from other states e.g. 🇺🇸🇫🇷🇵🇹 etc. Training, equipping, advising, maybe field mentoring etc.
1/ It's fair to say @UNPeacekeeping🇺🇳 is currently in a financial crisis caused largely but not solely by the 🇺🇸 Trump administration. Here's a thread explaining the state of play undocs.org/a/73/809
2/ First a caveat: the numbers fluctuate regularly so what follows are just snapshots. @UNPeacekeeping & its troop- & police-contributing countries (T/PCCs) are reimbursed after the fact. Here's an explainer of how it works via @ipinstGOtheglobalobservatory.org/2018/10/in-us-…
3/ When UN Member States don't pay their @UNPeacekeeping dues in full and on-time it hurts 1) T/PCCs; 2) mission effectiveness in the field; and 3) the reputation of the UN's🇺🇳 general effective system for financing #PeaceOperations.
3/ For information-environment context, photos of the damage caused by the mortar attack was already circulating on Twitter when @amisomsomalia posted its Tweet. Here’s an example: