I've recently been privileged to join in some fun discussions with @pseudoerasmus and @antonhowes on the path of British development. 1/7
Pseudo, following Robert Allen and E. A. Wrigley, has been strongly emphasizing his argument that autonomous development in British trade and manufacturing provoked productive responses by farmers, allowing for structural transformation. 2/7
Anton has made similar arguments in his blog, emphasizing the role of a growing London in promoting specialization by comparative advantage in the English countryside. 3/7 antonhowes.substack.com/p/age-of-inven…
I try to synthesize elements of this discussion against the contrary view (of O'Brien, Crafts, and Harley) that independent organizational/technical changes in agriculture (e.g. enclosure) were necessary to provide fuel and manpower for the cities. 4/7
I also argue that growing English towns, particularly London, drove up the prices of farm products relative to manufactured goods, encouraging farmers to make improvements and cultivate their lands more intensively. 5/7
Since slack labor, often employed in handicrafts, was common in the British countryside, resources already "within" agriculture could be redeployed to feed the cities, allowing the rural share of the population to decline (a la Weisdorf 2006). 6/7
This contribution is not at all definitive, but rather an attempt to put together a few thoughts in defense of their compelling and—in my view—quite probably correct theory of British development. 7/7
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Did Britain sacrifice the Industrial Revolution to defeat Napoleon? A thread: 1/
We've long known that growth during the classic IR of 1760-1820 was slow, and that major increases in real GDP per capita did not really occur until the early nineteenth century. 2/
What we're less sure about is why. One popular rationale—to which I largely subscribe—stressed inherent factors, such as the lag-times in technological adoption, development, and diffusion, or the inevitably slow rate at which the "modern" sector outgrows lagging sectors. 3/
A summary thread and musings on Allen and Wrigley's theory of early pre-industrial urbanization in Britain. 1/ #econhist#EconTwitter#twitterstorians
Most pre-industrial societies were caught in a devastating low-level equilibrium trap: they had small cities (in absolute and relative terms) and unproductive agriculture (low crop yields and labor efficiency). 2/
To expand the cities and get more labor into industry, farms needed to become more productive—e.g. investment, land use optimization, crop experimentation, etc. for raising yields. 3/
A classic view of British industrialization, dating back to Marx, holds that autonomous change in agriculture—enclosures, private property, large farms—increased worker productivity, supplying the growing cities with labor, food, and raw materials 2/
Crafts and Harley (2004), for example, find that French-style peasant farming would have had a significant "deindustrializing" effect by lowering urban employment.
The implication: capitalist farming permits city growth and explains British structural transformation. 3/
The Industrial Revolution was NOT caused by institutional reforms. A THREAD (and a newsletter): #econhist#EconTwitter
Acemoglu and Robinson, in *Why Nations Fail*, argue that the Glorious Revolution created "inclusive institutions" that started British industrialization. 1/4
Their claims are premised on the notion that Glorious Revolution made Parliament an open-access institution where wealth-holders could constrain the monarchy and protect their property rights.
They hold that this promoted investment and later enabled modern growth. 2/4
But that doesn't fit the facts. Parliament remained elite-dominated, there was no discontinuous change in property rights (which had been secure since the Middle Ages), and the merchants in Parliament used the body to enrich themselves. 3/4