In my first article for @CIMSEC, I discuss China’s growing fleet of autonomous undersea vehicles (AUVs) and what it means for the U.S. Navy and partners in the Indo-Pacific.
2/8 For years, U.S. and Chinese analysts have expected the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to face significant disadvantage in undersea and anti-submarine warfare.
RAND’s 2015 report "War with China" talks at length about "Chinese weakness in ASW.” rand.org/pubs/research_…
3/8 Gradual advances in policy (military-civil fusion) and technology (computer vision and battery tech) have birthed array of undersea vehicles designed to mitigate this gap.
By some estimates, in 2019, >150 UUV projects were under development at nearly 100 🇨🇳 institutes.
4/8 For one example, allow me to introduce the Haishen 6000 (海神, “Poseidon”), developed by the 701 Research Institute of China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation.
Weighing in at 3.5 tonnes (7.5m long), it is China's largest publicly known AUV, optimized for undersea recon.
5/8 Until now, the HSU001 was thought to be the largest AUV used by the PLA Navy. First unveiled at the 2019 military parade, its capabilities were covered extensively by PLA watchers and submarine analysts, including @CovertShores & @nktpnd. forbes.com/sites/hisutton…
6/8 But the Haishen 6000 is just one example of the sorts of large AUV models being developed by the Chinese defense industry. The big three players in this space are:
* Shenyang Institute of Automation
* Harbin Engineering University
* China State Shipbuilding Corporation
7/8 As a supplement to this article, I've compiled info on more than two dozen Chinese AUV systems, some never before reported in English.
They range in size and mission from portable reconnaissance units to large AUVs for anti-submarine warfare. docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d…
8/8 Many thanks to @CIMSEC for the opportunity to contribute this article to their series on emerging tech.
As always, my DMs are open for questions about the article.
2/6 The "20 million part-time trolls" in the report refers only to registered "network civilization volunteers" (网络文明志愿者) claimed by Communist Youth Leagues. There are other nationalists on the Chinese internet that are not organized by the Party/state.
3/6 Absent state support, yes, the folks who join CYLs and register to become volunteers probably would have made similarly combative posts anyway—but likely not as often, nor as well organized. Hard to play counterfactual, but Party organization and resourcing seem important.
In my latest for @ChinaBriefJT, I document how China's Communist Party raised an army of 22 million internet trolls—and how Beijing is wielding them as a weapon of foreign influence.
2/13 First we’ve got to talk about that number. It’s huge. Even larger than the 2 million trolls estimated in landmark 2013 & 2017 studies by @KingGary, @jenjpan, Margaret Roberts. How is this possible? gking.harvard.edu/50C
3/13 Well, the CCP runs a dual-track system of professionalized (paid) and “grassroots” (volunteer) internet trolls. This lets the Party harness and amplify the organic nationalism of some Chinese netizens while maintaining a loyal core, who handle "public opinion emergencies."
1. Step-by-step pseudo-refutation, attacking ethos, not substance.
The enumerated replies look like a bad high school debate flow chart. Take a look at this account, which constantly engaged in the same activity after the Skripal poisonings.
2. Specifically attacking one reporting team, ignoring the many other sources of information.
During the Skripal poisonings, the target was @bellingcat. For this Xinjiang reporting, it's @BBCNews; ASPI and @adrianzenz have likewise been scrutinized.
2/10 In our report for @CSETGeorgetown, we measured the relationships between elite 🇨🇳 universities and China's defense industry by looking at their Graduate Employment Quality Reports.
3/10 We looked at disaggregated employment data for 29 of 45 leading universities—China’s Double First Class universities + those administered by MIIT.
Our dataset reflects the career moves of 140,000 Chinese university graduates in 2019.
In my first article for @ChinaBriefJT, I mapped the budget of China's united front, the collection of organizations the CCP leverages to silence political opponents, persecute religious minorities, and acquire foreign tech.
(2/9) For years, Chinese diplomats have insisted that the united front is nothing more than a benign administrative bureaucracy and accused Western analysts of overhyping its role.
But the CCP's own public budget documents belie its claims about the UF's importance and function.
(3/9) For @ChinaBriefJT, I analyzed 160 budget reports from organizations involved in China's central and provincial united front systems.
The central 🇨🇳 government's UF spending exceeds $1.4 billion USD each year—and probably even surpasses the budget of @MFA_China.
This week @GeorgetownCSS we review foundational texts on Chinese strategic thinking -- Sun Tzu, Sun Bin, and others. But how heavily do these texts weigh on China's military, compared to, say, Clausewitz? Is there value in comparing 🇺🇸 and 🇨🇳 strategic culture in 2020? (1/6)
Eurocentrism in IR and security studies programs has penetrated global military thinking, in ways I don't think Western academics appreciate.
Why do we assume Sun Tzu matters more to China's (modern) strategic thought than Western military strategists? (2/6)
If you read through papers by Chinese military officers, it's clear Clausewitz is nearly as foundational for the PLA as he is for the U.S. services.
Still, these 123 academic papers might not be representative of broader Chinese military thinking (3/6):