2/6 The "20 million part-time trolls" in the report refers only to registered "network civilization volunteers" (网络文明志愿者) claimed by Communist Youth Leagues. There are other nationalists on the Chinese internet that are not organized by the Party/state.
3/6 Absent state support, yes, the folks who join CYLs and register to become volunteers probably would have made similarly combative posts anyway—but likely not as often, nor as well organized. Hard to play counterfactual, but Party organization and resourcing seem important.
4/6 The CCP has created a sprawling bureaucracy to organize volunteers, established minimum post quotas, formalized command & control (e.g. in Shandong), trains them in PR basics (public opinion actual combat drills), and supplies infrastructure to organize (sites like Wenming).
5/6 Recent reporting has also emphasized the role of CYLs in *starting* and sustaining boycotts against foreign firms and the attacks against Vicky Xu.
The state can in effect paint a bullseye on ideological opponents, and amplify resulting "organic" harassment against them.
6/6 While glib, I struggle to describe this as anything other than state-backed trolling.
That they are *volunteers* signals sticky intent, but CYL support shapes targeting & efficacy.
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In my latest for @ChinaBriefJT, I document how China's Communist Party raised an army of 22 million internet trolls—and how Beijing is wielding them as a weapon of foreign influence.
2/13 First we’ve got to talk about that number. It’s huge. Even larger than the 2 million trolls estimated in landmark 2013 & 2017 studies by @KingGary, @jenjpan, Margaret Roberts. How is this possible? gking.harvard.edu/50C
3/13 Well, the CCP runs a dual-track system of professionalized (paid) and “grassroots” (volunteer) internet trolls. This lets the Party harness and amplify the organic nationalism of some Chinese netizens while maintaining a loyal core, who handle "public opinion emergencies."
1. Step-by-step pseudo-refutation, attacking ethos, not substance.
The enumerated replies look like a bad high school debate flow chart. Take a look at this account, which constantly engaged in the same activity after the Skripal poisonings.
2. Specifically attacking one reporting team, ignoring the many other sources of information.
During the Skripal poisonings, the target was @bellingcat. For this Xinjiang reporting, it's @BBCNews; ASPI and @adrianzenz have likewise been scrutinized.
2/10 In our report for @CSETGeorgetown, we measured the relationships between elite 🇨🇳 universities and China's defense industry by looking at their Graduate Employment Quality Reports.
3/10 We looked at disaggregated employment data for 29 of 45 leading universities—China’s Double First Class universities + those administered by MIIT.
Our dataset reflects the career moves of 140,000 Chinese university graduates in 2019.
In my first article for @ChinaBriefJT, I mapped the budget of China's united front, the collection of organizations the CCP leverages to silence political opponents, persecute religious minorities, and acquire foreign tech.
(2/9) For years, Chinese diplomats have insisted that the united front is nothing more than a benign administrative bureaucracy and accused Western analysts of overhyping its role.
But the CCP's own public budget documents belie its claims about the UF's importance and function.
(3/9) For @ChinaBriefJT, I analyzed 160 budget reports from organizations involved in China's central and provincial united front systems.
The central 🇨🇳 government's UF spending exceeds $1.4 billion USD each year—and probably even surpasses the budget of @MFA_China.
This week @GeorgetownCSS we review foundational texts on Chinese strategic thinking -- Sun Tzu, Sun Bin, and others. But how heavily do these texts weigh on China's military, compared to, say, Clausewitz? Is there value in comparing 🇺🇸 and 🇨🇳 strategic culture in 2020? (1/6)
Eurocentrism in IR and security studies programs has penetrated global military thinking, in ways I don't think Western academics appreciate.
Why do we assume Sun Tzu matters more to China's (modern) strategic thought than Western military strategists? (2/6)
If you read through papers by Chinese military officers, it's clear Clausewitz is nearly as foundational for the PLA as he is for the U.S. services.
Still, these 123 academic papers might not be representative of broader Chinese military thinking (3/6):
This summer, @CSETGeorgetown has been publishing a whirlwind of papers about #AI and China's efforts to acquire it. Some projects have been months or years in the making. In case you missed them, here's a roundup of data-driven analyses I'm proud to have contributed to:
2/ On the military side of things, we wanted to know how PLA officers and defense engineers envision using AI in future warfare. It turns out the PLA is facing major hurdles in AI development: limited access to data, workforce issues, and a dearth of GPUs: cset.georgetown.edu/research/chine…
3/ That dovetails nicely with a more fundamental question: How is data used in military applications of AI, and can we measure whether 🇺🇸 or 🇨🇳 has a "data advantage"? With @HsjChahal and @carrickflynn, we uncovered the messy reality: cset.georgetown.edu/research/messi…