Black and Hispanic households see their housing wealth grow less, contributing to the overall racial wealth gap substantially.
The large raw differences are mostly about differences in borrower characteristics, particularly about *place* of purchase.
The returns gap is 1) amplified by high leverage and 2) entirely concentrated in distressed sales (foreclosures and other sales arising out of delinquency).
Because distress sales arise from liquidity / cash flow shocks, this means that more volatile labor income increases foreclosure risk.
The paper therefore shows how the labor market, fed through the mortgage market, makes it hard to use housing to close the racial wealth gap.
The paper might therefore be called "the foreclosure crisis strikes back" because it's about how the foreclosure crisis, which hit black and brown communities particularly hard, also did long term damage by increasing the racial wealth gap.
Millions of people have had federal UI benefits cut off
Stated goal: speed the labor market recovery.
Is it working?
Tldr: Nope. Per person losing benefits, net employment changes by -0.14 to + 0.08. Uncertainty remains large.
What makes today special? BLS releases state employment data, so we can compare July employment in states that cut off benefits and states that did not.
The new data capture employment during the payroll period containing July 12. @pascaljnoel and @JoeVavra and I analyze.
First, we plot the change in employment by state, coloring each state by whether they terminated benefits
Tomorrow is jobs day and everyone wants to know how early cut off of pandemic benefits will affect employment
I can tell you the answer tonight... you won't learn anything tomorrow‼️
no state data are released ‼️
🧵 on evidence from 5 other data sources that *are* by state
TLDR: four data sources point to no significant/detectable effect, one data source finds a decrease in employment. issues with parallel trend assumptions and inference are plentiful though.
1) The BLS releases state-level employment estimates based on the establishment survey two weeks after the national numbers. For July data, have to wait until August 20. Analysis of the June state-level estimates is here. Looks like a noisy zero.
The plot above shows that for people who got regular UI in 2019, non-UI income falls at exactly the same time that UI kicks in (green line).
Regular UI in 2020 (orange line) income starts to fall four weeks before UI kicks in
PUA (blue) income starts to fall ten weeks before
There is also a smaller decline in income after UI receipt for the blue line. Two likely interpretations:
--PUA recipients account for smaller share of HH income
--some PUA recipients have already gone back to work by the time they finally get their benefits
Disincentive remains small even after job openings up
An overarching theme of the pandemic has been to view the supplements as responsible for the biggest problems (slow employment recovery, usually conservatives) and the biggest successes (rising wages at the bottom, usually liberals).
Our results are inconsistent with both views.
Instead, it makes sense to think of the effects of pandemic UI primarily as an ambitious anti-poverty policy. I can’t think of a time before when a country gave *full* insurance to earnings losses (examples welcome in the comments)