@USSpensions ploughed ahead with a valuation using market data from the peak of market turmoil in the first wave of COVID (31 March 2020), wiping billions off the value of the scheme's assets.
2. Extreme prudence and misguided risk-management
Not content with a COVID-affected valuation date, #USS reworked their discredited Test 1 and ramped up prudence much further than in previous valuations. medium.com/ussbriefs/how-…
3. Contribution rates
With a COVID-affected valuation and ramped up prudence, the rates @USSpensions say are required to keep benefits unchanged lose touch with reality, somewhere between 42% and 57% of salary (cf 26% before the 2018 dispute). This is a rip off, pure and simple.
Think the regulator might step in to prevent overcharging? I'm afraid not. They are happy to see DB priced out of reach if it leads to less benefit accrual and lower risk to the PPF, and seem happy to ignore one of their statutory objectives.
6. ... then decided it was easiest to cut your pension
When @USSpensions confirmed that they weren't minded to review their valuation, employers swiftly pivoted to benefit cuts, with proposals equivalent to a 21% hit to benefits and "no detriment" to employers.
7. A 2021 could solve the problem...
The 2020 valuation has occurred a year before a triennial valuation was necessary (the last one was in 2018). A 2021 valuation would show a huge recovery in assets (a +£14bn swing!), and should show a greatly improved position.
8. ... but employers aren't interested
@UniversitiesUK have not shown any interest in switching the valuation date, as preferring to cut benefits now rather than pay a step-up in contributions (21.1% to 23.7%) scheduled for this October as part of the 2018 valuation.
9. ... and @USSpensions have the gall to claim it wouldn't make a difference
#USS's assessment of the 2021 position is that while the deficit is vastly improved, the overall cost of maintaining the benefits would be similar to the 2020 costs. Their claims do not stand scrutiny.
10. @UCU tried to find a compromise position that members might tolerate for the short-term..
@UCU looked for a way to deal with the 2020 valuation at the JNC, drawing up proposals that prioritised the lower paid and would have seen employers pay more & members less.
11. ... but UUK pulled the rug from under UCU by withdrawing covenant support
@UniversitiesUK ensured that @UCU's proposals could not be put to the vote by saying they would withdraw commitments to the scheme that #USS claimed were necessary to bring the costs down.
12. The JNC chair broke the deadlock, voting with employers
With only @UniversitiesUK's proposals left on the table, the JNC chair had to choose between backing the employers and resorting to the cost-sharing default, which could have sent rates up to 57%. She chose the former.
13. Industrial action is a near certainty
Unless employers swiftly recognise the mistakes that @UniversitiesUK have made on their behalf and ask for the JNC decision to be revoked, you can bet your bottom dollar that @USSpensions members will stike to defend their pensions. END
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Let's talk about the non-existent 2021 valuation, that could have been invoked by @USSpensions as a solution to the crisis that the scheme and pre-92 HE sector is heading towards. (This is an overdue thread.) 1/
It is widely appreciated by the scheme's members that the 2020 valuation date of 31 March 2020 is right in the middle of a COVID-related dip in the markets (first-wave, locked-down, market chaos), and is one important factor in the huge £14-15bn deficit. 2/
At the valuation date, the scheme's assets had plummeted from around £73bn at the end of December 2019 to £66.5bn. By 31 March 2021 the assets had recovered to £80.6bn, and market conditions were widley seen as more 'normal'. (Most recent figure? £88bn) 3/
"Tired of your old Test 1? Always found the linakage too rigidly mechanical? Then welcome to the new, improved Metric A!" Or so the marketing spiel seems to go. But look below the surface and you'll find all the same logical flaws and a near identical ramping up of costs. 1/
I will try and keep this as accessible as possible, because #USS can't be allowed to bluff their way through this stuff. First, a recap. What was wrong with Test 1? 2/
There were a number of criticisms of Test 1, but the main one was that it unnecessarily drove up deficits and contribution rates based on a very flimsy premise (a "large and demonstrable mistake" in @MikeOtsuka's words). 2/ medium.com/@mikeotsuka/us…
Okay, time for that #USS update! This thread is going to take in as much of what's going on as possible. And that is *a lot*. I will try to be as concise as I can, but this could be a long one. Happy Easter break. 1/
Firstly, the #USS board has confirmed it is proceeding with the 2020 valuation using market data as at 31 March. It is hard to see how a meaningful assessment of the scheme's long-term health can be made as that date, but that's what we're going to have to try and do. 2/
There are some arguments in favour of proceeding: @TPRgovuk will issue guidance for schemes with a March 2020 valuation date which may allow more flexibility than normal, and "post-valuation experience" over the next 15 months can (and we're told will) be taken into account. 3/
I wrote a quick reaction to the 2020 methodology "discussion document" that #USS released yesterday, but I didn't go into detail on the claims I made. Allow me to do some of that in a thread now. 1/
There are three main problems I identified in #USS's document:
1. The dual-discount rate they illustrate is a very close match for their old methodology; 2. Test 1 has been replaced by Test 1 v2.0; 3. We are still hitting a brick wall when it comes to evidence.
2/
Let's start with the easy one: the dual discount rate that #USS is considering is (at best) equivalent to the 2018 valuation in terms of the calculation of liabilities. This is evident in Table 7.2 of the document (compare the deficits and TP discount rates in rows 1 and 2). 3/
The release of the Joint Expert Panel's second report and the clear resolve shown by @UCU members mean we are now in a strong position to make major changes to how #USS is managed. A future free from the intense acrimony of recent years is possible. We need to make it happen. 1/
In September, I wrote that it was essential we take a stand over #USS in order to shift the balance of power in the discussions. The resounding mandate and first wave of strike action have totally changed the dynamics of recent meetings. 2/ medium.com/ussbriefs/why-…
Our employers' representatives at @UniversitiesUK had, since May, tried to convince members and employers that #USS's 'Option 3' was the best possible outcome within the law, and in line with the recommendations from the JEP's first report. 3/
People have been asking me for more details on the 9 day delay I tweeted about yesterday. I'm very happy to oblige, as it illustrates very clearly what we've been up against, and why it's hard to see constructive progress being made on #USS while Bill Galvin is in post. 1/
This summer, a subgroup of the #USS JNC was set up to look at modelling of the fund to get a better understand of the risks the scheme is carrying. We've been asking for such information for years, but have struggled to get meaningful data and modelling out of #USS. 2/
After years of showing very little interest, @UniversitiesUK finally joined our calls for such a group to happen. (Credit goes to @Cambridge_Uni CFO Cambridge Anthony Odgers, who joined the UUK team in the spring and is the sole member of the group from UUK.) 3/